

AN EXAMINATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY'S PORTION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET REQUEST IN ORDER TO DETERMINE
IF IT HAS BEEN IN LINE WITH THE SPECIFIED PRIORITIES OF THE
CONGRESS FROM FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2001 THROUGH FY 2010

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fulfillment of the requirements for the
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General Studies

by
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

AN EXAMINATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY'S PORTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET REQUEST IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF IT HAS BEEN IN LINE WITH THE SPECIFIED PRIORITIES OF THE CONGRESS FROM FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2001 THROUGH FY 2010, by Shannon Wilson, 193 pages.

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ACRONYMS

DoD	Department of Defense
FY	Fiscal Year
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
P.L.	Public Law
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
R&D	Research and Development
RDT&E	Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
U.S.	United States
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study examined if the Department of the Army's portion of the Department of Defense (DoD) budget request was in line with the specified priorities of congress from Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 through FY 2010. In order to address the research question mentioned above the following sub-questions were raised in order to expand the scope of research:

1. When new priorities emerged, did the budget request respond?
2. Is there a correlation between a change in priorities and a change in budget?
3. What were the priorities set forth in the *National Security Strategy (NSS)*, the *National Defense Strategy (NDS)*, and the *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)*?
4. How much supplemental funding was appropriated to the Department of the Army for the period being studied?
5. How much did the Department of the Army's budget request change from FY 2001 through FY 2010?

Additionally, this study examined other viable sources of data in order to use deductive reasoning in creating and testing a hypothesis. Consideration was given to the following data:

1. Executive priorities (identified in the appropriate governing priority documents).
2. Changes in executive priorities and-or strategy from fiscal year to fiscal year.
3. Correlations between the executive branch and congressional priorities for the Department of the Army.

4. The magnitude of change for priorities between priority funding documents and from fiscal year to fiscal year.

Background

The purpose of this chapter is to provide context to the Department of the Army's portion of the DoD congressional budget request for FY 2001 through FY 2010. The process begins with the Department of the Army requesting funding through the DoDs congressional budget justification submission, which is transmitted to Congress as a part of the President's annual budget request.¹ Congress authorizes and appropriates budget toplines on a fiscal year basis, rather than by calendar year (January to December). A fiscal year starts October 1 and ends on September 30th.² All congressional budget requests are required to be submitted to Congress by February of each year, as mandated by law. Department and program budget requests are then either reduced, supplemented, or enacted "as is" through congressional authority.

On September 11, 2001, the United States (U.S.) was attacked by terrorists. The events of that fateful day forced the United States Government to immediately respond in defense of its people and national security interests, which led to military combat operations in two wars spanning over a decade. These operations had an immediate effect

¹Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular No. A-11, *Preparing Submitting, and Executing the Budget*, Section 15, "Basic Budget Laws" (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, August 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/a11_current_year/s15.pdf (accessed August 19, 2012), 1.

²Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular No. A-11, *Preparing Submitting, and Executing the Budget*, Section 20, "Terms and Concepts" (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, August 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/a11_current_year/s20.pdf (accessed August 19, 2012), 6.

on the Department of the Army's mission, priorities, and requirements as they had spent the previous several years in garrison and peacekeeping environments.

In order to assess the significance of the points mentioned above and any impacts, the Department of the Army's budget request was analyzed for FY 2001 through FY 2010 to determine if the appropriated resource levels were in line with congressional priorities and intent.

The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.³

As part of the nation's arm against terrorism, the Department of the Army increased its recruitment efforts, made the necessary doctrinal revisions, established new training requirements, and initiated large acquisition programs. and began to spearhead joint coalition efforts. Just as it has always been in past conflicts, department and program budget submissions quickly became an intricate process that Congress would use to extend its authority over military forces using budgetary means, and as an extension of politics. Similarly, the Department of the Army would use the budget request process as a way to obtain resources that would assist in more effectively conducting combat military operations, enhancing its ability and capabilities.

Per the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, all federal government organizations are required to submit a budget request that addresses

³U.S. Congress, Public Law 107-40, Section 2, "Authorization for Use of United States Armed Forces," 107th Cong., September 18, 2001, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ40/pdf/PLAW-107publ40.pdf> (accessed August 19, 2012).

efficiencies, seeks to advance program or project effectiveness, is results driven, and aligns with clearly defined strategic goals and objectives.⁴ The OMB also requires that all departments and programs submit budget requests that are expected to advance their agency's goals, as well as align with the specified presidential priorities⁵ outlined in the NSS and other appropriate priority documents as applicable. Additionally, all government organizations are required by OMB to:

1. Establish attainable goals.
2. Provide justification for additional funding.
3. Provide program and project description and purposes.
4. Provide projected funding costs.
5. Provide current and previous year program and project programmed budgets.
6. Develop metrics in which performance can be measured.
7. Must fully obligate and expend all appropriated funding for the purposes intended.⁶

⁴Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular No. A-11, *Preparing Submitting, and Executing the Budget*, Section 250, “Agency Priority Goals” (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, August 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/a11_current_year/s250.pdf (accessed August 19, 2012), 250-2.

⁵Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular No. A-11, Section 250, 2.

⁶Congressional Budget Office, *Budget Concepts and Budget Process* (Washington, DC: White House, June 18, 2010), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/concepts.pdf> (accessed August 19, 2012), 131.

Purpose

The research behind this study conducted quantitative, qualitative, and mixed method analysis, and identified any correlation aspects, outlying data, trends in determining if the Department of the Army's budget was a predictive model and magnitudes of change for the Department of the Army's budget. Through the integration of different data sets a hypothesis was developed. The relationship between changes in policy and changes in government were researched, as well as changes in congressional composition. Upon completion of the research and using deductive reasoning conclusions were drawn.

Assumptions

The assumptions for this thesis include:

1. That the Department of the Army's budget requests to DoD represents the best professional judgment of Army leaders in defining the resourcing level needed to accomplish the mission.
2. That the Department of the Army's requests for Overseas Contingency Operations or supplemental funding was to address significant shortfalls.

Definitions

The following terms will be used throughout this thesis:

Allocation is the money allotted to a government entity and available for obligation and expenditure.⁷

⁷Department of Defense, DoD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14R, *Summary of Major Changes to DoDFMR “Glossary”* (Washington, DC: White House,

Amendment is the reassessing and modifying of the President's budget request by the House and Senate Appropriation Committees prior to enactment.⁸

Apportionment is the process of funds being made available to government organizations via the OMB, as provided in appropriation bills, acts, and/or continuing resolutions passed by Congress.⁹

Appropriation is the process of government organizations being provided with the legal right to obligate and expend funding as provided by law through Congress.¹⁰

Budget is funding appropriated by Congress providing, obligating, and expending authority through the OMB in order to execute in coordination with the President's priorities.¹¹

Budget Authority is the legal authority to obligate appropriated funds, resulting in expenditures.¹²

Budgetary Resources are the resources available for obligation and expenditure during the fiscal year.¹³

December 2008), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/a11_current_year/s20.pdf (accessed August 19, 2012), iii.

⁸Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular No. A-11, *Preparing Submitting, and Executing the Budget*, Section 20, "Terms and Concepts" (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, August 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/a11_current_year/s20.pdf (accessed August 19, 2012), 3.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

Congressional Budget Justification Submission is the President's budget request submitted through OMB to Congress for justification and enactment.

Fiscal Year (FY) is the federal government funding cycle, which begins on October 1 and ends September 30th.¹⁴

Military Personnel Appropriation is funding designated for Active, Reserve, and National Guard personnel for the purposes of pay, allowances, subsistence, permanent changes in duty stations, and other military personnel costs.¹⁵

National Defense Strategy (NDS) is the Secretary of Defense's strategy that addresses how the DoD will assist in achieving the stated objectives and goals outlined in the NSS.¹⁶

National Security Strategy (NSS) is the President's strategy that identifies the nation's concerns, focuses, and priorities in support of national security, and is mandated by law (reference Public Law 99-433, October 1, 1986).¹⁷ It is mandated by law that the

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., 6.

¹⁵Department of Defense, DoD 7000R, *Financial Management Regulation*, Volume 2A, Chapter 2, "Military Personnel Appropriations" (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 2012), http://comptroller.defense.gov/fmr/current/02a/02a_02.pdf (accessed August 19, 2012), 2-3-2-4.

¹⁶Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 11, 2011), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (accessed August 19, 2012), xi.

¹⁷U.S. Congress, Public Law 99-433, Section 603, *Annual Report on National Security Strategy*, October 1, 1986, http://csis.org/images/stories/bgn/gnact_2.pdf (accessed August 19, 2012).

NSS accompany the President's budget request to congress, transmitting both a classified and unclassified version.¹⁸

Obligation is the legal authority to obligate funding, resulting in expenditures.¹⁹

Operation and Maintenance Appropriation is funding designated for operating and maintaining annual mission requirements for the purposes of Active, Reserve, and National Guard training, equipment, real property maintenance, minor construction, etc.²⁰

Overseas Contingency Operations—Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is additional funding appropriated by Congress for specific purposes.²¹ The OMB has disseminated guidance identifying funding that geographically supports combat or conducts combat operations to include Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other designated countries. This guidance also outlines specific criteria that must be met in order for funding to be categorized as Overseas Contingency Operations (e.g., the replacement of items not yet programmed for).²²

¹⁸U.S. Congress, Public Law 99-43.

¹⁹Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular No. A-11, 7.

²⁰DoD Financial Management Regulation, Volume 2A, DoD Comptroller, November 2012, <http://comptroller.defense.gov/fmr/02a/02aarch/CHAPTER03.PDF> (accessed August 19, 2012), 3-3-3-4.

²¹Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular No. A-11, 8.

²²Steven M. Kosiak, *OMB Guidance Memorandum*, “Criteria for War/Overseas Contingency Operations Funding Requests” (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, September 9, 2010), <http://asafm.army.mil/Documents/OfficeDocuments/Budget/Guidances//omb-gd.pdf> (accessed August 19, 2012).

Procurement Appropriation is funding designated for large acquisitions for the purposes of multi-year procurement, and time-phased requirements.²³

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is the strategic document that establishes defense policy goals, force structure, capabilities, modernization, budget plans, and plans in addressing challenges. The *QDR* is prepared by the Secretary of Defense every four years or in a year that there is a newly elected Presidential Administration, and is mandated by law (reference Public Law 104-201—September 23, 1996).²⁴

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) Appropriation is funding designated for investment cost for basic research, applied research, advanced technology development, advance component development and prototypes, system development and demonstration, management support, and operational system development.²⁵

Reduction in Budgetary Resources is the process of Congress eliminating or reducing resources.²⁶

Supplemental Appropriation is the process of Congress providing additional funding separate from appropriated funding.²⁷

²³DoD Financial Management Regulation, Volume 2A, Chapter 3, DoD Comptroller, November 2012, http://comptroller.defense.gov/fmr/02b/02barch/02b_04old.pdf (accessed August 19, 2012), 4-1–4-2.

²⁴U.S. Congress, Public Law 104-201, Section 923, “Quadrennial Defense Review,” September 23, 1996, <http://www.nps.gov/legal/laws/104th/104-201.pdf> (accessed August 19, 2012).

²⁵Department of Defense, DoD Financial Management Regulation, Volume 2B, Chapter 5, “Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Appropriations, DoD Comptroller,” November 2012, <http://comptroller.defense.gov/fmr/archive/02barch/CHAPTER05.PDF> (accessed September 5, 2012), 5-1 to 5-3.

²⁶Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular No. A-11, 9.

Scope

This study examined the Department of the Army's portion of the DoD congressional budget request, appropriated budget levels, and any relationships that existed. Due to the scope of information available for examination, the focus for this thesis was narrowed. Only the Army's budget requests and appropriated funding for FY 2001 through FY 2010 and the following appropriations was examined for the quantitative analysis: (1) Military Personnel, Operation, and Maintenance, (2) Procurement, (3) Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, (4) Overseas Contingency Operations, and (5) Supplemental.

Additionally, for the qualitative analysis, this study only examined the following priority documents (applicable to the period being evaluated): the *National Security Strategy*, *National Defense Strategy*, and the *Quadrennial Defense Review*.

Of note, the priorities examined were not all inclusive to the governing priority documents outlined above due to time and the scope of information available. The mixed methods analysis examined all of the above mentioned sources of data as well. Additional information was considered for examination in this study based on when the data was made available and applicability to the thesis.

Due to the complexity of the data and the amount available a high-level analysis was conducted, understanding that a comprehensive analysis was required, and therein laid the rationale on why only specific data was reviewed. There was a large amount of

²⁷Ibid., 9.

data that could have been reviewed at detailed levels, but this type of analysis would have proven too broad for the intent of this thesis.

Limitations

Anticipated limitations were identified prior to conducting the examination. The estimated time available, research requirements, and other constraints limited the amount of research gathered and analyzed in support of this thesis. Limited access to the Department of the Army's budget systems, raw data, and historical reports inhibited the ability to collect detailed information. For the reasons mentioned above, it would have been difficult to determine if the findings of the research would be impacted by the limitations stated.

Delimitations

The Department of the Army's portion of the DoD's budget requests for FY 2001 through FY 2010 was considered to be too broad to analyze in their entirety. Therefore, this study focused on the request and appropriated budget levels for: (1) Military Personnel, (2) Operations and Maintenance, (3) Procurement, (4) Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, (5) Supplemental, and (6) Overseas Contingency Operations.

Additionally, due to time constraints of this study only specific data was reviewed. This study examined the following: (1) The Department of the Army's budget request, (2) the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, (3) the *National Security Strategy*, (4) the *National Defense Strategy*, and (5) the appropriate legislative documents.

Significance of the Study

This study examined if the Department of the Army's portion of the DoD budget request was in line with the specified congressional priorities. The importance of this study is to provide specific information to those with a vested interest in the Department of the Army's request and appropriated budgets, to include the American taxpayer, the OMB, and congressional committees charged with oversight. For the purposes of this study, a historical analysis was conducted, identifying how the Department of the Army's previous budget requests compared to its appropriated funding levels for FY 2001 through FY 2010.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the documents and information examined in support of the thesis. The literature that was used in this study provided a historical context as it related to the stated thesis by identifying relationships, determining trends, and discovering if there were any gaps or lags in information. All of the literature examined were considered viable, and included government publications, federal reports, department funding requests, and applicable legislative documents. The following sources were utilized in conducting research for the stated thesis, and provided direct evidence in support of the study.

Department of the Army's Portion of the DoD Budget Request

The DoD's congressional budget requests for FY 2001 through FY 2010 were examined for a comprehensive understanding of the Department of the Army's budget request, budget requirements, and overall priorities for each fiscal year. The DoD's congressional budget requests are submitted to the executive branch, through the OMB, for coordination and approval as directed by the Budget and Accounting Act.²⁸ According to Chapter 11, Title 31, U.S. Code, all agencies are required to submit budget requests to Congress no later than the first Monday in February, providing a summary of requirements as well as supporting information.²⁹

²⁸Ibid., 1.

²⁹Ibid.

National Security Strategy

This is the President's strategy document that outlines national priorities in support of national security, and is mandated by law (reference Public Law 99-433, October 1, 1986).³⁰ The law also requires that the NSS accompany the President's budget request to Congress, and it should include both a classified and unclassified version.³¹ The 2001 NSS was published during the Bush Administration and covered international strategy, deterring and defeating terrorism, and planned economic prosperity.³² The strategy addressed the importance of U.S. Federal Government organizations actively responding to challenges, while strategically exploiting opportunities³³ of the Twenty-first century. The 2001 NSS framed the priorities as:

1. Champion aspirations for human dignity.³⁴
2. Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against the U.S. and our friends.³⁵
3. Work with others to defuse regional conflicts.

³⁰U.S. Congress, Public Law 99-433, Section 603, Annual Report on National Security Strategy, October 1, 1986, http://csis.org/images/stories/bgn/gnact_2.pdf (accessed September 18, 2012).

³¹Ibid.

³²The White House, *The National Security Strategy 2002* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf> (accessed September 18, 2012), 1, 5, 17.

³³Ibid., 29.

³⁴Ibid., 1.

³⁵Ibid.

4. Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).³⁶
5. Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade.³⁷
6. Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.³⁸
7. Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power.³⁹
8. Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the Twenty-first century.⁴⁰

The 2006 NSS was published during the Bush Administration and covered the strengthening of international alliances, defusing international conflicts, and planned economic prosperity.⁴¹ The strategy addressed the importance of all U.S. Federal Government organizations actively responding to challenges, while strategically

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid., 2.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹The White House, *The National Security Strategy 2006* (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006), <http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/nss2006.pdf> (accessed September 18, 2012), 8, 14, 25.

exploiting opportunities of the Twenty-first century.⁴² The 2006 NSS framed the priorities as:

1. Champion aspirations for human dignity.⁴³
2. Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.⁴⁴
3. Work with others to defuse regional conflicts.⁴⁵
4. Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with WMD.⁴⁶
5. Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade.⁴⁷
6. Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.⁴⁸
7. Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power.⁴⁹

⁴²Ibid., 47.

⁴³Ibid., 2-7.

⁴⁴Ibid., 8-13.

⁴⁵Ibid., 14-17.

⁴⁶Ibid., 18-24.

⁴⁷Ibid., 25-30.

⁴⁸Ibid., 31-34.

⁴⁹Ibid., 35-42, 47.

8. Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the Twenty-first century.⁵⁰

9. Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.⁵¹

The 2010 *NSS* was published during the Obama Administration and addresses protecting the U.S. against WMD attacks, emerging cyber threats, and economic growth and stability.⁵² The strategy also outlines the importance of U.S. economic growth,⁵³ diplomatic efforts within the international community, and difficult fiscal decisions that must be made for the good of the U.S. as a whole.⁵⁴ The 2010 *NSS* framed the priorities as:

1. Secure the U.S., its citizens, and its allies and partners.⁵⁵

2. Ensure a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity.⁵⁶

3. Defend universal values at home and around the world.⁵⁷

⁵⁰Ibid., 43-46.

⁵¹Ibid., 47-48.

⁵²The White House, *The National Security Strategy 2010* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed September 18, 2012), 5.

⁵³The White House, *The National Security Strategy 2006*, 47.

⁵⁴The White House, *The National Security Strategy 2010*, 9.

⁵⁵Ibid., 17-28.

⁵⁶Ibid., 28-35.

⁵⁷Ibid., 35-40.

4. Maintain international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.⁵⁸

Quadrennial Defense Review

The DoD's 2001 *QDR* lays out its strategic priorities, focuses, and risk assessments for the armed forces. The first report published since the September 11, 2001 attacks, concentrated on the armed forces protecting America, its allies, and national interests.⁵⁹ The report highlighted anticipated new and emerging challenges as well as resource requirements, to include the strategic plan to bolster military capability, recruitment of forces, training programs, and force sustainment.

The defense policy goals focused on maintaining alliances and deterring, thwarting, and—or defeating threats to national security.⁶⁰ Additionally, the report identified that the requirements being levied on the DoD would have a definite impact to the size and organization of the armed forces.⁶¹ The outlined priorities were:

1. Assure allies and friends.
2. Dissuade future military competition.

⁵⁸Ibid., 40-50.

⁵⁹Department of Defense, *The Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 30, 2001), <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf> (accessed September 18, 2012), 25.

⁶⁰Ibid., 20.

⁶¹Ibid., 18.

3. Deter threats and coercion against U.S. interests.
4. If deterrence failed, decisively defeat any adversary.⁶²

The DoD's 2006 *QDR* outlined the strategic priorities, capability requirements, and risk assessments for the armed forces. The report highlighted anticipated new and emerging challenges as well as resource requirements, to include the strategic plan to bolster military capability, recruitment of forces, training programs, and force sustainment. The defense policy goals focused on leveraging interagency abilities;⁶³ flexible resource authorities;⁶⁴ and enhancing capabilities in support of defense operations.⁶⁵ Additionally, the report identified that the requirements being levied on the DoD due to overlapping missions required a more tailorabile force and capabilities.⁶⁶ The priorities outlined were framed as:

1. Defeat terrorist networks.⁶⁷
2. Defend the homeland in-depth.⁶⁸

⁶²Ibid., 2.

⁶³Department of Defense, *The Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 6, 2006), <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf> (accessed September 26, 2012), ix.

⁶⁴Ibid., ix.

⁶⁵Ibid., ix.

⁶⁶Ibid., 4.

⁶⁷Ibid., 20-24.

⁶⁸Ibid., 24-27.

3. Shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads.⁶⁹
4. Prevent hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD.⁷⁰

The DoD 2010 *QDR* outlines the strategic priorities, capability requirements, and risk assessments for the armed forces. The report highlights anticipated new and emerging challenges as well as resource requirements, to include the strategic plan to bolster military capability, recruitment of forces, training programs, and force sustainment. The defense policy goals are focused on international order, security, and economic development.⁷¹ Additionally, the report identifies that the DoD will seek to advance national interests while achieving a balance between resources and requirements.⁷² The priorities were framed as:

1. To prevail in today's wars.⁷³
2. Prevent and deter conflict.⁷⁴
3. Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies.⁷⁵
4. Preserve and enhance the all volunteer force.⁷⁶

⁶⁹Ibid., 27-32.

⁷⁰Ibid., 32-35.

⁷¹Department of Defense, *The Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2010), <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%20209jan10%201600.PDF> (accessed September 26, 2012), iv.

⁷²Ibid., v.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Ibid., vi.

National Defense Strategy

The *NDS* is the Secretary of Defense's strategy document and it addresses how the DoD will assist in achieving the stated objectives and priorities outlined in the *NSS*.⁷⁷ The 2005 *NDS* outlines the strategic approach in which the DoD will ensure national defense, address emerging challenges, meet national priorities set forth in the *NSS*, and building—leveraging international partnerships.⁷⁸ The 2005 *NDS* was published by Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, and identified the strategic priorities as the following:

1. Secure the U.S. from direct attack.⁷⁹
2. Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action.⁸⁰
3. Strengthen alliances and partnerships.⁸¹
4. Establish favorable security conditions.⁸²

The 2008 *NDS* outlines the strategic approach in which the DoD will conduct campaign development, manage and develop forces, and leverage actionable

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, xi.

⁷⁸Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2005), <http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf> (accessed September 26, 2012), iv.

⁷⁹Ibid., 6.

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Ibid., 7.

⁸²Ibid.

intelligence.⁸³ The 2008 *NDS* was published by Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, and identified the strategic priorities as the following:

1. Defend the homeland.⁸⁴
2. Win the long war.⁸⁵
3. Promote security.⁸⁶
4. Deter conflict.⁸⁷
5. Win our nation's wars.⁸⁸

Legislation

Public Laws authorize and appropriate funds, personnel, and resources and were referenced for each of the fiscal years examined for this study. The United States Constitution states that Congress has legislative authority to appropriate funding for all government organizations, and that no funding will be obligated in excess of what has been enacted by law.⁸⁹ All government organizations are required to submit their budget

⁸³Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2008), <http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf> (accessed September 26, 2012), 1.

⁸⁴Ibid., 6-7.

⁸⁵Ibid., 7-9.

⁸⁶Ibid., 9-11.

⁸⁷Ibid., 11-12.

⁸⁸Ibid., 13.

⁸⁹Sandy Streeter, *The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction* (Washington, DC: Congressional Service, December 2, 2008), http://democrats.appropriations.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=289%3Acrsappropsintro&catid=10&Itemid=35 (accessed September 26, 2012), 1.

requests through the Executive Branch (the OMB) to Congress on an annual basis.⁹⁰ The Defense House and Senate subcommittees have legislative oversight for all the DoD budget requests⁹¹ (to include the Department of the Army).

All federal government organizations are required to obligate their full budgetary authority within the timeframe specified for each of their authorized appropriations. It is mandated that the budget cycle be obligated and executed within a fiscal year, rather than a calendar year. Any federal government organization appropriated funding that is available for only one year must obligate its budgetary authority in full or risk returning the unused portion of the funding to the Department of the Treasury.⁹² The length of an appropriation is based on the type of funding it is. For example, Operation and Maintenance funds are only available for one year for obligation and then five more years for expenditure of funds, while Procurement funds are only available for three years for obligation and then five years for expenditure of funds.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Ibid., 2.

⁹²Ibid., 3.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the methods and techniques used in determining the magnitude of change in the Department of the Army's budget requests and appropriated funding levels for FY 2001 through FY 2010. In doing so, the evidence was examined in order to determine if there were any spikes, declines, or correlations in the Department of the Army's budgets from fiscal year to fiscal year due to executive and congressional changes. Mixed method analysis was utilized in identifying trends or patterns in determining if the Department of the Army's budget was in fact in line with congressional priorities for the period analyzed. The methods used during this research included:

1. Integrating different data sets to create a hypothesis in order to identify any relationships between the changes in policy and changes in government.
2. An examination of the funding requested and appropriated from fiscal year to fiscal year in order to draw conclusions.
3. Framing the research problem to determine if the budget was consistent with priorities.
4. Identifying if there were any extenuating circumstances (e.g., the U.S. economy, priorities established by the Executive Branch, Congressional priorities, and public opinion) that could be used in deductive reasoning to hypothesize budget decisions made.
5. Examining the analysis conducted in order to determine any outliers from fiscal year to fiscal year.

Instruments of Measure

The instruments of measure for this study included qualitative textual analysis and quantitative judgment by comparing the Department of the Army's budget request and congressionally appropriated budgets; the appropriate governing priority documents and changes in those priorities; and congressional composition. Additionally, mixed method analysis was conducted for the purposes of this study. This examination used a comparative analysis providing a more in-depth review of both the quantitative and qualitative data sets and their findings.

Data Compilation

A budget thesis matrix [Appendices A through J] was constructed for each of the 10 fiscal years being studied in order to have a side-by-side comparison. These matrices outline the DoD's budget request and congressionally appropriated funding levels (represented in millions) for the Department of the Army for the following appropriations: (1) Military Personnel, (2) Operations and Maintenance, (3) Procurement, (4) Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation.

The matrices framework also consists of the governing priority documents applicable to each of the fiscal years and ascertains the related priorities. Additionally, the appropriation bills [or public laws] applicative to each of the appropriated funds and funding requests, for each of the fiscal years, have been identified in support of the thesis research and for referencing.

Qualitative Research

The qualitative textual research restates the executive branch's priorities set forth in the *NSS* [mandated by law], the *QDR* [mandated by law], and the National Defense Review [prepared at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense] for each of the fiscal years. The list of priorities outlined in Appendices K and L should not be considered all encompassing, due to time constraints and priorities embedded within priorities. The purpose of Appendix K is to determine the overarching priorities; and to then identify which of those priorities are applicable to the different governing priority documents and in what fiscal years. The purpose of Appendix L is to indicate the added, dropped, and maintained of priorities per each fiscal year and for each of the governing priority documents.

Additionally, the congressional composition for the U.S. Senate Majority, House of Representatives Majority, and the presiding President were outlined in Appendices K, L, and M in preparation of both qualitative and mixed method analysis. Of note, there were no mathematical formulas used in Appendices K and L.

Qualitative research conducted in Appendix M numerically represents the added, dropped, and maintained priorities depicted in Appendix L. These priorities were also converted into percentage, and a change index was developed. The mathematical formula used for “added percent” was calculated as follows: added divided by the total of added, dropped, and maintained per priority document for a given fiscal year. The mathematical formula used for “dropped percent” was calculated as follows: dropped divided by the total of added, dropped, and maintained per priority document for a given fiscal year. The mathematical formula used for “maintained percent” was calculated as follows:

maintained divided by the total of added, dropped, and maintained per priority document for a given fiscal year. The mathematical formula used for the “change index” was calculated as follows: the total of added and dropped divided by priorities per document.

Qualitative research conducted for Appendix N depicted ranges that were developed based on the qualitative results displayed in Appendix M. The appropriate classification groupings (small, medium, and large) were identified by priority document per fiscal year. The ranges used in Appendix N were determined by the identified changes (of the added and dropped priorities in Appendix M) per funding document for each fiscal year. The purpose of Appendix N is to make a qualitative judgment regarding the change in policy—priorities from priority document to priority document. The ranges developed are as followed:

1. Small (0 to 5 priorities),
2. Medium (6 to 10 priorities),
3. Large (11 to 15 priorities).

The qualitative research conducted for Appendix O involved comparing the congressional composition (outlined in Appendices K and L) with the DoD composition (depicting the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff) per fiscal year for the period analyzed. Of note, there were no mathematical formulas used in Appendix O.

Quantitative Research

The quantitative research conducted for Appendices P and Q identifies the degree of change from fiscal year to fiscal year. The mathematical formula used is as follows: the delta percentage was determined by taking the appropriated budget minus the request and then divided by the request. The budget requests and appropriated funding levels

were extracted from the appropriate appropriation bills (public laws) as depicted in Appendices A through J.

Mixed Method Research

As mentioned above, mixed method research was conducted by examining different angles and using a comparative approach of the quantitative and qualitative research.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to examine all of the research gathered in support of determining if the Department of the Army's portion of the DoD budget request was in line with the specified congressional priorities for the period studied. Analysis conducted assisted in determining if there were any trends, patterns, or correlations between the quantitative and qualitative research; in addressing the stated thesis question.

Components of the Department of the Army's budget request, governing priority documents, congressional composition, and congressional testimony were analyzed in order to identify any periods of change, fluctuation, relationships, or irregularities in relation to the rest of the data analyzed for the period of this study.

Quantitative Findings

Over the 10 year period analyzed, the Department of the Army's actual appropriated budget received a cumulative increase in excess of \$53.0 billion (see Appendix P). However, when the FY 2001 appropriated budget was adjusted for the purposes of inflation, the increase in appropriated dollars reflected the change as \$37.0 billion (see table 1), which is an increase of more than 42 percent over the 10 year period. An in-depth analysis was conducted of the Department of the Army's budget requests and appropriated funding levels for the following appropriations: Military Personnel; Operations and Maintenance; Procurement; and RDT&E.

Table 1. Adjusted For Inflation

Fiscal Year	Average U.S. Inflation	Adjusted Inflationary Budget (Army)	(Funding in Millions)	
			FY 2010 Appropriated Budget	
FY 2001	0.0000	\$ 69,899.4	\$ 123,395.40	
FY 2002	1.0159	\$ 71,010.8		
FY 2003	1.0227	\$ 72,622.7		
FY 2004	1.0268	\$ 74,569.0		
FY 2005	1.0339	\$ 77,096.9		
FY 2006	1.0324	\$ 79,594.9		
FY 2007	1.0285	\$ 81,863.3		
FY 2008	1.0385	\$ 85,015.1		
FY 2009	(0.0034)	\$ (289.1)		
FY 2010	1.0164	\$ 86,703.1	\$ 36,692.30	

Source: Inflation.eu, “Current Inflation/United States,” <http://www.inflation.eu/> (accessed August 19, 2012).

For the purpose of this study, any appropriated funding levels identified to be within a deviation of six percent of its corresponding budget request were considered to be appropriated as requested. This 6 percent figure was arrived at because it was the median of the percentage changes between appropriated budget levels and requested budgets. There were no significant differences between the appropriated and requested amounts for FY 2001 through FY 2006, as they were all identified as having a deviation within 6 percent. FY 2007 through FY 2010 was identified as having larger deviations between appropriated and requested budgets, ranging from 9 to 17 percent. The deviations for each of the fiscal years are depicted in table 2.

Table 2. FY 2001 through FY 2012 Deviations

Fiscal Year	Requested	Appropriated	Percentage Change
2001	\$71,590.4	\$69,899.4	-2.4%
2002	\$77,229.8	\$76,087.9	-1.5%
2003	\$90,928.6	\$86,036.8	-5.4%
2004	\$90,232.0	\$90,730.9	0.6%
2005	\$95,582.1	\$94,818.7	-0.8%
2006	\$91,505.1	\$86,802.9	-5.1%
2007	\$106,439.0	\$88,855.4	-16.5%
2008	\$124,184.5	\$111,680.2	-10.1%
2009	\$136,292.8	\$122,636.1	-10.0%
2010	\$135,861.4	\$123,395.4	-9.2%

Source: Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2001 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2000), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2001.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2002 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), August 2001), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2002.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2003 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2002), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2003.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2004 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2003), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2004.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2005 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2004), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2005.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2006 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), April 2005), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2006.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2007 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2006), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2007.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2008 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2007), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2008.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2009 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2008), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2009.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2010 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), June 2009), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2010.html> (accessed November 20, 2012).

Appropriation Level Analysis

The analysis of FY 2001 through FY 2006 topline funding level identified evolving budgets where increases at the appropriation level stayed rather consistent. Subsequently, the FY 2007 through FY 2010 topline level budgets were identified as having larger deviations for the period studied. This was determined by calculating the deviation between appropriated funding levels and budget requests. For the purposes of this study, the above mentioned fiscal years were determined to have to larger deviations in excess of 6 percent between appropriated funding levels and corresponding budget requests.

Analysis at the appropriation level identified deviations that will be discussed in further detail later in the chapter. Of note, the RDT&E and Procurement appropriations were consistently found to have larger deviations. Throughout the period studied it was identified that the Department of the Army never received its full budget request for the Procurement appropriation. In fact, it was actually appropriated 24 percent less on average than its requested budget level for each fiscal year (see Appendix P). This analysis only accounts for base funding, as the researcher did not have access to any Department of the Army financial systems in order to review detailed information.

Some of the above mentioned shortfalls associated with the Procurement appropriation may be attributed to the shifting of funds to Overseas Contingency Operations, the GWOT, or supplemental funding for the purposes of procuring wartime equipment, such as Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles. Further analysis identified that the Department of the Army received, on average, 11 percent more than its requested amount for the RDT&E appropriation for each of the fiscal years analyzed (see

Appendix P). A break out on significant findings will be outlined by fiscal year in the follow-on sections. The other two appropriations (Operations and Maintenance and Military Personnel) were found to have smaller deviations at the appropriation level, and will be discussed later in the chapter.

QUAN-qual Findings

This section discusses the qualitative data of the quantitative information as it was considered to provide emerging insight to the researcher. The Department of the Army's portion of the DoD budget requests, public laws, appropriated funding, and congressional testimonies were considered to be in relation to one of the four appropriations studied in support of the stated thesis. The researcher was unable to obtain congressional testimonies and the detailed purposes for appropriated funding for every fiscal year. The data gathered only represents information that was researched and analyzed, and should not be considered all encompassing for every fiscal year.

The information annotated in the follow-on section provides further context in support of the study. As there are numerous hearings regarding the budget for each fiscal year, the researcher selected those that were most appropriate and obtainable. Therefore, the researcher selected the hearings that were most appropriate to DoD and its budget requests. A breakdown of the findings follows.

FY 2001

The information examined for FY 2001 attributed the budget request (\$72.0 billion in base funding) to continued stability efforts that were being conducted in

both Kosovo and Bosnia.⁹³ The FY 2001 budget requested resources for continued efforts in the following areas:

1. Procurement efforts that enhanced military capability;⁹⁴
2. Focusing on building capabilities and adapting to post Cold War threats throughout the international community;⁹⁵
3. Continued development of U.S. weapons and defense systems, to include programs such as the Medium Armored Vehicle for use in combat operations;⁹⁶
4. Continued implementation of the base closure and realignment program for the purposes of realigning funds from infrastructure to military operations.⁹⁷

Subsequently, Public Law (P.L.) 106-259 appropriated funds for FY 2001 (\$70.0 billion in base funding) for purposes that included:

1. Active duty personnel costs that include healthcare, clothing allowances, and permanent change in duty station;⁹⁸

⁹³Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Budget for FY 2001,” February 7, 2000, <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=2306> (accessed April 27, 2013).

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Ibid.

⁹⁸U.S. Congress, Public Law 106-259, August 9, 2000, <http://asafm.army.mil/Documents/OtherDocuments/CongInfo/BLDL/PL//01APPNpl.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013).

2. Active duty operation and maintenance, infrastructure, and ammunition upkeep;⁹⁹

3. Active duty procurement of aircraft, missile, weapons and tracked combat vehicles, and ammunition. Some examples included UH-60s (Blackhawk helicopters), ground-handling equipment, installation of equipment, and modification of ammunition;¹⁰⁰

4. RDT&E of programs to enhance military capabilities and effectiveness.¹⁰¹

While the deviation for FY 2001 was 2 percent, the year-over-year budget was not researched for an increase or decrease in budget as it was the starting point for the study. In order to review FY 2001 appropriated versus requested see figure 2 and figure 3 to view FY 2001 by appropriation.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹Ibid.




Figure 1. FY 2001 Appropriated versus Request (Funding represented in millions)

Source: U.S. Congress, Public Law 106-259, August 9, 2000, <http://asafm.army.mil/Documents/OtherDocuments/CongInfo/BLDL/PL//01APPNpl.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013); Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request,” <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2001.html> (accessed April 28, 2013).




Figure 2. FY 2001 by Appropriation (Funding represented in millions)

Source: U.S. Congress, Public Law 106-259, August 9, 2000, <http://asafm.army.mil/Documents/OtherDocuments/CongInfo/BLDL/PL//01APPNpl.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013); Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request,” <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2001.html> (accessed April 28, 2013).

No congressional testimony could be obtained for FY 2001 through open sources. Additionally, since FY 2001 has more of a relationship with its preceding years (FY 2000 and FY 1999) it is not considered individually applicable to the study. FY 2001 served more as a starting point for the purposes of this study, and assisted in identifying trends, correlations, and relationships between FY 2002 through FY 2010.

FY 2002

The information examined for FY 2002 attributed the budget request (\$77.2 billion in base funding) to the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s priorities in

advancing military programs, capabilities, and ensuring soldier readiness.¹⁰² The Secretary of Defense stated that the FY 2002 budget request would create a much needed balance between program shortfalls and military readiness and capabilities.¹⁰³ The FY 2002 budget requested resources for continued efforts in the following areas:

1. Operations and Maintenance for the purposes of preserving military weapons systems, conducting base operations, and ensuring force protection;¹⁰⁴
2. Developing the intelligence systems, technology, and weapons requirements necessary for the Twenty-first century;¹⁰⁵
3. Augmenting and upgrading DoD infrastructure, to include living quarters, medical facilities, and of military facilities;¹⁰⁶
4. Ensuring competitive outsourcing for contractual DoD requirements.¹⁰⁷

Subsequently, P.L. 107-117 appropriated funds for FY 2002 (\$76.1 billion in base funding) for purposes that included:

1. Active duty personnel costs that include pay and allowances, subsistence, and permanent change in duty station;¹⁰⁸

¹⁰² Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Amended Budget for FY 2002,” June 27, 2001, <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=2958> (accessed April 27, 2013).

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

2. Active duty operation and maintenance for purposes that include confidential military requirements and the care of ammunition;¹⁰⁹
3. Active duty procurement of aircraft, missile, weapons and tracked combat vehicles, and ammunition. Some examples include installation of equipment, ground-handling equipment, and modification of ammunition;¹¹⁰
4. RDT&E of programs that will enhance military capabilities and effectiveness.¹¹¹

While the deviation for FY 2002 was -2 percent, the budget increased by 9 percent when compared to FY 2001. In order to review the FY 2002 appropriated versus requested see figure 3 and figure 4 to view FY 2002 by appropriation.

¹⁰⁸U.S. Congress, Public Law 107-117, 107th Cong., January 10, 2002, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ117/pdf/PLAW-107publ117.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013).

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹¹Ibid.




Figure 3. FY 2002 Appropriated versus Request (Funding represented in millions)

Source: U.S. Congress, Public Law 107-117, 107th Cong., January 10, 2002, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ117/pdf/PLAW-107publ117.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013); Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request,” <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2002.html> (accessed April 28, 2013).




Figure 4. FY 2002 by Appropriation (Funding represented in millions)

Source: U.S. Congress, Public Law 107-117, 107th Cong., January 10, 2002, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ117/pdf/PLAW-107publ117.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013); Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request,” <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2002.html> (accessed April 28, 2013).

Based on the results for FY 2002 depicted in figure 4, it was determined that there were no significant deviations for Military Personnel with a deviation of less than 1 percent, Operations and Maintenance with a deviation of 5 percent, and RDT&E with a deviation of 6 percent. The Procurement appropriation was identified as having a larger deviation of -22 percent. Research of the House hearing with 107th Congress on Wednesday, July 11, 2001 for FY 2002 has provided further insight.¹¹² Ranking member,

¹¹²U.S. Congress, *Defense Department Budget Priorities for Fiscal Year 2002*, December 19, 2009, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=CHRG&browsePath=107%2FHOUSE%2FCommittee+on+the+Budget&isCollapsed=true>

Mr. John Spratt (Democratic party—South Carolina) stated that the DoD's research and development (R&D) request had been significantly increased over its prior fiscal year request.¹¹³

Mr. Spratt stated that the problem with R&D programs was that the DoD could only develop weapons not acquire actual equipment in support of military operations.¹¹⁴ He stated that the procurement of weapons was actually more important than their development, and noted that while DoD requested additional RDT&E funding it reduced its request for Procurement.¹¹⁵ Mr. Spratt stated that if the DoD did not have the funding necessary to acquire the weapons it has sought to develop its efforts for future programs would be in vain.¹¹⁶

Additional research of the Senate hearing with 107th Congress on Thursday, March 22, 2001 for FY 2002 provided further understanding.¹¹⁷ Ms. Mary Landrieu (Democratic party—Louisiana) and Mr. Joseph Lieberman (Democratic party—Connecticut) stated that congress had provided additional funding for the continued procurement of several programs, and questioned their importance, planned uses, and if

ed=false&leafLevelBrowse=false&isDocumentResults=true&ycord=446 (accessed May 4, 2013).

¹¹³Ibid.

¹¹⁴Ibid.

¹¹⁵Ibid.

¹¹⁶Ibid.

¹¹⁷U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2002*, March 22, 2001, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg75346/pdf/CHRG-107shrg75346.pdf> (accessed May 4, 2013).

there were any projected resource shortfalls. It appears that the questions asked throughout the testimony were focused on items procured, further requirements, plans for procured items, and their importance to military operations.

FY 2003

The Department of the Army's budget increase could be attributed to military action taken in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on America and its people. Of note, the Department of the Army's budget request for FY 2002 had already been transmitted through the President to Congress, which meant that the funds required in response to the 9/11 attacks would not be requested until the latter part of FY 2002. The standard fiscal year budgetary process for appropriated base funding (as mandated by law) would not allow the Department of the Army to receive the funds required in response to 9/11 until FY 2003 (upon congressional authorization and appropriation).

The information examined for FY 2003 attributed the budget request (\$91.0 billion in base funding) to fighting and winning the war against terrorism.¹¹⁸ Funding was requested for counter-terrorism, force protection, and other critical requirements.¹¹⁹ The FY 2003 budget requested resources for continued efforts in the following areas:

¹¹⁸Department of Defense, "Details of Fiscal 2003 Department of Defense (DoD) Budget Request," February 4, 2002, <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=3226> (accessed April 27, 2013).

¹¹⁹Ibid.

1. Transforming military programs, to included RDT&E and procurement for missile defense; armored vehicles; and Comanche reconnaissance helicopters;¹²⁰
2. The procurement of chemical biological defense, and Science and Technology efforts;¹²¹
3. Enhancing soldier readiness in order to keep up with deployment requirements for the war against terrorism.¹²²

Subsequently, P.L. 107-248 appropriated funds for FY 2003 (\$86.0 billion in base funding) for purposes that include:

1. Active duty personnel costs that include pay and allowances, subsistence, and permanent change in duty station;¹²³
2. Active duty operation and maintenance for purposes that include confidential military requirements and the care of ammunition;¹²⁴
3. Active duty procurement of aircraft, missile, weapons and tracked combat vehicles, and ammunition. Some examples include CH-47 fleet, ground-handling equipment, and modification of ammunition;¹²⁵

¹²⁰Ibid.

¹²¹Ibid.

¹²²Ibid.

¹²³U.S. Congress, Public Law 107-248, 107th Cong., October 23, 2002, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ248/pdf/PLAW-107publ248.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013).

¹²⁴Ibid.

4. RDT&E of programs that will enhance military capabilities and effectiveness.¹²⁶

While the deviation for FY 2003 was -5 percent, the budget increased by 13 percent when compared to FY 2002. In order to review the FY 2003 appropriated versus requested see figure 5 and figure 6 to view FY 2003 by appropriation.




Figure 5. FY 2003 Appropriation versus Request (Funding represented in millions)

Source: U.S. Congress, Public Law 107-248, 107th Cong., October 23, 2002, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ248/pdf/PLAW-107publ248.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013); Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), "DOD Budget Request," <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2003.html> (accessed April 28, 2013).

¹²⁵Ibid.

¹²⁶Ibid.




Figure 6. FY 2003 by Appropriation (Funding represented in millions)

Source: U.S. Congress, Public Law 107-248, 107th Cong., October 23, 2002, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ248/pdf/PLAW-107publ248.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013); Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request,” <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2003.html> (accessed April 28, 2013).

Based on the results for FY 2003 depicted in figure 6, it was determined that there were no significant deviations for Military Personnel with a deviation of less than -1 percent, and Operations and Maintenance with a deviation of -1 percent. The Procurement (-28 percent) and RDT&E (11 percent) appropriations were identified as having larger deviations. Research of the House hearing with 107th Congress on Tuesday, February 12, 2002 for FY 2003 has provided insight¹²⁷ as to why there were

¹²⁷U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Budget Priorities for Fiscal Year 2003*, February 12, 2003, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107hhrg77819/pdf/CHRG-107hhrg77819.pdf> (accessed May 4, 2013).

larger deviations for the two appropriations above. Chairman Jim Nussle (Republican party—Iowa) stated that the DoD's R&D and Procurement requests had significantly increased over its prior fiscal year request.¹²⁸ He asked the DoD to provide further clarification on how the funding request could be determined and for what.¹²⁹ Testimony led to the assumption that the House committee had concerns about the large requests for RDT&E and Procurement funding.¹³⁰

Additional research of the Senate hearing with the 107th Congress on Wednesday, February 27, 2002 for FY 2003 provided further¹³¹ understanding. In testimony, Mr. Richard Shelby (Republican party—Alabama) stated that he was of the belief that DoD was not spending nearly enough on R&D programs, and identified that the R&D program was below its funding target.¹³² Mr. Daniel Inouye (Democratic party—Hawaii) criticized the development of the Comanche helicopter that spanned over two decades and had significant cost overruns, continuous revisions, and poor performance.¹³³ He went on to then criticize the DoD's budget increase for programs such as the above

¹²⁸Ibid.

¹²⁹Ibid.

¹³⁰Ibid.

¹³¹Ibid.

¹³²U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2003*, February 27, 2002, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=CHRG&browsePath=107%2FSENATE%2FCommittee+on+Appropriations&isCollapsed=false&leafLevelBrowse=false&isDocumentResults=true&ycord=350> (accessed May 5, 2013).

¹³³Ibid.

mentioned. Additionally, many of the other committee members consistently brought up the fact that most procurement efforts had proven to be in excess of available funds, requiring out year funding that may not be available, while other procurement programs had proven unsuccessful.¹³⁴

FY 2004

The information examined for FY 2004 attributed the budget request (\$90.2 billion for base funding) to President George Bush's new defense strategy.¹³⁵ Funding requested was for the purposes of maintaining soldier readiness in response to threats, to include terrorism.¹³⁶ The FY 2004 budget requested resources for continued efforts in the following areas:

1. Acquisition and procurement of defense programs in response to the GWOT;¹³⁷
2. Preparing military forces in response to the war on terrorism and other required military engagements;¹³⁸
3. Transforming military organizations, fostering joint efforts, and engaging in joint military training efforts;¹³⁹

¹³⁴Ibid.

¹³⁵Department of Defense, "Fiscal 2004 Department of Defense Budget Release," February 3, 2003, <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=3615> (accessed April 27, 2013).

¹³⁶Ibid.

¹³⁷Ibid.

¹³⁸Ibid.

¹³⁹Ibid.

4. Transforming and enhancing military capabilities and ability, to include Stryker armored wheeled combat vehicles and Comanche low observation reconnaissance helicopters.¹⁴⁰

Subsequently, P.L. 108-87 appropriated funds for FY 2004 (\$91.0 billion in base funding) for purposes that include:

1. Active duty personnel costs that include pay and allowances, subsistence, and permanent change in duty station;¹⁴¹
2. Active duty operation and maintenance for purposes that include confidential military requirements and the care of ammunition;¹⁴²
3. Active duty procurement of aircraft, missile, weapons and tracked combat vehicles, and ammunition. Some examples include modification, ground-handling equipment, procurement requirements for the fifth and sixth Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, and modification of ammunition;¹⁴³
4. RDT&E for molecular genetics and musculoskeletal research and other programs that will enhance military capabilities and effectiveness.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰Ibid.

¹⁴¹U.S. Congress, Public Law 108-87, *Department of Defense Appropriation Act*, 108th Cong., September 30, 2003, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ87/pdf/PLAW-108publ87.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013).

¹⁴²Ibid.

¹⁴³Ibid.

¹⁴⁴Ibid.

While the deviation for FY 2004 was less than -1 percent, the budget increased by 6 percent when compared to FY 2003. In order to review the FY 2004 appropriated versus requested see figure 7 and figure 8 to view FY 2004 by appropriation.




Figure 7. FY 2004 Appropriation versus Request (Funding represented in millions)

Source: U.S. Congress, Public Law 108-87, *Department of Defense Appropriation Act*, 108th Cong., September 30, 2003, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ87/pdf/PLAW-108publ87.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013); Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request,” <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2004.html> (accessed April 28, 2013).




Figure 8. FY 2004 by Appropriation (Funding represented in millions)

Source: U.S. Congress, Public Law 108-87, *Department of Defense Appropriation Act*, 108th Cong., September 30, 2003, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ87/pdf/PLAW-108publ87.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013); Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request,” <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2004.html> (accessed April 28, 2013).

Based on the results for FY 2004 depicted in figure 8, it was determined that there were no significant deviations for Military Personnel with a deviation of less than -1 percent, and Operations and Maintenance with a deviation of less than 1 percent. The Procurement (-7 percent) and RDT&E (14 percent) appropriations were identified as having larger deviations. Research of the House hearing with 108th Congress on

Wednesday, March 12, 2003 for FY 2004 has provided insight¹⁴⁵ to the larger deviations mentioned above.

In given testimony one of the committee members (unidentified) explained that the DoD had requested R&D and Procurement funding for the Patriot PAC-3 system, and were now questioning the Department of the Army. They stated that they could not understand why in the FY 2004 budget request the Department of the Army was once again seeking increased funding for the same program.¹⁴⁶ They also questioned other aspects of the program, such as record of accomplishment and advancements. Another unidentified member questioned other R&D and procurement efforts pertaining to current costs per aircraft requirements, and the increased funding requirements for the R&D and procurement of the same aircraft.¹⁴⁷

The Senate hearing with 108th Congress on Wednesday, March 19, 2003 for FY 2004 provided further understanding.¹⁴⁸ Of note, there were no committee members found to have made remarks in the testimony in regards to RDT&E appropriation. However, there were many pertinent questions asked by Senate committee members. Mr. Thad Cochran (Republican party—Mississippi) asked the DoD if it was procuring

¹⁴⁵U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriation for 2004*, March 12, 2003, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108hhrg92804/html/CHRG-108hhrg92804.htm> (accessed May 5, 2013).

¹⁴⁶Ibid.

¹⁴⁷Ibid.

¹⁴⁸U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2004*, March 19, 2003, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg1910409/pdf/CHRG-108shrg1910409.pdf> (accessed May 5, 2013).

unmanned aerial vehicles at a fast enough rate.¹⁴⁹ Mr. Arlen Specter (Republican party—Pennsylvania) questioned how the Department of the Army was going to be able to develop or upgrade combat vehicles being manufactured by United Defense, ensuring timely completion and cost savings, to include Bradley Fighting Vehicles and self-propelled howitzers.¹⁵⁰

FY 2005

The information examined for FY 2005 attributed the budget request (\$96.0 billion for base funding) to maintaining soldier readiness in response to GWOT and the continued advancement of military programs and capabilities.¹⁵¹ This request identified the importance on maintaining soldier readiness in response to threats, to include terrorism.¹⁵² The FY 2005 budget requested resources for continued efforts in the following areas:

1. Advancing capabilities in response to unconventional threats experienced in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars;¹⁵³
2. Training and developing other security forces and militaries in combating terrorism and conducting military operations in unconventional fights;¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁹Ibid.

¹⁵⁰Ibid.

¹⁵¹Department of Defense, “Fiscal 2005 Department of Defense Budget Release,” February 2, 2004, <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7046> (accessed April 27, 2013).

¹⁵²Ibid.

¹⁵³Ibid.

3. Rebalancing the force in order to enhance responsiveness, to ready reserve forces, and to maintain rotational forces for deployment requirements;¹⁵⁵
4. Continue base realignment and closure effort in order to realize a cost savings that can be transferred to support military operations;¹⁵⁶
5. Transforming and developing military capabilities necessary in combating threats, to include the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems.¹⁵⁷

Subsequently, P.L. 108-287 appropriated funds for FY 2005 (\$95.0 billion in base funding) for purposes that include:

1. Active duty personnel costs that include pay and allowances, subsistence, and permanent change in duty station;¹⁵⁸
2. Active duty operation and maintenance for purposes that include confidential military requirements and the care of ammunition;¹⁵⁹
3. Active duty procurement of aircraft, missile, weapons and tracked combat vehicles, and ammunition. Some examples include modification, ground-handling equipment, training devices, and modification of ammunition;¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁴Ibid.

¹⁵⁵Ibid.

¹⁵⁶Ibid.

¹⁵⁷Ibid.

¹⁵⁸U.S. Congress, Public Law 108-287, 108th Cong., August 5, 2004, <http://www.coherentbabble.com/PublicLaws/HR4613PL108-287.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013).

¹⁵⁹Ibid.

4. RDT&E for molecular genetics and musculoskeletal research and other programs that will enhance military capabilities and effectiveness.¹⁶¹ While the deviation for FY 2005 was less than -1 percent, the budget increased by 5 percent when compared to FY 2004. In order to review the FY 2005 appropriated versus requested see figure 9 and figure 10 to view FY 2005 by appropriation.




Figure 9. FY 2005 Appropriation versus Request (Funding represented in millions)

Source: U.S. Congress, Public Law 108-287, 108th Cong., August 5, 2004, <http://www.coherentbabble.com/PublicLaws/HR4613PL108-287.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013); Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request,” <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2005.html> (accessed April 28, 2013).

¹⁶⁰Ibid.

¹⁶¹Ibid.




Figure 10. FY 2005 by Appropriation (Funding represented in millions)

Source: U.S. Congress, Public Law 108-287, 108th Cong., August 5, 2004, <http://www.coherentbabble.com/PublicLaws/HR4613PL108-287.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013); Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request,” <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2005.html> (accessed April 28, 2013).

Based on the results for FY 2005 depicted in figure 10, it was determined that there were no significant deviations for Military Personnel with a deviation of -1 percent, Operations and Maintenance with a deviation of -1 percent, and Procurement with a deviation of -2 percent. The RDT&E appropriation was identified as having a larger deviation of 3 percent. No testimony could be obtained through open resources for a House hearing with either the 108th or 109th Congress for FY 2005. The Senate hearing with 108th Congress on Wednesday, April 21, 2004 for FY 2005 was obtained, but no committee members were found to have made any remarks in the testimony in regards to

the RDT&E appropriation.¹⁶² Of note, while the 108th Congress held testimony on the DoD's FY 2005 budget request, it was the 109th Congress that appropriated actual funding level.

FY 2006

The FY 2006 budget request could be attributed (in part) to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's plan to reduce U.S. troop levels in Iraq and the handing-over of security operations to the host nation.¹⁶³ In 2005, the United States Government and its coalition partners planned to transition over responsibility and security in 2006 after planned elections took place.¹⁶⁴ In fact, the U.S. House of Representatives was seeking to force the President's hand in what it stated was a much needed withdrawal from Iraq.¹⁶⁵ An intense battle was being waged in Congress as U.S. troop casualties for 2005 were the highest since the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan began. In fact, many congressional

¹⁶²U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriation for 2004*, March 12, 2003, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108hhrg92804/html/CHRG-108hhrg92804.htm> (accessed May 5, 2013).

¹⁶³Jim Garamone, "Rumsfeld Sees Iraqi Special Operations Training in Jordan," *American Forces Press Service*, December 23, 2005, <http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=18467> (accessed April 21, 2013).

¹⁶⁴Enes Dulami, Kevin Flower, Jamie McIntyre, and Ayman Mohyeldin, "Rumsfeld in Iraq: No Political Delays," *CNN*, April 12, 2005, <http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/04/12/iraq.main/> (accessed April 21, 2013).

¹⁶⁵Ibid.

representatives questioned the benefit versus the risk¹⁶⁶ of not transferring security operations responsibilities to host nation security forces.¹⁶⁷

Of the information examined for FY 2006, other factors could also be attributed to the budget request (\$96.0 billion for base funding) to the continued transformation of the U.S. military in addressing challenges of the Twenty-first century.¹⁶⁸ The FY 2006 budget requested resources for continued efforts in the following areas:

1. Military personnel allowance for the purposes of maintaining a proficient and skilled forces;¹⁶⁹
2. Provides resources necessary to prevail in wars against terrorism.¹⁷⁰

Subsequently, P.L. 109-148 appropriated funds for FY 2006 (\$87.0 billion in base funding) for purposes that include:

1. Active duty personnel costs that include pay and allowances, subsistence, and permanent change in duty station;¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁶Ibid.

¹⁶⁷Ibid.

¹⁶⁸Department of Defense, “Fiscal 2006 Department of Defense Budget is Released,” February 7, 2005, <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8203> (accessed April 27, 2013).

¹⁶⁹Ibid.

¹⁷⁰Ibid.

¹⁷¹U.S. Congress, Public Law 109-148, 109th Cong., December 30, 2005, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ148/pdf/PLAW-109publ148.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013).

2. Active duty operation and maintenance for purposes that include confidential military requirements and the care of ammunition;¹⁷²
3. Active duty procurement of aircraft, missile, weapons and tracked combat vehicles, and ammunition. Some examples include acquiring HH-60Ls (medical evacuation variant Blackhawk helicopters), UH-60 (Blackhawk helicopters), ground-handling equipment, training devices, and modification of ammunition;¹⁷³
4. RDT&E of programs that will enhance military capabilities and effectiveness.¹⁷⁴

While the deviation for FY 2006 was -5 percent, the budget decreased by -9 percent when compared to FY 2005. In order to review the FY 2006 appropriated versus requested see figure 11 and figure 12 to view FY 2006 by appropriation.

¹⁷²Ibid.

¹⁷³Ibid.

¹⁷⁴Ibid.




Figure 11. FY 2006 Appropriation versus Request (Funding represented in millions)

Source: U.S. Congress, Public Law 109-148, 109th Cong., December 30, 2005, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ148/pdf/PLAW-109publ148.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013); Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request,” <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2006.html> (accessed April 28, 2013).




Figure 12. FY 2006 by Appropriation (Funding represented in millions)

Source: U.S. Congress, Public Law 109-148, 109th Cong., December 30, 2005, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ148/pdf/PLAW-109publ148.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013); Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request,” <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2006.html> (accessed April 28, 2013).

Based on the results for FY 2006 depicted in figure 12, it was determined that there were significant deviations for Military Personnel with a deviation of -9 percent, Operations and Maintenance with a deviation of -4 percent, Procurement with a deviation of -12 percent, and RDT&E with a deviation of 15 percent. No testimony could be obtained through open resources for a House hearing with either the 108th or 109th Congress for FY 2006. The Senate hearing with 109th Congress on Wednesday, March 9,

2005 for FY 2006 was obtained, but there were no committee members found to have made any remarks in the testimony in regards to the above mentioned appropriations.¹⁷⁵

However, there were several general concerns raised. Mr. Inouye (Democratic party—Hawaii) questioned the DoD on a \$285 million recruitment shortfall.¹⁷⁶ Mr. Ted Stevens (Republican party—Alaska) testified that many of the committee members were questioning why modularity funding requirements were included in the military's supplemental request, and exactly how this additional funding would assist U.S. troops on the ground.¹⁷⁷ Mr. Richard Shelby (Republican party—Alabama) questioned the premature termination of the Joint Common Missile program, as it was funded as new capability that would allow the military to respond to future threats.¹⁷⁸

FY 2007

For the purposes of this study, FY 2007 was identified as a larger deviation due to the fact that its appropriated funding level and budget request were not within the deviation of 6 percent. The information examined for FY 2007 attributed the budget

¹⁷⁵U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2006*, April 6, 2005, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg39104137/pdf/CHRG-109shrg39104137.pdf> (accessed May 5, 2013).

¹⁷⁶Ibid.

¹⁷⁷Ibid.

¹⁷⁸Ibid.

request (\$106.4 billion for base funding) to key¹⁷⁹ areas for required investment. The FY 2007 budget requested resources for continued efforts in the following areas:

1. Developing capabilities necessary to improve soldier readiness and mobility;¹⁸⁰
2. Provide resources necessary to prevail in wars against terrorism.¹⁸¹

Subsequently, P.L. 109-289 appropriated funds for FY 2007 (\$89.0 billion in base funding) for purposes that include:

1. Active duty personnel costs that include pay and allowances, subsistence, and permanent change in duty station;¹⁸²
2. Active duty operation and maintenance for purposes that include confidential military requirements and the care of ammunition;¹⁸³
3. Active duty procurement of aircraft, missile, weapons and tracked combat vehicles, and ammunition. Some examples include acquiring HH-60Ls

¹⁷⁹Department of Defense, “Fiscal 2007 Department of Defense Budget is Released,” February 6, 2006, <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9287> (accessed April 27, 2013).

¹⁸⁰Ibid.

¹⁸¹Department of Defense, “Fiscal 2006 Department of Defense Budget is Released,” February 7, 2005, <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8203> (accessed April 27, 2013).

¹⁸²U.S. Congress, Public Law 109-289, 109th Cong., September 29, 2006, http://www.doi.gov/budget/appropriations/2006/upload/pl109_289.pdf (accessed April 28, 2013).

¹⁸³Ibid.

(medical evacuation variant Blackhawk helicopters), ground-handling

equipment, training devices, and modification of ammunition;¹⁸⁴

4. RDT&E of programs that will enhance military capabilities and

effectiveness.¹⁸⁵

While the deviation for FY 2007 was -17 percent, the budget increased by 2 percent when compared to FY 2006. In order to review the FY 2007 appropriated versus requested see figure 13 and figure 14 to view FY 2007 by appropriation.




Figure 13. FY 2007 Appropriation versus Request (Funding represented in millions)

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), "DoD Budget Request," <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2007.html> (accessed April 28, 2013); U.S. Congress, Public Law 109-289, September 29, 2006, http://www.doi.gov/budget/appropriations/2006/upload/pl109_289.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012).

¹⁸⁴Ibid.

¹⁸⁵Ibid.




Figure 14. FY 2007 by Appropriation (Funding represented in millions)

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request,” <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2007.html> (accessed April 28, 2013); U.S. Congress, Public Law 109-289, September 29, 2006, http://www.doi.gov/budget/appropriations/2006/upload/pl109_289.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012).

Based on the results for FY 2007 depicted in figure 14, it was determined that there were significant deviations for Military Personnel with a deviation of -11 percent, Operations and Maintenance with a deviation of -11 percent, Procurement with a deviation of -40 percent, and RDT&E with a deviation of 2 percent. No testimony could be obtained through open resources for a House hearing with either the 109th or 110th Congress for FY 2007. The Senate hearing with 109th Congress on Tuesday, March 28,

2006 for FY 2007 was obtained, but there were no committee members found to have made any remarks in the testimony in regards to the above mentioned appropriations.¹⁸⁶

However, there were several general concerns raised. Ms. Dianne Feinstein (Democratic party—California) stated that the Pentagon and Secretary of Defense had estimated that U.S. forces would need approximately \$50 million (this was the cumulative requirement for the DoD) for the GWOT, but stated that the current requirement had surpassed \$200 billion.¹⁸⁷ She went on to state, that to date the committee still did not have a true understanding on exactly what the FY 2007 funding requirement was.¹⁸⁸ Mr. Inouye (Democratic party—Hawaii) stated that the Department of the Army identified a funding shortfall for purposes that include bonuses and recruitment, and questioned why the FY 2007 budget request did account for funding these obligations.¹⁸⁹

Mr. Specter (Democratic party—Pennsylvania) questioned why the project for the Army Heritage and Education Center (that was funded FY 2006) remained unfinished even though facility plans had been complete for quite some time.¹⁹⁰ Ms. Feinstein

¹⁸⁶U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2007*, March 28, 2006, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=CHRG&browsePath=109%2FSENATE%2FCommittee+on+Appropriations&isCollapsed=false&leafLevelBrowse=false&isDocumentResults=true&ycord=259> (accessed May 5, 2013).

¹⁸⁷Ibid.

¹⁸⁸Ibid.

¹⁸⁹Ibid.

¹⁹⁰Ibid.

questioned the executive branch on its consistent reliance of emergency supplemental requests for the purposes of funding the GWOT.¹⁹¹

FY 2008

For the purposes of this study, FY 2008 was identified as having a larger deviation, as its appropriated funding level and budget request were not within a deviation of 6 percent. The FY 2008 budget request could be attributed to former President George Bush's acknowledgement that U.S. forces needed to change their strategy in conducting operations in the Iraq War.¹⁹² The former President called for a revised strategy in the wake of increased violence and an on-going requirement of assisting Iraq in succeeding in its campaign for regional stability.¹⁹³ Former President Bush stated that this newly devised plan would require the commitment of additional American troops.¹⁹⁴

The intention was for American troops, along with their Iraqi counterparts, to ensure a joint effort of securing the Iraqi people, protecting the local populace, and transition the responsibility for regional stability to Iraqi forces.¹⁹⁵ Former President Bush stated that the revised strategy would go beyond conducting military operations; the new

¹⁹¹Ibid.

¹⁹²The White House, “President’s Address to the Nation,” January 2007, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html> (accessed April 21, 2013).

¹⁹³Ibid.

¹⁹⁴Ibid.

¹⁹⁵Ibid.

approach would require that U.S. troops work in conjunction with Iraqi forces in order to achieve desired objectives.¹⁹⁶

Of the information examined for FY 2008 other factors attributed the budget request (\$124.2 billion for base funding) included continuing military operations in support of the GWOT.¹⁹⁷ The FY 2007 budget requested resources for continued efforts in the following areas:

1. Ensuring soldier readiness and to continue military capabilities in order to maintain superiority;¹⁹⁸
2. Procuring and acquiring equipment and other resources in response to the GWOT.¹⁹⁹

Subsequently, P.L. 110-116 appropriated funds for FY 2008 (\$112.0 billion in base funding) for purposes that include:

1. Active duty personnel costs that include pay and allowances, subsistence, and permanent change in duty station;²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁶Ibid.

¹⁹⁷Department of Defense, “Fiscal 2008 Department of Defense Budget Released,” February 5, 2007, <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10476> (accessed April 27, 2013).

¹⁹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹⁹Ibid.

²⁰⁰U.S. Congress, Public Law 110-116, 110th Cong., November 13, 2007, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ116/pdf/PLAW-110publ116.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013).

2. Active duty operation and maintenance for purposes that include confidential military requirements and the care of ammunition;²⁰¹
3. Active duty procurement of aircraft, missile, weapons and tracked combat vehicles, and ammunition. Some examples include acquiring ordinance, ground-handling equipment, training devices, and modification of ammunition;²⁰²
4. RDT&E of programs that will enhance military capabilities and effectiveness.²⁰³

While the deviation for FY 2008 was -10 percent, the budget increased by 26 percent when compared to FY 2007. In order to review the FY 2008 appropriated versus requested see figure 15 and figure 16 to view FY 2008 by appropriation.

²⁰¹Ibid.

²⁰²Ibid.

²⁰³Ibid.




Figure 15. FY 2008 Appropriation versus Request (Funding represented in millions)

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request,” <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2008.html> (accessed April 28, 2013); U.S. Congress, Public Law 110-116, November 13, 2007, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ116/pdf/PLAW-110publ116.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012).




Figure 16. FY 2008 by Appropriation (Funding represented in millions)

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request,” <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2008.html> (accessed April 28, 2013); U.S. Congress, Public Law 110-116, November 13, 2007, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ116/pdf/PLAW-110publ116.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012).

Based on the results for FY 2008 depicted in figure 16, it was determined that there were significant deviations for Military Personnel with a deviation of -1 percent, Operations and Maintenance with a deviation of -4 percent, Procurement with a deviation of -35 percent, and RDT&E with a deviation of 15 percent. No testimony could be obtained through open resources for a House hearing with either the 109th or 110th Congress for FY 2008. The Senate hearing with 110th Congress on Wednesday, February 28, 2007 for FY 2008 was obtained, but there were no committee members

found to have made any remarks in the testimony in regards to the above mentioned appropriations.²⁰⁴

However, several concerns were raised by committee members. Mr. Byron Dorgan (Democratic party—North Dakota) questioned why each of the military services were funding separate projects focused on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle programs.²⁰⁵ He stated that this was a bad business model, and insinuated that it should be more of a joint effort.²⁰⁶ Mr. Pete Domenici (Republican party—New Mexico) raised a point that the DoD had requested \$1.0 billion in order to address the military's global posture, but questioned its importance as it related to national defense.²⁰⁷

FY 2009

For the purposes of this study FY 2009 was identified as having a larger deviation, as its appropriated funding level and budget request was determined to be in excess of the 6 percent deviation. The information examined for FY 2009 attributed the budget request (\$136.3 billion for base funding) to former President Bush's commitment in prevailing in both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars by increasing military forces on the ground, maintaining force readiness, and providing support to the service members and

²⁰⁴U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2008*, February 28, 2007, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg69104244/pdf/CHRG-110shrg69104244.pdf> (accessed May 6, 2013).

²⁰⁵Ibid.

²⁰⁶Ibid.

²⁰⁷Ibid.

their families.²⁰⁸ The FY 2009 budget requested resources for continued efforts in the following areas:

1. Succeeding in efforts against the GWOT;²⁰⁹
2. Increasing ground forces and capabilities;²¹⁰
3. Maintaining readiness of the force;²¹¹
4. Advancing required combat capabilities; and
5. Improving quality of life for the service members and their families.

Additionally, requested resources were intended to promote and encourage foreign partnerships or alliances in cost burden-sharing efforts in joint combat operations. Funding was also sought to strengthen U.S. troop efforts in support of stability efforts in Africa and in standing up the U.S. Africa Command.²¹²

Subsequently, P.L. 110-329 appropriated funds for FY 2009 (\$122.6 billion in base funding) for purposes that include:

²⁰⁸Department of Defense, “Fiscal Year 2009 Department of Defense Budget Released,” February 4, 2008, <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11663> (accessed April 21, 2013).

²⁰⁹Ibid.

²¹⁰Ibid.

²¹¹Ibid.

²¹²Ibid.

1. Active duty personnel costs that include pay and allowances, subsistence, and permanent change in duty station;²¹³
2. Active duty operation and maintenance for purposes that include confidential military requirements and the care of ammunition;²¹⁴
3. Active duty procurement of aircraft, missile, weapons and tracked combat vehicles, and ammunition. Some examples include acquiring ordinance, ground-handling equipment, training devices, and modification of ammunition;²¹⁵
4. RDT&E of programs that will enhance military capabilities and effectiveness²¹⁶ and continue the hypersonic weapons initiative.²¹⁷

While the deviation for FY 2009 was -10 percent, the budget increased by 10 percent when compared to FY 2008. In order to review the FY 2009 appropriated versus requested see figure 17 and figure 18 to view FY 2009 by appropriation.

²¹³U.S. Congress, Public Law 110-329, 110th Cong., September 30, 2008, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ329/pdf/PLAW-110publ329.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013).

²¹⁴Ibid.

²¹⁵Ibid.

²¹⁶Ibid.

²¹⁷Ibid.




Figure 17. FY 2009 Appropriation versus Request (Funding represented in millions)

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request,” <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2009.html> (accessed April 28, 2013); U.S. Congress, Public Law 110-329, September 30, 2008, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ329/pdf/PLAW-110publ329.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012).




Figure 18. FY 2009 by Appropriation (Funding represented in millions)

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request,” <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2009.html> (accessed April 28, 2013); U.S. Congress, Public Law 110-329, September 30, 2008, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ329/pdf/PLAW-110publ329.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012).

Based on the results for FY 2009 depicted in figure 18, it was determined that there were no significant deviations for Military Personnel with a deviation of less than -1 percent, and Operations and Maintenance with a deviation of less than -1 percent. The Procurement -39 percent and RDT&E 15 percent appropriations were identified as having larger deviations. Research of the House hearing with 110th Congress on Wednesday, February 13, 2008 for FY 2009 was obtained, but provided no support²¹⁸ as to why the RDT&E and Procurement appropriations might have had larger deviations. Of

²¹⁸U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2009*, February 13, 2008, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg46474/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg46474.pdf> (accessed May 5, 2013).

note, while the 110th Congress held testimony on the DoD's FY 2009 budget request, it was the 111th congress that appropriated its actual budget.

Even though House testimony was available, there were no committee members found to have made any remarks in regards to the above mentioned appropriations.²¹⁹ However, there were several concerns raised. Mr. John Murtha (Democratic party—Pennsylvania) expressed a concern with the DoD's lack of transparency.²²⁰ He brought up the subject on program reductions and that the DoD should identify those that would yield a cost savings.²²¹ Mr. Murtha stated that the executive branch's current plan called for more taxpayer dollars in assisting Europe against ballistic missile threats.²²² He also questioned if taxpayers could afford the number of requirements levied on the DoD Airborne Laser Program.²²³ Another unidentified committee member questioned why the DoD was planning to get rid of programs that had just been initiated within the past few years.²²⁴ Lastly, Mr. Murtha questioned why the FY 2009 budget request did not reflect anticipated reductions to programs, such as the fire unit.²²⁵

²¹⁹Ibid.

²²⁰Ibid.

²²¹Ibid.

²²²Ibid.

²²³Ibid.

²²⁴Ibid.

²²⁵Ibid.

Additional research of the Senate hearing with the 110th Congress on Wednesday, February 27, 2008 for FY 2009 also led to further²²⁶ understanding. Even though testimony was available, there were no committee members found to have made any remarks in regards to the above mentioned appropriations.²²⁷ However, many committee members did express other concerns.²²⁸ Mr. Dorgan (Democratic party—North Dakota) expressed that the military had too many contractor funded efforts, and he could not understand why.²²⁹ Mr. Cochran (Republican party—Mississippi) questioned why the Department of the Army would request procurement of 43 aircraft one fiscal year, 18 for the next few fiscal years, and then request 43 aircraft for the following fiscal year.²³⁰ He went on to question this procurement practice.

FY 2010

For the purposes of this study, FY 2010 was identified as having a larger deviation between its appropriated funding level and corresponding budget request in excess of a 6 percent deviation. The information examined for FY 2010 attributed the budget request (\$136.0 billion for base funding) to President Barack Obama's commitment in maintaining support to military operations being conducted in Iraq and

²²⁶Ibid.

²²⁷Ibid.

²²⁸Ibid.

²²⁹Ibid.

²³⁰Ibid.

Afghanistan.²³¹ This funding request takes into account the planned reduction of U.S. forces in Iraq, which was intended to take place after the Iraqi elections in March 2010.²³² Operational and equipment requirements were projected to decrease if the planned reduction strategy for U.S. forces in Iraq took place.²³³

Subsequently, P.L. 111-118 appropriated funds for FY 2010 (\$123.4 billion in base funding) for purposes that include:

1. Active duty personnel costs that include pay and allowances, subsistence, and permanent change in duty station;²³⁴
2. Active duty operation and maintenance for purposes that include confidential military requirements and the care of ammunition;²³⁵
3. Active duty procurement of aircraft, missile, weapons and tracked combat vehicles, and ammunition. Some examples include acquiring ordinance,

²³¹Department of Defense, “DoD Releases Fiscal 2010 Budget Proposal,” May 7, 2009, <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12652> (accessed April 21, 2013).

²³²Department of Defense, “FY 2010 Supplemental Request and FY 2011 OCO Request,” February 2010, <http://asafm.army.mil/Documents/OfficeDocuments/Budget/BudgetMaterials/FY11/OCO/oma.pdf> (accessed April 29, 2013).

²³³Ibid.

²³⁴U.S. Congress, Public Law 111-118, 111th Cong., December 19, 2009, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ118/pdf/PLAW-111publ118.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013).

²³⁵Ibid.

ground-handling equipment, training devices, and modification of ammunition;²³⁶

4. RDT&E of programs that will enhance military capabilities and effectiveness.²³⁷

While the deviation for FY 2010 was -9 percent, the budget increased by less than 1 percent when compared to FY 2009. In order to review the FY 2010 appropriated versus requested see figure 19 and figure 20 to view FY 2010 by appropriation.




Figure 19. FY 2010 Appropriation versus Request (Funding represented in millions)

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), "DoD Budget Request," <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2010.html> (accessed April 28, 2013); U.S. Congress, Public Law 111-118, December 19, 2009, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ118/pdf/PLAW-111publ118.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013).

²³⁶Ibid.

²³⁷Ibid.




Figure 20. FY 2010 by Appropriation (Funding represented in millions)

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request,” <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2010.html> (accessed April 28, 2013); U.S. Congress, Public Law 111-118, December 19, 2009, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ118/pdf/PLAW-111publ118.pdf> (accessed April 28, 2013).

Based on the results for FY 2010 depicted in figure 20, it was determined that there were no significant deviations for Military Personnel with a deviation of less than -1 percent, and Operations and Maintenance with a deviation of -1 percent. The Procurement (-40 percent) and RDT&E (9 percent) appropriations were identified as having larger deviations. Research of the House hearing with 111th Congress on Thursday, March 19, 2009 for FY 2010 has provided further insight.²³⁸ While none the committee members made specific reference to any of the appropriations mentioned

²³⁸U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2010*, March 19, 2009, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hrg56285/pdf/CHRG-111hrg56285.pdf> (accessed May 6, 2013).

above, they did express several concerns. Mr. John Murtha (Democratic party—Pennsylvania) questioned how the DoD could spend so much of U.S. taxpayer dollars on helicopters, and then determine that it was less capable than other preexisting helicopters.²³⁹

Mr. Murtha stated that the DoD was responsible for the acquisition operations of the services, and remarked that it was the taxpayer who had to pay for their mistakes in procurement errors.²⁴⁰ Ms. Marcy Kaptur (Democratic party—Ohio) questioned Europe's missile defense abilities, and if it was the U.S. taxpayer that was going to be responsible for the entire requirement.²⁴¹ Additional research of the Senate hearing with the 111th Congress on Tuesday, May 12, 2009 for FY 2010 was available,²⁴² however none the committee members made direct reference to the above appropriations, nor asked any questions that could be attributed to any of the deviations.

The Department of the Army's budget requests and appropriated funding levels were identified as upward trending for the period studied, with the exception of FY 2006 and FY 2007. These fiscal years are further discussed later in the study. A snap shot of each of the fiscal years studied is depicted in figure 21 by appropriation, followed by figure 22, which then displays appropriated funding versus budget requests for the period studied.

²³⁹Ibid.

²⁴⁰Ibid.

²⁴¹Ibid.

²⁴²Ibid.




Figure 21. FY 2001 through FY 2010 by Appropriation
(Funding represented in millions)

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request FY 2001 through FY 2010,” <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2010.html> (accessed April 28, 2013).




Figure 22. FY 2001 through FY 2010 by Appropriation
(Funding represented in millions)

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “DoD Budget Request FY 2001 through FY 2010,” <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2010.html> (April 28, 2013).

Supplemental

Analysis identified FY 2002 as having a larger standard deviation for supplemental funding with 55 percent, between the appropriated funding level and correlating budget request (see Appendix Q). While the FY 2002 delta is considered to have a larger deviation, the value of the appropriated amount when compared with other fiscal years was extremely small. The value of the FY 2002 appropriated budget level was \$300 million, versus an average of \$31.0 billion for the period studied (see Appendix Q). Excluding FY 2002 and FY 2003, the Department of the Army received on average

7 percent less than its requested amount for supplemental funding (see Appendix Q). Of note, a detailed justification of the Department of the Army's FY 2003 supplemental funding request could not be obtained through open sources. It cannot definitively be determined if there was even a supplemental funding request submitted for this fiscal year.

Additionally, the FY 2007 appropriated amount for supplemental funding was only \$7.0 billion (see Appendix Q). This is compared to \$36.0 billion in FY 2006, and \$56.0 billion in FY 2008 (see Appendix Q). There is no evidence as to why the Department of the Army was appropriated such a significantly low amount of supplemental funding in FY 2007 when compared to the other fiscal years analyzed. Analysis only identifies that the funding was appropriated for the purposes of conducting operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa.²⁴³

Qualitative Findings

Governing Priority Document Analysis

Legislation dictates the *NSS* as the primary governing priority document responsible for setting the tone for each of the following priority documents (the *QDRs* and the *NDS*). There was a verifiable trend in correlating priorities from document to document. Analysis conducted also assisted in determining that when there were changes in administration, there were also follow-on changes in the development and structuring of priorities. The research conducted assisted in identifying that the Bush

²⁴³ Jim Garamone, "President Signs 2007 Defense Authorization Act," *American Forces Press Service*, October 17, 2006, <http://www.defense.gov/news/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=1650> (accessed April 28, 2013).

Administration (from FY 2002 through FY 2009) developed higher quantities of specified goals and priorities within the *NSS* that were considered very clear and concise in their intent (see Appendix K).

Research further identified that the Obama Administration (FY 2010) developed a significantly shorter list of priorities within the *NSS* (see Appendix K). While the total number of priorities were less, each of the main priorities were considered very high level and had embedded sub-priorities featured for the purposes of providing a more holistic view and intent. Understanding how each of the administrations developed priorities within the *NSS* provided insight into how priorities changed during the period studied. Through the research conducted, it was determined that priorities were either grouped as a list or combined as a set of priorities within priorities.

Of the priorities examined during this study, the majority appeared to be focused on maintaining homeland security, establishing national security, and enlisting the support of U.S. international partners (see Appendix K). The examination conducted identified that priorities in the beginning of the study were determined to have more a domestic focus and then slowly shifted over the period studied. This myopic focus of domestic concern eventually took on a more holistic approach; focusing more on international priorities, developing foreign partnerships, and seeking global and economic development (see Appendix K). Examination of the governing priorities essentially established through the executive branch allowed the researcher to observe the consistent changes in priorities, as they were added, dropped, and then re-added throughout the period studied.

While priorities consistently changed there appeared to be no real “new” priorities added during the period studied, but rather recycled throughout the years examined (whether it was covered under a main or nested sub-priority). Even though priorities were considered recycled throughout the period studied, changes did occur from fiscal year to fiscal year, which were accounted for in the priority change index section.

Congressional and DoD Composition

A detailed accounting of the U.S. Senate congressional composition is depicted in table 3.

Table 3. Senate Congressional Composition

Fiscal Years	Congress	Senate		
		Republican Seats	Democrat Seats	Vacant Seats
2001	107 th	50	50	0
2002	107 th	50	50	0
2003	108 th	51	48	1
2004	108 th	51	48	1
2005	109 th	55	44	1
2006	109 th	55	44	1
2007	110 th	49	49	2
2008	110 th	49	49	2
2009	111 th	40	58	2
2010	111 th	40	58	2

Source: Infoplease.com, “Composition of Congress, by Political Party, 1855-2015,” <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0774721.html> (accessed November 20, 2012).

A detailed accounting of the House of Representatives congressional composition is depicted in table 4.

Table 4. House of Representatives Congressional Composition

Fiscal Years	Congress	House of Representatives		Vacant Seats	Independent
		Republican Seats	Democrat Seats		
2001	107 th	221	212	2	0
2002	107 th	221	212	2	0
2003	108 th	227	205	2	0
2004	108 th	227	205	2	0
2005	109 th	230	202	2	1
2006	109 th	230	202	2	1
2007	110 th	199	235	1	0
2008	110 th	199	235	1	0
2009	111 th	178	256	1	0
2010	111 th	178	256	1	0

Source: Infoplease.com, “Composition of Congress, by Political Party, 1855-2015,” <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0774721.html> (accessed November 20, 2012).

As depicted above, for the period of FY 2002 through FY 2006 the Republicans held the majority for both the Senate and House of Representatives more often than not (see Appendix K). For the period of FY 2007 through FY 2010, the Democrats held the majority for the Senate and House of Representatives (see Appendix K). Of note, former President George Bush was in office and oversaw the FY 2002 through FY 2009 budget requests, while President Barack Obama was in office and oversaw the FY 2010 budget request (see Appendix K).

The DoD composition for the position of the Secretary of Defense is depicted in table 5.

Table 5. FY 2001 through FY 2010 Secretary of Defense

Fiscal Years	Secretary of Defense
2001	Donald Rumsfeld
2002	Donald Rumsfeld
2003	Donald Rumsfeld
2004	Donald Rumsfeld
2005	Donald Rumsfeld
2006	Donald Rumsfeld
2007	Robert Gates
2008	Robert Gates
2009	Robert Gates
2010	Robert Gates

Source: Department of Defense, Secretaries of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/specials/secdef_histories/ (accessed April 21, 2013).

The DoD composition for the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is depicted in table 6.

Table 6. FY 2001 through FY 2010 Joint Chiefs of Staff

Fiscal Years	Secretary of Defense
2001	Donald Rumsfeld
2002	Donald Rumsfeld
2003	Donald Rumsfeld
2004	Donald Rumsfeld
2005	Donald Rumsfeld
2006	Donald Rumsfeld
2007	Robert Gates
2008	Robert Gates
2009	Robert Gates
2010	Robert Gates

Source: Infoplease.com, “Past Chairmen of the JCS,” <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0004630.html> (accessed April 21, 2013).

QUAL-quant Findings

This section discusses the quantitative data of the qualitative information as it was considered to provide emerging insight to the researcher. Congressional testimony from House and Senate hearings were reviewed in support of the stated thesis. The researcher was unable to obtain congressional testimonies for every fiscal year. The data gathered only represents information that was researched and analyzed, and should not be considered all encompassing for every fiscal year. The information annotated in the follow-on section provides a congressional viewpoint for the purposes of supporting the study. Some fiscal years were identified as having multiple testimonies and several hearings by various committees. Therefore, the researcher selected the hearings that were most appropriate to DoD and its budget requests. A breakdown of the findings will follow.

Congressional Testimony

FY 2001: No testimonies were obtainable through open resources for either Senate or House hearing with 107th Congress for FY 2001.

FY 2002: There was a House hearing with 107th Congress on Wednesday, July 11, 2001 for FY 2002. The hearing was held by the Committee on the Budget and was titled “Defense Department Budget Priorities for Fiscal Year 2002.”²⁴⁴ In this testimony, Chairman Jim Nussle (Republican party—Iowa) recognized that the military’s budget

²⁴⁴U.S. Congress, *Defense Department Budget Priorities for Fiscal Year 2002*, December 19, 2009, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=CHRG&browsePath=107%2FHOUSE%2FCommittee+on+the+Budget&isCollapsed=false&leafLevelBrowse=false&isDocumentResults=true&ycord=446> (accessed May 4, 2013).

was in desperate need of its FY 2002 requested budget increases. He identified that the funding request was in response to soldier readiness issues, the President's Blueprint for New Beginnings a new national defense strategy, and resourcing the military in preparation for future requirements.²⁴⁵ In his opening remarks, Mr. Nussle also recognized that the defense of the nation was the number one constitutional priority of Congress, and that nothing else mattered if the U.S. was unable to preserve its national stability in ensuring its continued freedom.²⁴⁶

In a statement made by ranking member, Mr. Spratt (Democratic party—South Carolina), he spoke of the DoD's additional budget request of \$3.0 billion (a 60 percent increase) for its ballistic missile defense system. He also stated that the ballistic missile defense system could not be fiscally sustained in follow-on budget years should the DoD not receive its entire funding request,²⁴⁷ which he strongly suggested that it would not. He stated that this was an important point and consideration for the committee, as he did not know if additional funding could be obtained, nor how it was going to be sustained in future fiscal years.²⁴⁸ Upon completion of these remarks, Mr. Nussle entered in a prepared statement at the consent of the presiding committee.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁵Ibid.

²⁴⁶Ibid.

²⁴⁷Ibid.

²⁴⁸Ibid.

²⁴⁹Ibid.

These remarks stated that the committee had come together in order to conduct a defense review for FY 2002, and determine long-term resourcing requirements.²⁵⁰ It recognized that the military had experienced deployment requirements for over a decade, that it did not have appropriate priorities established, and that its budget was severely underfunded from the previous administration and it required immediate response.²⁵¹ The statement identified that the purpose of the hearing was to gain further insight into the DoD's priorities for FY 2002. Additionally, the statement addressed the requirement for future resources in response to increasing military obligations, and a concern for not cutting into the Social Security and Medicare surpluses.²⁵²

There was a Senate hearing with 107th Congress on Thursday, March 22, 2001 for FY 2002. The hearing was held by the Committee on Armed Services and was titled "Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2002."²⁵³ In this testimony, Chairman John Warner (Republican party—Virginia) stated that this was the first of several hearings to be held on project status and the military's obligation rate on the regional alignment of combatant commands.²⁵⁴ He referenced the various military operations that U.S. forces were engaged in, to include operations in Saudi Arabia,

²⁵⁰Ibid.

²⁵¹Ibid.

²⁵²Ibid.

²⁵³U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2002*, March 22, 2001, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg75346/pdf/CHRG-107shrg75346.pdf> (accessed May 4, 2013).

²⁵⁴Ibid.

Kuwait, Turkey, Bosnia, and Kosovo.²⁵⁵ Upon completion of these remarks, gentlemen from the committee entered in prepared statements at the consent of the presiding committee.²⁵⁶

In Mr. Thurmond's (Republican party—South Carolina) prepared statement, he expressed a concern for the U.S. and its involvement in various military operations in the same regions for over 10 years, with no evident end in sight.²⁵⁷ He stated that the U.S. should have considered a different position concerning the Balkans and Iraq. Mr. Thurmond stated that the U.S. needed to now refocus its efforts on ending violence within these regions, minimizing the impacts on other military engagements and the military forces (writ large).²⁵⁸ Additionally, Mr. Thurmond stated that he wanted to understand DoD's force protection issues and the current terrorist threats facing U.S. troops.²⁵⁹

In Mr. Jim Bunning's (Republican party—Kentucky) prepared statement, he expressed his concern of the military being overburdened and overused in regions throughout the world, in fact, in some places that the U.S. may not have a valid interest.²⁶⁰ He attributed the above statements as to the reason why soldier readiness was

²⁵⁵Ibid.

²⁵⁶Ibid.

²⁵⁷Ibid.

²⁵⁸Ibid.

²⁵⁹Ibid.

²⁶⁰Ibid.

severely lacking and perhaps a contributing factor to a growing trend in low morale.²⁶¹

Mr. Bunning explained his distrust for the military's chain of command and lack of transparency.²⁶² He stated that if the senior leaders within the DoD refused to be forthcoming then it would continue to hinder the committee's ability in making appropriate decisions, and would subsequently affect military forces engaged in operations.²⁶³

FY 2003: There was a House hearing with 107th Congress on Tuesday, February 12, 2002 for FY 2003. The hearing was held by the Committee on the Budget and was titled "Department of Defense Budget Priorities for Fiscal Year 2003."²⁶⁴ Chairman Nussle (Republican party—Iowa) recognized the U.S. as a country at war, and therefore, anticipated a corresponding budget request from the Executive Branch²⁶⁵ that was appropriate in response. He stated that national defense was the committee's number one priority, and that the U.S. had recently suffered attacks resulting in grave consequences.

²⁶¹Ibid.

²⁶²Ibid.

²⁶³Ibid.

²⁶⁴U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Budget Priorities for Fiscal Year 2003*, February 12, 2003, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107hhrg77819/pdf/CHRG-107hhrg77819.pdf> (accessed May 4, 2013).

²⁶⁵Ibid.

Chairman Nussle beseeched the committee in appropriately responding to the military's requirements in order to succeed in the war against terrorism.²⁶⁶ He also recognized that in doing so the committee was potentially creating a larger fiscal concern, as the U.S. economy was currently experiencing a downturn.²⁶⁷ Chairman Nussle quoted the President as saying that there were three acceptable reasons as to when the government should enter the U.S. into deficit, to include national crisis, an economic collapse, and-or a war.²⁶⁸

Chairman Nussle stated that the U.S. Government would go into temporary deficits in order to conduct military operations, but stated that a payback plan would be developed for immediate resolution.²⁶⁹ He also made note that the DoD operations and maintenance budget request had been the largest it had been in over the past two decades.²⁷⁰ Upon completion of these remarks, Chairman Nussle entered in a prepared statement at the consent of the presiding committee.²⁷¹ In his statement, he assured the DoD that the committee would do anything necessary to support military forces, equip

²⁶⁶Ibid.

²⁶⁷Ibid.

²⁶⁸Ibid.

²⁶⁹Ibid.

²⁷⁰Ibid.

²⁷¹Ibid.

forces with the appropriate capabilities, and establish the training programs necessary to defeat terrorism.²⁷²

There was a Senate hearing with the 107th Congress on Wednesday, February 27, 2002 for FY 2003. The hearing was held by the Committee on Appropriations and was titled “Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2003.”²⁷³ In his opening statement, Mr. Inouye (Democratic party—Hawaii) stated that the committee’s responsibility was to appropriate funding necessary for the military to enhance its ability in ensuring national defense.²⁷⁴ He referenced the attacks that took place on September 11, 2001 and argued against cutting defense spending.²⁷⁵ Mr. Inouye stated that the DoD was underfunded, which necessitated increases to defense spending so that the military may appropriately be resourced, in order take on the difficult task of ensuring national security.²⁷⁶ He also brought up the statements made by DoD critics and requested that it be forthcoming on the purposes of requested funding.²⁷⁷

²⁷²Ibid.

²⁷³U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2003*, February 27, 2002, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=CHRG&browsePath=107%2FSENATE%2FCommittee+on+Appropriations&isCollapsed=false&leafLevelBrowse=false&isDocumentResults=true&ycord=350> (accessed May 5, 2013).

²⁷⁴Ibid.

²⁷⁵Ibid.

²⁷⁶Ibid.

²⁷⁷Ibid.

In Mr. Stevens' (Republican party—Alaska) statement, he acknowledged that the U.S. was currently facing a varying degree of national security challenges.²⁷⁸ He stated that the funds requested were necessary to address critical requirements within the DoD, and then questioned the validity of the DoD's large budget²⁷⁹ request. Mr. Stevens stated that he was impressed by soldier morale and their willingness to conduct and complete missions.²⁸⁰ He welcomed DoD testimony, but stated that there were still structural changes that he did not understand²⁸¹ and that he welcomed testimony on the topic.

In Mr. Fritz Hollings' (Democratic party—South Carolina) statement, he commented on the DoD's growing fiscal requirement and the neglect it received from the previous administration.²⁸² He stated that DoD had significant shortfalls and that during the previous administration it had never realized the required increases. He recalled that the Secretary of Defense stated in the previous fiscal year's testimony (and prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks) that the military needed to make several improvements, to include phasing out old systems, which would create a cost savings for developing new capabilities.²⁸³ Mr. Hollings acknowledged the DoD's testimony before the committee, and made mention that the DoD was requesting a larger budget than it planned to,

²⁷⁸Ibid.

²⁷⁹Ibid.

²⁸⁰Ibid.

²⁸¹Ibid.

²⁸²Ibid.

²⁸³Ibid.

according to last year's hearing.²⁸⁴ He acknowledged that Congress had already provided the DoD with millions of dollars in additional supplemental funding.²⁸⁵ He then went on to question the FY 2003 budget increase, made reference to the national deficit, and stated that he would have many questions that required detailed justification.²⁸⁶

In a statement made by Ms. Kay Hutchison (Republican party—Texas), she recognized the great job that the military had been doing since the September 11, 2001 attacks.²⁸⁷ She acknowledged that the military was in desperate need of transforming each of the services, and that tough considerations would have to be made given the current state of the U.S. economy.²⁸⁸ She stated that she would have additional questions, particularly in the areas of vaccines and cures for service members potentially exposed to chemical attacks.²⁸⁹

In Ms. Feinstein's (Democratic party—California) statement, she commended the DoD for its progress and continued efforts.²⁹⁰ She then stated that she had several concerns about the DoD's budget request. One of the concerns she expressed was that it assumed the military would be engaged in war for a prolonged period of time, and

²⁸⁴Ibid.

²⁸⁵Ibid.

²⁸⁶Ibid.

²⁸⁷Ibid.

²⁸⁸Ibid.

²⁸⁹Ibid.

²⁹⁰Ibid.

therefore, imperative that the committee discontinue funding programs that had proven no longer necessary.²⁹¹ Ms. Feinstein went on to express a concern for valuable resources being used to fund DoD programs that may no longer be essential, such as the missile defense program.²⁹² She acknowledged the importance of funding the military in order to respond to the terrorist attacks that took place on September 11, 2001, but stated that continued increases to the DoD's budget would significantly hinder the committee's fiscal ability.²⁹³

In Mr. Domenici's (Republican party—New Mexico) statement, he commended the DoD for the progress it had made, but stated that it still had a long way to go in order to ensure continued success.²⁹⁴ He referenced the U.S. economy and stated that the committee may have been premature in its worry, as economists had stated it appeared to have bottomed out.²⁹⁵ He recognized that the U.S. had been confronted with a recession simultaneously while entering into war, that he was of the opinion the recession would soon falter.²⁹⁶

FY 2004: There was a House hearing with the 108th Congress on Wednesday, March 12, 2003 for FY 2004. The hearing was held by the Committee on Appropriations

²⁹¹Ibid.

²⁹²Ibid.

²⁹³Ibid.

²⁹⁴Ibid.

²⁹⁵Ibid.

²⁹⁶Ibid.

and was titled “Department of Defense Appropriations for 2004.”²⁹⁷ In his statement, Mr. Jerry Lewis (Republican party—California) acknowledged that the FY 2004 budget and (as well as its preceding budgets) were in transformational stages so that it could better equip the military in responding to the challenges of the Twenty-first century.²⁹⁸ He praised the DoD for its efforts, and recognized the increased missions placed on U.S. troops, to include military operations being conducted in Afghanistan and the Middle East.²⁹⁹

In an additional statement made by Mr. Murtha (Democratic party—Pennsylvania), he recognized the Chairman’s efforts on supporting the Predator unmanned aerial system, as it had proven very successful out in the field.³⁰⁰ He acknowledged other DoD advancements, to include a more effective logistical system and expressed his support in the military winning in the war against terrorism.³⁰¹ Mr. Murtha stated that a leaner military force was going to be the answer in responding to future conflicts and prevailing³⁰² against terrorism.

²⁹⁷U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriation for 2004*, March 12, 2003, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108hhrg92804/html/CHRG-108hhrg92804.htm> (accessed May 5, 2013).

²⁹⁸Ibid.

²⁹⁹Ibid.

³⁰⁰Ibid.

³⁰¹Ibid.

³⁰²Ibid.

There was a Senate hearing with the 108th Congress on Wednesday, March 19, 2003 for FY 2004. The hearing was held by the Committee on Appropriations and was titled “Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2004.”³⁰³ In a prepared statement, Mr. Stevens (Republican party—Alaska) acknowledged that DoD transformation efforts had thus far proven to be a success in the midst of several critics.³⁰⁴ He made mention of how U.S. troops were not only involved in the GWOT, but that they were now also preparing to conduct military operations in Iraq.³⁰⁵ Mr. Stevens stated that for the reasons mentioned above it was imperative the military be funded appropriately.³⁰⁶ He acknowledged that the transformation of the military not only involved the development and procurement of weapons, but also necessitated doctrinal revisions and changes in organizational structure.³⁰⁷

In a statement by Mr. Inouye (Democratic party—Hawaii), he praised the DoD’s transformation efforts and for enhancing a well trained, determined, and dedicated force.³⁰⁸ He acknowledged the DoD’s efforts in seeking developments that would

³⁰³U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2004*, March 19, 2003, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg1910409/pdf/CHRG-108shrg1910409.pdf> (accessed May 5, 2013).

³⁰⁴Ibid.

³⁰⁵Ibid.

³⁰⁶Ibid.

³⁰⁷Ibid.

³⁰⁸Ibid.

enhance its capabilities and assist U.S. troops in winning the war against terrorism.³⁰⁹ Mr. Inouye recognized the DoD's growing mission, as reserve units had now been employed to serve in areas that included Bosnia, Kosovo, Sinai, Saudi Arabia, and soon in support of a war in Iraq.³¹⁰ He expressed an interest on U.S. troop capability and sustainability with its current strength and capabilities.³¹¹

FY 2005: No testimony was obtainable through open resources for a House hearing with either the 108th or 109th Congress for FY 2005.

There was a Senate hearing with the 108th Congress on Wednesday, April 21, 2004 for FY 2005. This hearing was held by the Committee on Appropriations and was titled "Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2005."³¹² Of note, while the 108th Congress held testimony on the DoD's FY 2005 budget request, it was the 109th Congress that appropriated the actual funding level. In a prepared statement Mr. Stevens (Republican party—Alaska), made mention of developments to missile defense capabilities that had been initiated in 2004, and stated that he was interested in hearing the progression made.³¹³ In a prepared statement, Mr. Inouye (Democratic party—Hawaii) also spoke about the missile defense system and the various developments made

³⁰⁹Ibid.

³¹⁰Ibid.

³¹¹Ibid.

³¹²U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2005*, April 21, 2004, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg3910492/pdf/CHRG-108shrg3910492.pdf> (accessed May 5, 2013).

³¹³Ibid.

in the midst of many naysayers.³¹⁴ He expressed that the program's budget continues to grow, even though it is unsure if out year funding will be attainable for long-term sustainability.³¹⁵

FY 2006: No testimony was obtainable through open resources for a House hearing with either the 108th or 109th Congress for FY 2006.

There was a Senate hearing with the 109th Congress on Wednesday, March 9, 2005 for FY 2006. This hearing was held by the Committee on Appropriations and was titled "Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2006."³¹⁶ Mr. Stevens (Republican party—Alaska) stated that he was looking forward to working with the Department of the Army in sustaining military requirements in a difficult time.³¹⁷ He stated that it was imperative the military be remaining agile, trained, and well equipped in order to remain combat effective.³¹⁸ Mr. Stevens acknowledged that the committee must take a balanced budget approach to the military's budget request, while maintaining recruitment and mobility efforts.³¹⁹ In another prepared statement by Mr. Inouye

³¹⁴Ibid.

³¹⁵Ibid.

³¹⁶U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2006*, April 6, 2005, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg39104137/pdf/CHRG-109shrg39104137.pdf> (accessed May 5, 2013).

³¹⁷Ibid.

³¹⁸Ibid.

³¹⁹Ibid.

(Democratic party—Hawaii), he echoed the comments and concerns made by Mr. Stevens.

FY 2007: No testimony was obtainable through open resources for a House hearing with either the 109th or 110th Congress for FY 2007.

There was a Senate hearing with the 109th Congress on Tuesday, March 28, 2006 for FY 2007. This hearing was held by the Committee on Appropriations and was titled “Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2007.”³²⁰ Chairman Stevens (Republican party—Alaska) stated that the U.S. was a nation still involved in two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.³²¹ He acknowledged that the budget request would receive much consideration, but that there are many challenges on the horizon.³²² He identified these challenges as being recruitment, retaining the force, and continued efforts in developing capabilities.³²³ Mr. Stevens mentioned that the Department of the Army’s budget had realized continued growth throughout the past few fiscal years, and questioned if the government would be able to sustain that level of spending in the out years.³²⁴

³²⁰U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2007*, March 28, 2006, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=CHRG&browsePath=109%2FSENATE%2FCommittee+on+Appropriations&isCollapsed=false&leafLevelBrowse=false&isDocumentResults=true&ycord=259> (accessed May 5, 2013).

³²¹Ibid.

³²²Ibid.

³²³Bid.

³²⁴Ibid.

In a statement made by Mr. Inouye (Democratic party—Hawaii), he spoke about the Department of the Army's transformational efforts in changing its organizational construct, while simultaneously conducting military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.³²⁵ He recognized the ever increasing resource requirements and the committee's ability (or lack thereof) in funding the military to meet its stated obligations.³²⁶ He expressed a concern for military operations that had significantly increased in the midst of its transformational efforts, which he stated was creating a heavy burden on U.S. troops.³²⁷ Mr. Inouye referenced the military's additional supplemental requests, and expressed that he believed the Department of the Army would receive support from the committee.³²⁸

In a statement prepared by Mr. Christopher Bond (Republican party—Missouri), he brought up a range of things that were identified as hindering soldier readiness; and stated that the committee had many difficult choices to make given the scarcity of resources.³²⁹ He spoke about the National Guard at great length, making reference to many of the outstanding funding requirements.³³⁰ He also made mention of the military's transformation efforts of future combat systems, and stated that the Department of the

³²⁵Ibid.

³²⁶Ibid.

³²⁷Ibid.

³²⁸Ibid.

³²⁹Ibid.

³³⁰Ibid.

Army needed to remain forthcoming about program successes, challenges, and gaps.³³¹

Mr. Bond also spoke about the C-17 at great length and questioned if revisions made would hinder future logistical support requirements.³³²

In a statement made by Mr. Dorgan (Democratic party—North Dakota), he acknowledged all of the efforts that had been achieved by the National Guard and Reserve units in support of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.³³³ He discussed the length of deployments for each of the military services, and questioned the effect deployments had on retention.³³⁴ Mr. Dorgan made the assumption that the committee would do whatever it needed to, in order to support the military in ensuring national security.³³⁵

FY 2008: No testimony was obtainable through open resources for a House hearing with either the 109th or 110th Congress for FY 2008.

There was a Senate hearing with the 110th Congress on Wednesday, February 28, 2007 for FY 2008. This hearing was held by the Committee on Appropriations and was titled “Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2008.”³³⁶ In a statement,

³³¹Ibid.

³³²Ibid.

³³³Ibid.

³³⁴U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2008*, February 28, 2007, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg69104244/pdf/CHRG-110shrg69104244.pdf> (accessed May 6, 2013).

³³⁵U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2007*, March 28, 2006.

³³⁶U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2008*, February 28, 2007.

Mr. Inouye (Democratic party—Hawaii) remarked that the DoD’s FY 2008 budget and supplemental requests were now in the several hundred billions, and that while necessary, increases to the DoD’s budget were beginning to hinder investments of other federal programs.³³⁷ He recognized that the committee should support U.S. troops and their efforts, but that it should be through a practice of due diligence when appropriating taxpayer dollars.³³⁸ Mr. Inouye also stated that the committee was interested in hearing what steps the DoD had taken in reducing operating costs and realigning available funds.³³⁹

In a prepared statement by Mr. Stevens (Republican party—Alaska), he acknowledged that the committee had a difficult task before them, as he stated that they must find a balance between available funds and the DoD budget request.³⁴⁰ He recognized the demand for continued increases to the DoD budget, but stated that a time had come when there was only a limited amount of resources available.³⁴¹

FY 2009: There was a House hearing with the 110th Congress on Wednesday, February 13, 2008 for FY 2009. This hearing was held by the Committee on Appropriations and was titled “Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year

³³⁷Ibid.

³³⁸Ibid.

³³⁹Ibid.

³⁴⁰Ibid.

³⁴¹Ibid.

2009.”³⁴² Mr. Murtha (Democratic party—Pennsylvania) discussed the Walter Reed Medical Center, funding provided, and the much needed improvements that have been made.³⁴³ He expressed a concern for the numerous waivers being given to service members, and stated that the military was recruiting more and more individuals without a high school level education.³⁴⁴ He expressed his concern for U.S. troop abilities if the government continued to make exceptions to the rules.³⁴⁵ Mr. Murtha also spoke about service members serving on consecutive deployments, while an identified population within the military that had been determined to never have deployed.³⁴⁶

Mr. Murtha acknowledged that the DoD submitted two supplemental requests for FY 2009, and stated that the substantial requests should be able address current and out year requirements.³⁴⁷ He commented that he was disappointed certain programs had not been utilized, and requested programs that are no longer needed be discontinued.³⁴⁸

There was a Senate hearing with the 110th Congress on Wednesday, February 27, 2008 for FY 2009. This hearing was held by the Committee on

³⁴²U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2009*, February 13, 2008, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg46474/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg46474.pdf> (accessed May 5, 2013).

³⁴³Ibid.

³⁴⁴Ibid.

³⁴⁵Ibid.

³⁴⁶Ibid.

³⁴⁷Ibid.

³⁴⁸Ibid.

Appropriations and was titled “Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2009.”³⁴⁹ In a statement made by Mr. Inouye (Democratic party—Hawaii), he referenced the Department of the Army’s FY 2008 budget increase request, FY 2008 pending supplemental request, and the FY 2009 budget increase and supplemental request.³⁵⁰ He made mention of the toll that the GWOT had on U.S. troops, equipment, and capabilities.³⁵¹ Mr. Inouye addressed the military’s funding requirement and spoke about having to find a balance between priorities.³⁵² He expressed his concern for high priced programs, asking if the military was taking on too much, and if the right amount of oversight was being provided in meeting future challenges.³⁵³

In a statement by Mr. Stevens (Republican party—Alaska), he acknowledged a lack of funding when the military had first entered into conflict, and suggested that future changes be made to ensure that the military was never caught off guard again.³⁵⁴ In a prepared statement by Mr. Cochran (Republican party—Mississippi), he brought up a concern about the Department of the Army heavily relying on supplemental funding, and its inability to sustain mission requirements solely through its base funding requests.³⁵⁵

³⁴⁹Ibid.

³⁵⁰Ibid.

³⁵¹Ibid.

³⁵²Ibid.

³⁵³Ibid.

³⁵⁴Ibid.

³⁵⁵Ibid.

He also expressed an interest on how the military planned to address this problem in out year funding requests.³⁵⁶

FY 2010: There was a House hearing with the 111th Congress on Thursday, March 19, 2009 for FY 2010. This hearing was held by the Committee on Appropriations and was titled “Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2010.”³⁵⁷ Mr. Sanford Bishop (Democratic party—Georgia) made a statement on the importance of the new Africa Command, as growing threats had become problematic in this region over the past several years.³⁵⁸ He stated that the establishment of Africa Command had not been without its problems, since it was unable to find a close nation in which it could post its headquarters. This resulted in Africa Command being located in Germany where it was harder to establish necessary relationships with the appropriate African leaders.³⁵⁹

There was a Senate hearing with the 111th Congress on Tuesday, May 12, 2009 for FY 2010. This hearing was held by the Committee on Appropriations and was titled “Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2010.”³⁶⁰ In opening remarks, Mr. Inouye (Democratic party—Hawaii) referenced the Department of the Army’s FY

³⁵⁶Ibid.

³⁵⁷U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2010*, March 19, 2009, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg56285/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg56285.pdf> (accessed May 6, 2013).

³⁵⁸Ibid.

³⁵⁹Ibid.

³⁶⁰U.S. Congress, *Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2010*, May 12, 2009, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg89104345/pdf/CHRG-111shrg89104345.pdf> (accessed May 6, 2013).

2009 budget and supplemental requests, as well as its FY 2010 supplemental request.³⁶¹

He mentioned that while the Department of the Army was still engaged in military operations overseas, it was also still in the midst of transformation efforts for the forces.³⁶² Mr. Inouye made mention of the budget cuts that had sparked outrage over programs that had received significant investment and then failed operationally.³⁶³ He stated that the Department of the Army needed to reconsider its approach in conducting cost analysis and preparing the budget³⁶⁴ request. Mr. Inouye also mentioned that procurement funding would become more scarce and that the committee expected to see the DoD making appropriate decisions, as well as identifying the potential way forward in its next *QDR*³⁶⁵ report.

Priority Change Index

The priorities researched and analyzed for the period of this study were extracted from the *National Security Strategy*, the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, and *National Defense Strategy* (see Appendix M). The added, dropped, and maintained priorities per document for each fiscal year were identified in order to determine the relative change from document to document. The number of added, dropped, and maintained priorities per document were then calculated into percentages in order to identify the magnitude

³⁶¹Ibid.

³⁶²Ibid.

³⁶³Ibid.

³⁶⁴Ibid.

³⁶⁵Ibid.

of change from document to document. Of note, every priority (whether added, dropped, or maintained) was treated as co-equal and given a weight equal to one. A change index was then developed in order to determine the degree of change between priority documents per each fiscal year.

The analysis conducted identified FY 2002, FY 2006, FY 2008, and FY 2010 as being years with the greatest magnitude of change (see Appendix M). Ranges were then developed for each of the priorities based on the above mentioned qualitative results (see Appendix N). The total numbers of change (added, dropped, and maintained) between successive documents determined these ranges, which were then classified into groups as depicted in table 7.

Table 7. Classification

Ranges	Classification of Priorities
0 - 5	Small
6 - 10	Medium
11- 15	Large

Source: Created by author.

The qualitative judgment regarding the change in policy (priorities) between successive documents was determined to be small to medium. The number of small to medium results was equal and represented the vast majority of priorities reviewed in each of the documents (see Appendix N).

Budgetary Process

A detailed description of the fiscal year budgetary request process follows in order to provide clarity and context to the follow-on mixed method findings. The Department of the Army prepares its budget requests and submits them through the DoD for approval. The DoD will then make any necessary revisions and then submit an all encompassing budget request to the OMB. The OMB is the oversight office responsible for ensuring that all congressional budget submissions reflect the President's priorities (priorities of the Executive Branch). The OMB will provide direction, allocation, and necessary revision to any congressional budget submissions that are found not to be in line with priorities of the Executive Branch's.

When revisions are necessary OMB will enter into negotiations with the appropriate departments and then upon reaching a consensus will make necessary revisions. The DoD will then transmit what is considered the President's budget to Congress for approval or revision. Once the budget request is considered to be in line with congressional priorities Congress will authorize and then finally appropriate funding through public law by the Congress (the legislative branch).

Mix Method Findings

For the period studied a mix method analysis was conducted by combining both the quantitative and qualitative research. The purpose of doing so was to expand the scope of the examination, and to determine additional findings for the stated thesis. Mixing the two research methods has expanded the results of the analysis conducted for the stated thesis question. Mixed method analysis was conducted in order to determine if

any relationships existed between the two methods, and the magnitude and timing of change.

Executive versus Legislative Branch

An exploratory examination of the quantitative and qualitative data was conducted using mixed method. Analysis identified that from FY 2002 through FY 2006 President George Bush (a Republican) was in office and the congressional composition of both the Senate and the House of Representatives were primarily Republican majority. Research identified that during this timeframe the Department of the Army's portion of the DoD budget request (which was approved by the executive branch) was determined to be in line with congressional priorities (the legislative branch), as each of the budget requests were considered to be appropriated as requested with deviations of less than 6 percent (see Appendices K and P). These smaller deviations between what is ultimately considered to be the priorities of the executive and legislative branches could have attributed to a still aggressive and still fairly front and center war against terrorism.

Additionally, the Department of the Army realized a consistent increase to its topline funding level from FY 2002 through FY 2006, which also allowed the researcher to determine that budget requests were in line with congressional priorities. It can be assumed, that for the period mentioned above the executive branch's priorities were supported by Congress as the Republicans held majority, and had a common interest and agenda with the President (who was also a member of their party).

For FY 2007 through FY 2009, the Senate was identified as being split, while the House of Representatives held Democrat majority. Democratic majority could explain why the executive branch's priorities were not considered to be in line with congressional

priorities (legislative) for FY 2007 (appropriated with a 17 percent deviation), FY 2008 (appropriated with a 10 percent deviation), and FY 2009 (appropriated with a 10 percent deviation). It can be assumed that the larger deviations could be attributed to a Democratic majority having different priorities and intentions than the President (who was not a member of their party), and other economic factors.

For FY 2010, President Barack Obama (a Democrat) was in office and the congressional composition for the Senate and House of Representatives was Democratic majority. Analysis determined that in FY 2010 the Department of the Army's portion of the DoD budget request (which was approved by the executive branch) was not considered to be in line with congressional priorities (the legislative branch), as the appropriated and requested budgets were identified as having a larger deviation in excess of 6 percent (9 percent deviation) (see Appendices K and P).

Largest Deviation and Economic Factors

Further examination identified the FY 2007 appropriated funding level as having the greatest magnitude of change in regards to its budget request. In FY 2007, qualitative data identified that former President Bush (a Republican) was in office; a congressional composition that was split in the Senate and Democratic majority in the House of Representatives, and that the U.S. economy was suffering a recession (see Appendix K). Quantitative data identified that the Department of the Army's budget request was \$106.4 billion and yet was only appropriated \$89.0 billion of its request (see Appendix P).

Additionally, the U.S. national debt had significantly increased in 2007, while it was simultaneously experiencing a downturned economy. This finding is further

reinforced as the national debt in FY 2007 (\$10 trillion)³⁶⁶ had nearly doubled since FY 2001 (\$5.8 trillion).³⁶⁷ It has been determined that a declining U.S. economy, a climbing national debt, and an anticipated withdrawal from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars could have attributed to a decrease in the FY 2007 appropriated budget, and subsequent decreases in follow-on budgets for FY 2008 through FY 2010.

Budget Requests versus Executive Branch Priorities

In applying mixed method analysis a relationship was identified between the Department of the Army's budget requests and priorities established by the executive branch was identified. The executive branch's policy developed priorities that were found to influence budget requests. Both the Department of the Army and the DoD testified in several hearings that their budget requests were in response to the executive branch's priorities, strategies, and requirements as laid out in governing priority documents. To further defend this assumption, researchers affirmed the NSS as the primary priority document, and found it to be a stage setter for follow-on priority documents.

Additional relationships were found between budget requests and certain changes in priorities from document to document and year to year. Priorities that were added, dropped, or maintained did account (in some instances) for increased or decreased budget requests. Of the evidence obtained certain findings were found to substantiate that a relationship existed between budget requests and changes in priorities.

³⁶⁶Department of Treasury, “The Daily History of Debt Results,” <http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/NPGateway> (accessed April 21, 2013).

³⁶⁷Ibid.

Budget Requests versus Legislative Branch Priorities

Relationships between budget requests and congressional priorities established through the legislative branch could only be assumed. The researcher made this assumption by determining the median of deviations between appropriated funding levels and corresponding budget requests. The researcher then used that median in determining if budget requests were considered to be in line with congressional priorities. The researcher had to develop a methodology in rendering a supportable judgment, as the researcher did not have access to congressional databases. The researcher was also unable to identify congressional priorities or intent. Congressional testimony did provide insight; however, it appeared that congressional priorities may have been established only after having been presented with the executive branch's budget requests.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to draw conclusions and make reasonable recommendations on the results determined throughout the examination. The overall intent of this chapter is to address the stated hypothesis that the Department of the Army's portion of the DoD budget request was in line with the specified priorities of the Congress, and the following stated sub-questions:

1. When new priorities emerged, did the budget request respond?
2. Is there a correlation between a change in priorities and a change in budget?
3. What were the priorities set forth in the *National Security Strategy*, the *National Defense Strategy*, and the *Quadrennial Defense Review*?
4. How much supplemental funding was appropriated to the Department of the Army for the period being studied?
5. How much did the Department of the Army's budget request change from FY 2001 through FY 2010?

Additionally, this chapter will also identify areas for further research and questions in support of furthering this study.

Additional Sub-Questions

The following sub-questions emerged during the course of this examination and warrant response in support of the stated thesis:

1. Did congressional composition affect the Department of the Army's budget request, and subsequently appropriated budget levels?

2. Were there any economic factors that could be attributed to appropriated budget levels?

Hypothesis: Has the Department of the Army's Portion of the DoD Budget Request been in line with the Specified Priorities of the Congress for FY 2001 through FY 2010?

The Department of the Army's FY2001 budget request was used in this study for the purposes of establishing a starting point. It should be noted that the FY 2001 budget request has more of a connection with the fiscal requirements established in 1999 and 2000, as these years are when the FY 2001 budget request was prepared and transmitted to Congress. Even though this is the case, FY 2001 was still considered relevant to this study as it provided not only a starting point for the research, but was also applicable in determining trend lines, changes, and alignment for FY 2002 through FY 2010.

For FY 2002 through FY 2006, the Department of the Army's appropriated funding levels and budget requests were identified as having smaller deviations within 6 percent. As stated in chapter 4, fiscal years identified as having deviations within 6 percent between appropriated funding levels and corresponding budget requests were considered to be appropriated as requested. A 6 percent deviation was determined to be the cut off for funding that was considered to be appropriated as requested. This cut off was determined for the purpose of this study as it was found to be median of percentage changes between appropriated budget levels and corresponding budget requests. FY 2002 through FY 2006 were identified to as having deviations within 6 percent as previously stated, and therefore, it was assumed that these budgets were in line with congressional priorities and intent.

FY 2007 through FY 2010 was identified as having larger deviations throughout the research conducted. For each fiscal year, their appropriated funding levels and budget requests were identified as having deviations in excess of 6 percent. FY 2007 was identified as having the largest deviation at -17 percent, and was considered to not be in line with congressional priorities. In the FY 2007 DoD press release, requested funds were identified as having a shift in emphasis.³⁶⁸ This shift identified the importance of transforming the military and refocusing the military on being a more agile and precision driven force.³⁶⁹ Additionally, the request called for increases in capabilities and personnel to special operations forces.³⁷⁰ While the standard deviation for FY 2007 was negative, the budget increased by 2 percent when compared to FY 2006, which corresponds to the above stated press release.

FY 2008 was identified as having a large deviation of -10 percent, and was not considered to be in line with congressional priorities. In the FY 2008 DoD press release, funds were requested to grow the force, enhance soldier readiness, and increase the number of brigade combat teams.³⁷¹ The budget request identified important areas for military investment, to include unmanned aerial vehicles, ground vehicles, and launch

³⁶⁸Department of Defense, “President Bush’s FY 2007 Defense Budget,” February 6, 2006, http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/Docs/2007_Budget_Rollout_Attachment.pdf (accessed April 30, 2013).

³⁶⁹Ibid.

³⁷⁰Ibid.

³⁷¹Department of Defense, “President Bush’s FY 2008 Defense Budget Submission,” February 5, 2007, http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/Docs/2008_Budget_Rollout_Attachment.pdf (accessed April 30, 2013).

platforms that would improve joint efforts and the lethality of forces. The funding request also focused on efforts that would continue to assist in detecting and destroying improvised explosive devices; to train, ready, and transfer security operations over to Iraqi forces; and to continue joint efforts with international partners in ensuring regional security and stabilization.³⁷² While the deviation for FY 2008 was negative, the budget increased by 25 percent when compared to FY 2007, which corresponds to the above stated press release.

FY 2009 was identified as having a deviation of -10 percent, and was not considered to be in line with congressional priorities. In the FY 2009 DoD release, funds requested remained committed to continuing efforts in the war against terrorism. The budget request focused efforts on enhancing ground capabilities; developing systems necessary to mitigate future combat gaps; and enhancing soldier readiness and mobility.³⁷³ This request increased military forces, identified procurement efforts necessary to advance weapons capabilities, and planned development of other wartime equipment or systems that would provide coalition forces with an operational advantage.³⁷⁴ While the deviation for FY 2009 was negative, the budget increased by 10 percent when compared to FY 2008, which corresponds to the above stated press release.

³⁷²Ibid.

³⁷³Department of Defense, “FY 2009 Department of Defense Budget Released,” February 4, 2008, http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2009/2009_Budget_Rollout_Release.pdf (accessed April 30, 2013).

³⁷⁴Ibid.

FY 2010 was identified as having a deviation of -9 percent, and was not considered to be in line with congressional priorities. In the FY 2010 DoD press release, requested funds were focused on reshaping the military force in order to address “today’s” unconventional fight, mitigating capability gaps, and building partnership capacity through combined international efforts.³⁷⁵ The budget request identified the following areas for investment and advancement: special operations capabilities; missile defense; cyber security; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; satellite capabilities; and developing helicopter reconnaissance.³⁷⁶ While the deviation for FY 2010 was negative, the budget increased by less than 1 percent when compared to FY 2009, which corresponds to the above stated press release.

The above mentioned analyzes the Department of the Army’s budget requests over a 10 year period and develops a method in assuming if each of the fiscal years were found to be in line with congressional priorities. The researcher also analyzed the results of the study seeking any secondary explanations. As the examination came to a close, the researcher reanalyzed the quantitative data collected, and in doing so it was determined that there appeared to be two different data sets. FY 2001 through FY 2006 and FY 2007 through FY 2010 appeared to be two separate periods in time. For FY 2001 through FY 2006 the appropriated funding levels and corresponding budget requests were identified as having smaller deviations with the median of percentage changes as

³⁷⁵Ibid.

³⁷⁶Ibid.

2 percent. The researcher also identified the topline funding levels for each of these years to be upward trending.

As for FY 2007 through FY 2010 the appropriated funding levels and corresponding budget requests were determined to have larger deviations with the median of percentage changes as 11 percent. It was also concluded that the topline funding levels for the above mentioned fiscal years were identified as upward trending. This allowed the researcher to identify FY 2007 through FY 2010 as a period of “new normal.” This period of change or new normal was attributed to the change in congressional composition and an increasing national debt, as discussed later in this chapter.

Additionally, it should be noted that the rate of change for the first data set (FY 2002 through FY 2006) appeared smaller from appropriated budget level to its corresponding budget request for each of the fiscal years. The rate of change for the second data set (FY 2007 through FY 2010) were examined to be larger, as appropriated funding levels deviated more and more from their corresponding budget requests.

**Sub-Question 1: When new Priorities Emerged,
did the Budget Request Respond?**

Research conducted for the stated thesis identified that when new priorities emerged in the varying priority documents, the budget request did subsequently respond to certain priorities. This section will identify priorities examined during this study, and then identify any relationships they might have with the Department of the Army’s portion of the DoD budget request.

FY 2002: The NSS added the following priorities:

1. Defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.

FY 2002 Corresponding Budget: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that the FY 2002 budget request focused on defense of the nation and preparation of new and emerging threats.³⁷⁷

2. Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction.

FY 2002 Corresponding Budget: The amended budget request intended to meet former President Bush's expectations in transforming military capabilities, to include the development of capabilities that would counter or combat unconventional threats.³⁷⁸

3. Champion aspirations for human dignity.
4. Work with others to defuse regional conflicts.
5. Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade.
6. Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.
7. Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power.

FY 2002 Corresponding Budget: The information available and researched for the budget request did not identify efforts in support of the priorities (three through seven).

³⁷⁷Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Amended Budget for FY 2002," June 27, 2001, <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=2958> (accessed April 30, 2013).

³⁷⁸Ibid.

8. Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the Twenty-first century.

FY 2002 Corresponding Budget: The budget request made mention of military transformational requirements necessary in order to respond to the Twenty-first century.³⁷⁹ It also identified the acquisition and development of capabilities necessary to appropriately respond to the security environment³⁸⁰ facing U.S. troops.

FY 2003 and FY 2004: No new priorities were found to be added for these fiscal years, as there were no priority documents developed or published.

FY 2005: The *NDS* added the following priorities:

1. Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action.

FY 2005 Corresponding Budget: The budget request identified the importance of enhancing and developing capabilities that would optimize force mobility, and immediately respond to global security challenges with participation from U.S. allies and international partners.³⁸¹

2. Secure the U.S. from direct attack.

FY 2005 Corresponding Budget: The budget request identified the intent to further develop its ballistic missile defense system in order to effectively deter and

³⁷⁹Ibid.

³⁸⁰Ibid.

³⁸¹Department of Defense, "Fiscal 2005 Department of Defense Budget Release," February 2, 2004, <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7046> (accessed April 30, 2013).

defend the U.S. against missile attacks; and to continue the development of ground-based interceptors.³⁸²

3. Establish favorable security conditions.

FY 2005 Corresponding Budget: The budget request sought to transform military capabilities and systems in order to effectively be able to deter security threats, to include developing unmanned aerial vehicles.³⁸³

FY 2006: The *NSS* and the *QDR* added the following priorities:

1. Defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.

FY 2006 Corresponding Budget: The budget request conveyed support of the priorities set forth by the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and President George Bush, to include defeating terrorism.³⁸⁴

2. Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction.

FY 2006 Corresponding Budget: The budget request developed military capabilities for the purposes of countering future threats.³⁸⁵ It identified funding in support of homeland defense by conducting activities that would detect and defend against threats of WMD, and increase rapid response time.³⁸⁶

³⁸²Ibid.

³⁸³Ibid.

³⁸⁴Department of Defense, “President Bush’s FY 2006 Defense Budget,” 2005, <http://www.defense.gov/news/Feb2005/d20050207budget.pdf> (accessed April 30, 2013).

³⁸⁵Ibid.

³⁸⁶Ibid.

3. Work with others to defuse regional conflicts.

FY 2006 Corresponding Budget: The budget request identified funding assistance for the purpose of building partner capacity.³⁸⁷ The requests also stated that funding may be provided, in support of or to, foreign security forces in order to enhance their ability in combating terrorism and supporting U.S. stability operations.³⁸⁸

4. Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade.

5. Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.

FY 2006 Corresponding Budget: The information available and researched within the budget request did not identify efforts in support of the above priorities (four and five).

6. Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power.

FY 2006 Corresponding Budget: The budget request sought to restructure the U.S. global posture in order to strengthen partnerships and international relationships to collectively address and defeat terrorism.³⁸⁹

7. Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the Twenty-first century.

³⁸⁷Ibid.

³⁸⁸Ibid.

³⁸⁹Ibid.

FY 2006 Corresponding Budget: The budget request sought to restructure the U.S. global posture in order to strengthen partnerships and international relationships in order to collectively address and defeat terrorism.³⁹⁰

8. Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.

FY 2006 Corresponding Budget: The information available and researched for the FY 2006 budget request did not identify any efforts in support of the above priority.

9. Defending the homeland in-depth.

FY 2006 Corresponding Budget: The budget request developed military capabilities for the purposes of countering future threats.³⁹¹ It identified funding in support of homeland defense by conducting activities that would detect and defend against threats of WMD, and increase rapid response time.³⁹²

10. Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads.

FY 2006 Corresponding Budget: The information available and researched for the FY 2006 budget request did not identify any efforts in support of the above priority.

FY 2007: No new priorities were added for this fiscal year, as no new priority documents were developed or published.

FY 2008: The *NDS* added the following priorities:

1. Win the Long War.

³⁹⁰Ibid.

³⁹¹Ibid.

³⁹²Ibid.

FY 2008 Corresponding Budget: In the budget request the DoD expressed determination in prevailing in irregular warfare operations by growing its special operations forces, developing required equipment for a new special operations squadron; and by increasing its language and cultural training³⁹³ for U.S. troops.

2. Promote Security.

3. Deter Conflict.

FY 2008 Corresponding Budget: The information available and researched for the budget request did not identify any efforts in support of the above priority.

FY 2009: No new priorities were added for this fiscal year, as no priority documents were developed or published.

FY 2010: The *NDS* and *QDR* added the following priorities:

1. Win the Long War.

FY 2010 Corresponding Budget: The budget request ensured that funds would be used in support of winning wars that the U.S. was engaged in, and for the development of capabilities that would support national defense.³⁹⁴

2. Deter Conflict.

³⁹³Department of Defense, “FY 2007 Department of Defense Budget Briefing,” February 6, 2006, <http://www.defense.gov/news/Feb2006/d20060206slides.pdf> (accessed April 30, 2013).

³⁹⁴Department of Defense, “Overview of the DoD Fiscal 2010 Budget Proposal,” 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/news/2010%20Budget%20Proposal.pdf> (accessed April 30, 2013).

FY 2010 Corresponding Budget: The budget requested resources in support of combat operations being conducted in the war against terrorism; for the purpose of deterring threats and aggression; and to project combat power when warranted.³⁹⁵

3. Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies.

FY 2010 Corresponding Budget: The information available and researched for the budget request did not identify any efforts in support of the above priority.

4. Preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force.

FY 2010 Corresponding Budget: The budget request identified one of its main objectives as remaining committed to enhancing, strengthening, and caring for the all-volunteer military force.³⁹⁶

Sub-Question 2: Is there a Correlation Between a Change in Priorities and a Change in Budget?

The governing priority documents examined during this study were the *National Security Strategy*, the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, and the *National Defense Strategy*. The *NSS* is the primary document that the President uses to establish national priorities and is mandated by law. The *QDR* is a DoD report that is required by law and prepared by Secretary of Defense for the purpose of establishing priorities in support of the *NSS*, identifying additional requirements, and to address any current or future challenges. The *NDS* is the priority document developed by the Secretary of Defense in support of the *NSS*, and it identifies exactly how the DoD intends to achieve the priorities stated within

³⁹⁵Ibid.

³⁹⁶Ibid.

the NSS. The NDS also identifies additional priorities or sub-tasks considered to be in support of the NSS.

Relationships were identified between governing priority documents and the Department of the Army's budget requests. The researcher identified that the priorities established through the executive branch were found to influence budget request. The Department of the Army and DoD testified in several hearings that their budget requests were in response to the executive branch's priorities, strategies, and requirements laid out in governing priority documents. Through research conducted, it is assumed that executive policy develops national priorities, and these priorities are what have driven budget decisions and requests for resources. The researcher is of the opinion that the executive branch must establish policy, and subsequently priorities in order for departments to be able to effectively establish a baseline for their budget requests.

Additional relationships were determined to exist between budget requests and certain priorities from document to document and year to year. This is substantiated as the following priorities were considered to be in support of military operational requirements: winning the long war, ensuring homeland security, promoting international security, building alliances, and defeating terrorism and other threats. The above mentioned priorities primarily fall under the DoD's stated mission. Winning the long war is a priority of the military (in concert with other interagency partners) in defeating terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ensuring homeland security is a priority that involves a whole of government approach that also includes military involvement where national defense and security are concerned.

Promoting international security is a priority that requires a whole of government approach and helps to ensure our military is successful in jointly securing stable regions for economic prosperity. Building alliances, is a priority that requires a whole of government approach in developing joint military and political efforts, as well as accomplishing shared goals and allow for cost burden sharing. Defeating terrorism and other threats is a priority that also requires a whole of government approach in support of military troop engaged in combat operations.

Sub-Questions 3, 4, and 5

Sub-questions 3, 4, and 5 were each considered to be very elementary and more in support of data compilation, rather than in answering the stated hypothesis. Sub-questions 3, 4, and 5 follow for review:

1. What were the priorities set forth in the *National Security Strategy*, the *National Defense Strategy*, and the *Quadrennial Defense Review*?
2. How much supplemental funding was appropriated to the Department of the Army for the period being studied?
3. How much did the Department of the Army's budget request change from FY 2001 through FY 2010?

As stated above, these sub-questions did not expand or support the stated hypothesis. These questions were determined to answer other questions in support of research and assembling the “big picture.” They were originally thought to have been pertinent in supporting the study, but were later determined otherwise during the examination. The above stated questions did not provide meaningful insight to the stated hypotheses.

**Sub-Question 6: Did Congressional Composition Affect the
Department of the Army's Budget Request, and
Subsequently Appropriated Budget Levels?**

For the period studied, the congressional composition did appear to have an effect on the Department of the Army's budget request and subsequent appropriated budgets. As stated above, the FY 2001 budget request was deemed applicable in determining trend lines, changes, and alignment for FY 2002 through FY 2010. The composition of the executive branch, Senate, and House of Representatives for FY 2001 was researched but not considered part of the study, as it served more as a starting point or baseline for the study.

For FY 2002 through FY 2006, a Republican President was in office and the congressional composition for both the Senate and the House of Representatives was primarily Republican majority. For FY 2007 and FY 2008, a Republican President was in office and the congressional composition was split in the Senate and Republican majority for the House of Representatives. For FY 2009 and FY 2010, a Democratic President was in office and the congressional composition was a Democratic majority for both the Senate and House of Representatives.

Of note, the Department of the Army's budget request is submitted to DoD, and subsequently to the OMB. The OMB is an oversight agency that falls directly under the office of the President, and is responsible for ensuring that all congressional budget requests are in line with the priorities established by the executive branch. After negotiations and necessary revisions with the OMB, the Department of the Army, through the DoD will transmit its budget request to Congress. Therefore, in determining if the congressional composition had an effect on the Department of the Army's budget,

the researcher is really asking if the legislative branch had an effect on budget requests and appropriated funding levels due to the composition of the executive branch.

A thorough examination of the data compiled identified that the appropriated budgets for FY 2002 through FY 2006 were considered to be appropriated as requested with deviations within 6 percent. These fiscal years had smaller deviations over the 10 year period studied, between appropriated budget levels and corresponding budget requests. It appears that the Republican congressional majority were in support of the Department of the Army's budget requests, and subsequently the executive branch's priorities. Congressional support could be attributed to the Republican majority ensuring support of the President (a member of their party), as is likely, they shared the same priorities and agendas.

FY 2007 through FY 2009 were not considered to be in line with congressional priorities as their appropriated budget levels and corresponding budget requests were determined as having larger deviations in excess of 6 percent. FY 2007 was identified as having a deviation of -17 percent, a deviation of -10 percent for FY 2008, and a deviation of -10 percent for FY 2009. Research identified that for these fiscal years, the congressional composition was split between the Senate and Democrat majority for the House of Representatives.

Examination has led the researcher to assume that the Department of the Army's budget requests (for the period identified above), and subsequently the executive branch's request were not considered to be in line with congressional priorities (of legislative branch). The researcher attributed the larger deviations to the congressional composition and other economic factors. The struggle for control of the Senate and House of

Representatives could have attributed to the Department of the Army's budget not being appropriated as requested. As stated above, other economic factors could have affected the Department of Army's appropriated budget levels, to include a downward trending U.S. economy and an increasing national debt.

FY 2010 was not considered to be in line with congressional priorities as its appropriated funding level and corresponding budget request was determined as having a deviation in excess of 6 percent. FY 2010 was determined to have a deviation of -9 percent. An examination of the data collected identified the congressional composition as Democrat majority for both the Senate and House of Representatives. Based on the data analyzed, the researcher made the assumption that the Department of the Army's budget request, and subsequently the executive branch's request was not in line with congressional priorities (of legislative branch). This assumption attributed the larger deviation to the U.S. national debt and other economic factors.

Sub-Question 7: Were there any Economic Factors that could be
Attributed to Appropriated Budget Levels?

Economic factors have attributed to the larger deviations found between the Department of the Army's appropriated budget levels and corresponding budget requests for FY 2007 through FY 2010. It was during this timeframe that the U.S. housing market began to realize a decline in housing prices as they began to dip and homeowners started to default on mortgage loans. This subsequently led to the 2007 mortgage crisis, which began to foster distrust amongst banking institutions. This distrust created an unwillingness between banks to take on any mortgages that could be determined faulty or

defaulted on, resulting in gross loss.³⁹⁷ It has been stated that the collapse of the housing market was the cause of a long U.S. recession and ultimately was one of the contributing factors to an increasing national debt.³⁹⁸ The federal government had to intervene several times by establishing oversight programs over certain organizations, while financially bailing out other organizations in order to mitigate any further economic declines.³⁹⁹

The housing market crash led to slow economic development and growth, and significantly affected the U.S. job market.⁴⁰⁰ As a result of the above mentioned the national debt more than doubled from \$5.8 trillion in FY 2001 to \$11.9 trillion in FY 2010 as depicted in table 8.

³⁹⁷ Kimberly Amadeo, “U.S. Economic Crisis,” About.com, <http://useconomy.about.com/od/criticalssues/a/US-Economic-Crisis.htm> (accessed April 30, 2013).

³⁹⁸ The Bancroft Library, “Slaying the Dragon of Debt,” <http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/ROHO/projects/debt/financialcrisis.html> (accessed April 30, 2013).

³⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.

Table 8. U.S. National Deficit for FY 2001 through FY 2010

<i>(Funding in Trillions)</i>		
Fiscal Years	Date	U.S. National Debt
2001	10/2/2000	\$5.8
2002	10/1/2001	\$5.8
2003	10/1/2002	\$6.2
2004	10/1/2003	\$6.8
2005	10/1/2004	\$7.4
2006	10/3/2005	\$8.0
2007	10/2/2006	\$8.6
2008	10/1/2007	\$9.1
2009	10/1/2008	\$10.1
2010	10/1/2009	\$11.9

Source: Department of Treasury, “The Daily History of Debt Results,” <http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/NPGateway> (accessed May 2, 2013).

Priority Change Index

The priority change index was developed because the researcher encountered challenges in determining the magnitude of change amongst successive documents year-over-year. The priority change index is a tool that was created by the researcher in order to gain further insight. It was through exploratory study that the researcher developed a new methodology that clearly depicted the year-over-year summation of priority changes. The weakness in using this tool was that the researcher had to treat each priority as co-equal even though it can be assumed that some of the priorities had precedence over others. For the purposes of this study, each priority was given a weight equal to one, so that a degree or magnitude of change could be ascertained. This tool could be improved for future researchers by determining the order of priority precedence and then appropriately weighting each priority that were added, dropped, and maintained.

Experience in Applying the Different Research Methods

The researcher did have prior experience in conducting quantitative and qualitative research and analysis. Quantitative research was conducted by gathering budgetary data and then examining it to determine statistical significance, trends, deviations, and percentage changes. After a thorough review was conducted on the quantitative data available, the researcher then developed any necessary charts, tables, or methodologies. In doing so, the researcher was to view the data in other ways that could potentially provide further insight, and to uncover additional findings. The researcher also expanded the study to include QUAN–qual research, which allowed for the qualitative data of the quantitative information to provide further insight.

Qualitative research was involved gathering other variables that were not numeric and then examining all of the data with the intent of identifying trends, determining relationships, and gaining a historical understanding in order to gain insight. Upon completion of the review, the researcher had a more in-depth understanding on the various factors involved, which were able to provide context to the stated thesis. The researcher expanded the study to include QUAL-quan research, which allowed for the quantitative data of the qualitative information to provide further insight.

The researcher also used mixed method analysis during the study, which examined both the quantitative and qualitative data together in order to determine if any relationships existed. It also allows data sets to be compared and analyzed in providing further insight. The researcher had no prior experience in applying this method, and found it very difficult during the research stage. There was a consistent concern on mixing two very different data sets, but throughout the study, it was a tool that proved to

be invaluable as it assisted in providing further insight and validity into the other research methods conducted. The researcher also struggled in looking for relationships between every aspect of the two research methods. It wasn't until the researcher understood that relationships may not exist in mixed method analysis between all of the data sets within the two other methods that the study was able to be continued and finalized.

Preconceived Notions—Bias

It was unknown at the time the study began, but later became apparent that the researcher started this project with a bias for the military. As the study was underway it became apparent that the researcher had already answered the hypothesis and determined what conclusions were going to be made prior to any research being conducted. The researcher had prior military experience and was of the belief that the Department of the Army's budget was in line with congressional priorities before gathering or analyzing any data. This assumption had been made, as the researcher was also a big proponent of the Army and in support of its combat missions being conducted.

After extensive research a biased view was discovered, and was anticipated to be carried throughout the study. However, continued analysis over time changed the researcher's biased opinion. In fact, the researcher came to a completely different set of conclusions, identified additional questions for consideration, and recommended that follow-on researchers restate or reframe the stated hypothesis, so that it may be tested.

Conclusions

The overall conclusion of this study is that the stated hypothesis could not be tested. The scope of the thesis was determined to be too broad. Additionally, the

researcher did not have access to the required DoD and congressional systems necessary to determine if the Department of the Army's portion of the DoD budget request was in line with congressional priorities. As a result, a methodology was created as a tool to determine what fiscal budget requests, if any, were considered to be in line with congressional priorities. This tool was developed, as the researcher was unable to ascertain the true intent and priorities of the Congress. The researcher did not have access to Department of the Army or DoD financial systems, and therefore, was forced to make assumptions with resources that were available to the public.

The researcher was also unable to obtain any detailed budget requests from the Department of the Army. Detailed budget requests are considered by the researcher to be thorough justifications, with stated performance objectives, an accounting of prior-year program performance, and any realignments of funding in order to have been able to appropriately test the stated hypothesis and sub-questions. The researcher was also unable to determine the full funding request for supplemental, overseas contingency operations, and GWOT, as the researcher did not have access to the detailed justification on why resources were or were not requested. As a result, the researcher could only further hypothesize or make assumptions based on the available data.

In order to appropriately examine the stated thesis the researcher scaled back the study to only include four appropriations: Operations and Maintenance; Military Personnel; Procurement; and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation. In doing so, the researcher had to gather information and test several portions of different data sets, which proved very time consuming and detracted from other pertinent areas of research. For example, for the Military Personnel appropriation only funding for the active duty

component of the Department of the Army was examined, and as a result, only represented a partial budget request and appropriated budget level for this appropriation.

It is suggested that the stated thesis be further examined or restated so that it can be appropriately researched and tested. It is recommended that follow-on researchers consider limiting the number of fiscal years researched; limiting the study to one appropriation so that it may be researched in its entirety; and-or limiting the study to topline funding levels. Follow-on researchers should seek early access to DoD and congressional systems prior to conducting research and-or conducting interviews with the appropriate budget personnel of these organizations. Additional recommendations and considerations for continued research will be further discussed in the follow-on sections.

Throughout the study, the researcher expected to see a relationship between the executive and legislative branches' in order to assist in confirming the stated hypothesis. The only relationship that could be determined was that the budget requests transmitted to Congress were considered to be in line with the executive branch's priorities, and in turn, budgets were appropriated by the legislative branch according to congressional priorities. This relationship was identified to be between requirements and actuals. Further explained, this was a relationship between what the executive branch said was important and how much funding the legislative branch put against those priorities.

The researcher hypothesized that a unified government (executive and legislative) would lead to smaller deviations, but this study shows that this is not always the case. It appears that from FY 2002 through FY 2006 there were smaller deviations, suggesting that the legislative branch was in support of the executive branch. However, this was no longer true for FY 2007 through FY 2010, as these fiscal years experienced larger

deviations that could have been attributed to the financial crisis, a fiscally constrained environment, and different fiscal climate. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the financial meltdown required the financial bailout of multiple financial institutions, and therefore, brought about a very long recession.

With the federal government financially bailing out several organizations it appeared that the war against terrorism might have become a lower priority. This is assumed, as a higher emphasis seemed to be placed on priorities with a domestic focus on economic and financial development. Perhaps it was financial crisis of such historic proportions that might have affected the legislative branch's willingness to support the executive branch's priorities in full, and subsequently the Department of the Army and DoD.

Considerations for Further Research

While the stated thesis question and sub-questions have been addressed above, a more thorough examination is required in order to further the research. This in-depth analysis would require access to the appropriate Department of the Army and DoD budget systems. This would also require cooperation from the staffs within each of the above mentioned departments. It would allow the researcher to gain a better understanding on why budgets were requested at certain funding levels and the justification for doing so.

This examination would need to incorporate interviews with certain elements of the executive branch, such as personnel from the OMB. In doing, the researcher would have a better understanding of priorities established by the executive branch, just how much budget requests changed after being submitted to OMB personnel, and other

funding guidance applicable to each fiscal year. Additionally, the researcher would need to have congressional cooperation from either the members or staffers in order to clearly delineate congressional priorities and the intent of appropriated budgets.

Additional Questions for Consideration

In order to further the research conducted, the following questions should be considered for examination.

Should the period of the study be expanded in order to gain a larger historical context? A follow-on researcher would need to decide if expanding the study would prove to be out of scope, or necessary in answering the stated thesis. He (or she) would need to more than likely identify a specific timeframe and only take topline budget levels into consideration, rather than conduct research at the appropriation level. The researcher should also consider expanding the total budget analysis to include both Reserve and National Guard components, in order to gain a more holistic understanding of the Department of the Army's appropriated funding levels and corresponding budget requests.

Should additional appropriations be considered in the study, or should the study be conducted at the topline appropriated level for the department? As mentioned above, a follow-on researcher would need to identify if the stated thesis should be conducted at the topline level or appropriation level. It is suggested that if the timeframe being studied is expanded that the researcher consider narrowing the budget focus. It is assumed that the study would be too broad should a researcher expand the timeframe and conduct research at the appropriation level simultaneously. It is not recommended that additional

appropriations be considered in this study, due to the limited amount of obtainable resources and time available to conduct research.

Should other government organizations be considered in the study? For example, the Government Printing Office or the Government Accountability Office. Follow-on research should include other viable sources of information, so that he (or she) can ensure that there is sufficient data in support of the study. Consideration should be given to other outside agencies that may be able to provide valuable information in ensuring that the researcher can provide a more informed and unbiased opinion. Examples of other government organizations that should be considered in the examination follows: The Government Accountability Office with fiscal oversight, an impartial federal organization that works directly for Congress; and the Congressional Budget Office, an impartial federal organization that works directly for Congress and provides independent fiscal review of budgetary and economic concerns.

Should other military services be considered in order to determine if budgetary changes were consistent throughout each organization? Follow-on researchers need to determine if research consideration should be given to the other DoD elements, to include the Air Force, Marines, and Navy. They would need to ascertain if there was any merit in including the other branches of service, or if this additional research would be considered out of scope. The researcher would have to determine if there was a need to understand the DoD cumulative budget request, since the Department of the Army is just a sub-set.

What would explain why the topline funding level for each fiscal year was less than their corresponding budget requests, except for FY 2004? A follow-on researcher would more than likely want to determine why this was the case. FY 2004 was

considered to be an anomaly for the period studied, and with the appropriate resources and time, a determination could be made as to what might have attributed to this.

Follow-on research could consider interviews with congressional staffers that might be able to provide meaningful insight as to why this was the only fiscal year appropriated more than requested.

What motivated the change in policy language? The researcher should consider looking into what motivated change over the period studied. Can this be attributed to the change in staffs over time, a change in administration, or a change in policy language? This question should receive much consideration, as it would allow the researcher to provide more context and further insight into why changes were made, and how those changes related to the Department of the Army's portion of the DoD request.

Additional Hypothesis

Other hypotheses that should receive consideration for further research is as follows:

1. The Department of the Army's budget request levels have been appropriate because the department has been effective in responding to organizational requirements.
2. The Department of the Army's personnel strength should not be decreased because there have been several surge requirements throughout FY 2001 through FY 2010.
3. The Department of the Army's budget should be reviewed and audited because the American taxpayer has a right to understand exactly how funding was obligated and expended.

Recommendations

It is recommended that further research be conducted on the stated thesis question to understand the methodologies used in developing budget requests, identifying the overarching priorities, and understanding the congressional thought behind appropriated budgets. The examination conducted for the stated thesis is considered conducive for continued development and follow-on study. Further research would require an unbiased view (preferably conducted by a third party member outside the DoD organizational construct) utilizing an objective approach. The following stated items should be considered for future research on the stated thesis.

Follow-on research should reframe or redefine the stated thesis. Additional research should determine if the Department of the Army is able and willing to provide an accounting on how its funding was obligated for each of the fiscal years being studied. The researcher should consider reaching out to the Department of the Army and asking for supplementary information that can provide detailed justification and intent. The researcher should consider if expanding the study to gain more of a historical understanding is necessary, in order to provide more context in support of the examination. If doable, the data should be further examined to determine how much funding was applied to specific congressional priorities and what those priorities were.

A determination should be made on whether the scope of the study should be expanded, take the other DoD elements into consideration for the examination (i.e., Air Force, Marines, and the Navy). Additional analysis should be conducted in order to determine the sustainability of budgets in times of peace or war. The researcher should determine and highlight if program funding was ever reprioritized at the time when the

department was developing its budget requests, so that it was able present a more realistic requirement. Consideration should be given to expanding research to capture short-term goals and long-term implications for consistently increasing budgets over the period studied.

It is evident from the examination conducted that there are still unanswered questions, some of which may remain unanswerable. The researcher is unsure of how the limitations of this study (such as limited time and access to DoD financial systems) may have influenced the results during examination of the findings. Further examination and analysis indicates that follow-on researchers should expand upon the study conducted for the stated thesis; and continue to develop other reliable hypothesis that are considered to be testable and defensible.

APPENDIX A: Budget–Thesis Matrix (FY 2001)

Supporting Document	Title I - Military Personnel	Title II - O&M	FY 2001	Title III - PROCUREMENT	Title IV - RDTE
National Security Strategy (NSS)			—	—	
National Defense Strategy (NDS)			—	—	
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) http://www.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf	September 30, 2001; Henry H. Shelton, CJCS – Assuring allies and friends; Dissuading future military competition; Deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests; and If deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary.				
DoD Budget Request http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2001.html	\$28,381.0 million	\$23,828.0 million	\$14,121.0 million	\$5,260.4 million	
	\$22,199.0 million Army; \$2,434.0 million Reserve; and \$3,748.0 million NG	\$19,124.0 million Army; \$1,521.4 million Reserve; and \$3,182.3 million NG	\$10,424.3 million Army; \$1,232.3 million Reserve/NG equipment; \$1,049.5 million NG; \$182.7 million Reserve; \$84.1 million NG/reserve Aircraft Proc; \$127.1 million NG/Reserve Missile Proc; \$41.8 million NG/Reserve W&TCV Proc; \$173.5 million NG/Reserve Ammunition Proc; \$805.7 million NG/Reserve Other Proc	\$5,260.4 million	
DoD OCO Request http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2001.html	\$1,943.0 million				
	\$222.0 million Urgent Pay and Benefits; \$389.7 million Readiness, Training, and Ops; \$227.4 million Contractual Obligations and Cost Growth; \$129.3 million Infrastructure and Weapon System Repair and Maintenance; \$3.0 million Other (Classified Program); \$222.0 million Military Personnel; \$719.2 million O&M; \$3.0 million Procurement; \$ 27.2 million MILCON, Family Housing, and Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)				
Congressional Budget	\$28,431.4 million	\$24,041.0 million	\$11,084.0 million	\$6,343.0 million	
Funds Appropriated	\$22,175.4 million Army; \$2,473.0 million Reserve; \$3,783.0 million NG	\$19,144.4 million Army; \$1,562.1 million Reserve; \$3,334.0 million NG	\$1,572.0 million Aircraft; \$1,321.0 million Missile; \$2,473.0 million Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles; \$1,221.0 million Ammunition; \$4,497.0 million Other Proc	\$6,343.0 million	
Appropriation Bills http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-106publ259/pdf/PLAW-106publ259.pdf	P.L. 106-259 – Aug 9, 2000 –Department of Defense Approp Act, 2001.				
OCO Request Funds Appropriated	\$1,229.3 million				
	\$164.0 million Army; \$52.0 million Reserve; \$6.0 million NG; \$792.4 million O&M Army; \$20.5 million O&M Reserve; \$42.9 million O&MNG; \$7.0 million Other Procurement; \$5.0 million RDTE; \$86.5 million O&M General; \$22.0 million MILCON; \$31.0 million Family Housing				
Appropriation Bills http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107hr2216enr.pdf	P.L. 107-20 -- Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2001.				
<i>Footnote: Funding represented in the above chart may not coincide with supporting budget documentation due to rounding.</i>					

Source: Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 30, 2001), <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2001 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2000), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2001.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); U.S. Congress, Public Law 106-259, *Department of Defense Appropriation Act 2001*, August, 9, 2000, 106th Cong., <http://asafm.army.mil/Documents/OtherDocuments/CongInfo/BLDL/PL/01APPNpl.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); U.S. Congress, Public Law 107-20, 107th Cong., July 24, 2001, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ20/pdf/PLAW-107publ20.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX B: Budget–Thesis Matrix (FY 2002)

Supporting Document	Title I - Military Personnel	FY 2002 Title II - O&M	Title III - PROCUREMENT	Title IV - RDTE
National Security Strategy (NSS) http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf	September 17, 2002, Prepared by President Bush, The White House – Champion aspirations for human dignity; Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against US and our friends; Work with others to defuse regional conflicts; Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction; Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy; Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.			
National Defense Strategy (NDS) Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)		—	—	
DoD Budget Request http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget/fy2002.html	\$30,245.3 million \$23,627.0 million Army; \$2,604.2 million Reserve; \$4,014.1 million NG	\$26,656.7 million \$21,192.0 million Army; \$1,787.3 million Reserve; \$3,677.4 million NG	\$13,633.8 million \$12,370.5 million Army; \$1,263.3 million Reserve/NG	\$6,694.0 million \$6,694.0 million
DoD OCO Request http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbusdget/fy2003/fy2002_supp.pdf	\$654.2 million \$107.0 million O&M Army; \$79.2 million Other Procurement; \$8.2 million RDTE; \$74.0 million Command, Control, Communications, and Intel Justification; \$101.8 million O&M Classified Programs; \$284.0 million Other Proc Classified Programs			
Congressional Budget Funds Appropriated	\$30,464.6 million \$23,752.4 million Army; \$2,670.2 million Reserve; \$4,042.0 million NG	\$27,874.5 million \$22,335.1 million Army; \$1,771.3 million Reserve; \$3,768.1 million NG	\$10,642.7 million \$1,984.4 million Aircraft; \$1,079.3 million Missile; \$2,194.0 million Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles; \$1,201.0 million Ammunition; \$4,184.0 million Other	\$7,106.1 million \$7,106.1 million
Appropriation Bills http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ117/pdf/PLAW-107publ117.pdf	P.L. 107-117 – January 10, 2002 – Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002.			
OCO Request Funds Appropriated	\$296.4 million \$209.0 million O&M Army; \$79.2 million Other Procurement; \$8.2 million RDTE			
Appropriation Bills http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ206/pdf/PLAW-107publ206.pdf	P.L. 107-206 – August 2, 2002 – 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States.			
<i>Footnote: Funding represented in the above chart may not coincide with supporting budget documentation due to rounding.</i>				

Source: The White House, *The National Security Strategy 2002* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2002 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), August 2001), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2002.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); U.S. Congress, Public Law 107-117, *Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery From and Response To Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act 2002*, 107th Cong., January 10, 2002, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ117/pdf/PLAW-107publ117.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); U.S. Congress, Public Law 107-206, *2002 Supplemental Appropriations for Further Recovery From and Response To Terrorist Attacks on the United States*, 107th Cong., August 2, 2002, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ206/pdf/PLAW-107publ206.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX C: Budget–Thesis Matrix (FY 2003)

Supporting Document	Title I - Military Personnel	FY 2003 Title II - O&M	Title III - PROCUREMENT	Title IV - RDTE
National Security Strategy (NSS)		—		
National Defense Strategy (NDS)		—		
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)		—		
DoD Budget Request	\$35,620.4 million	\$30,641.2 million	\$17,748.0 million	\$6,919.0 million
http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2003.html	\$27,089.3 million Army; \$3,400.0 million Reserve; \$5,131.1 million NG	\$24,581.1 million Army; \$1,923.3 million Reserve; \$4,136.8 million NG	\$13,770.0 million Army; \$1,739.0 million for Reserve/NG equipment, \$1,665.7 million NG Active Approp, \$573.3 million Reserve Active Approp	\$6,919.0 million
DoD OCO Request		—		
—		—		
Congressional Budget	\$35,344.4 million	\$30,224.3 million	\$12,778.1 million	\$7,670.0 million
Funds Appropriated	\$26,855.0 million Army; \$3,374.4 million Reserve; \$5,115.0 million NG	\$23,992.1 million Army; \$1,970.2 million Reserve; \$4,262.0 million NG	\$2,286.0 million Aircraft; \$1,097.0 million Missile; \$2,267.0 million Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles; \$1,253.1 million Ammunition; \$5,875.0 million Other Proc	\$7,670.0 million
Appropriation Bills	P.L. 107-248 – October 23, 2002 – Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003.			
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ248/pdf/PLAW-107publ248.pdf				
OCO Request	\$24,643.0 million			
Funds Appropriated	\$7,700.0 million Army; \$3.0 million Reserve; \$100.0 million NG; \$16,000.0 million O&M Army; \$3.0 million O&M Reserve; \$75.0 million O&M NG; \$4.1 million Aircraft Procurement Army; \$3.1 million Missile Procurement; \$53.3 million Weapons/Tracked Combat Vehicles; \$448.0 million Ammunition Procurement; \$242.0 Other Procurement; \$11.5 million RDTE			
Appropriation Bills	P.L. 108-11 – April 16, 2003 – Wartime Supplemental Appropriations.			
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ11/pdf/PLAW-108publ11.pdf				
<i>Footnote: Funding represented in the above chart may not coincide with supporting budget documentation due to rounding.</i>				

Source: Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2003 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2002), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2003.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); U.S. Congress, Public Law 107-248, 107th Cong., October 23, 2002, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ248/pdf/PLAW-107publ248.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); U.S. Congress, Public Law 108-11, 108th Cong., April 16, 2003, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ11/pdf/PLAW-108publ11.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX D: Budget–Thesis Matrix (FY 2004)

Supporting Document	Title I – Military Personnel	Title II – O&M	Title III - PROCUREMENT	Title IV - RDTE
National Security Strategy (NSS)		FY 2004		
National Defense Strategy (NDS)		—		
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)		—		
DoD Budget Request	\$37,389.0 million	\$31,129.0 million	\$12,591.0 million	\$9,123.0 million
http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2003.html	\$28,288.4 million Army; \$3,586.0 million Reserve; \$5,514.3 million NG	\$24,965.4 million Army; \$1,952.1 million Reserve; \$4,211.4 million NG	\$10,756.0 million Army; \$917.4 million for Reserve/NG equipment, \$625.9 million NG Active Aprop, \$291.5 million Reserve Active Aprop	\$9,123.0 million
DoD OCO Request	\$39,200.0 million			
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2005/fy2004_supp.pdf	\$36,440.0 million Military Ops; \$1,222.0 million Depot Maintenance; \$983.0 million Procurement; \$120.0 million MILCON; 436.0 million Other Activities (e.g., Coalition Support)			
Congressional Budget	\$37,317.4 million	\$31,369.4 million	\$11,680.1 million	\$10,364.0 million
Funds Appropriated	\$28,248.0 million Army; \$3,569.0 million Reserve; \$5,500.4 million NG	\$25,029.4 million Army; \$1,999.0 million Reserve; \$4,341.0 million NG	\$2,154.0 million Aircraft; \$1,506.0 million Missile; \$1,857.1 million Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles; \$1,388.0 million Ammunition; \$4,775.0 million Other Proc	\$10,364.0 million
Appropriation Bills	P.L. 108-87 – September 30, 2003 – Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004.			
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ248/pdf/PLAW-107publ248.pdf				
OCO Request	\$38,113.2 million			
Funds Appropriated	\$12,859.0 million Army; \$23,997.1 million O&M Army; \$101.6 million Weapons/Tracked Combat Vehicles; \$1,144.0 Other Procurement; \$11.5 million RDTE			
Appropriation Bills	P.L. 108-106 – November 6, 2003 – Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2004.			
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ106/pdf/PLAW-108publ106.pdf				

Footnote: Funding represented in the above chart may not coincide with supporting budget documentation due to rounding.

Source: Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2004 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2003), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2004.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *FY 2004 Supplemental Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Nobel Eagle (One)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), September 2003), http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2005/fy2004_supp.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012); U.S. Congress, Public Law 108-87, *Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 2004*, 108th Cong., September 30, 2003, [http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ87.pdf](http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ87/pdf/PLAW-108publ87.pdf) (accessed November 20, 2012). U.S. Congress, Public Law 108-106, Government Printing Office, November 6, 2003, [http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ106.pdf](http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ106/pdf/PLAW-108publ106.pdf) (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX E: Budget–Thesis Matrix (FY 2005)

Supporting Document	FY 2005			
	Title I – Military Personnel	Title II – O&M	Title III – PROCUREMENT	Title IV – RDTE
National Security Strategy (NSS)			—	
National Defense Strategy (NDS) http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf	March 2005, Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense -- Secure the United States from direct attack; Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action; Strengthen alliances and partnerships; and Establish favorable security conditions.			
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)			—	
DoD Budget Request http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2003.html	\$39,409.0 million \$29,724.0 million Army; \$3,734.0 million Reserve; \$5,951.0 million NG	\$32,573.1 million \$26,076.0 million Army; \$2,008.1 million Reserve; \$4,489.0 million NG	\$13,164.0 million \$11,736.4 million Army; \$1,105.2 million for Reserve/NG equipment, \$784.0 million NG Active Approp. \$322.0 million Reserve Active Approp	\$10,436.0 million
DoD OCO Request http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2006/fy2005_supp.pdf	\$41,217.0 million \$25,446.3 million Military Ops; \$3,219.0 million Maintenance of Equipment, \$8,995.0 million Procurement & RDTE; \$990.1 million MILCON; \$2,567.3 million Other Programs			
Congressional Budget	\$38,947.4 million	\$32,199.0 million	\$12,973.3 million	\$10,699.0 million
Funds Appropriated	\$29,381.4 million Army; \$3,664.0 million Reserve; \$5,902.0 million NG	\$25,765.0 million Army; \$1,991.1 million Reserve; \$4,442.4 million NG	\$2,855.0 million Aircraft; \$1,307.0 million Missile; \$2,468.0 million Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles; \$1,388.0 million Ammunition; \$4,955.3 million Other Proc	\$10,699.0 million
Appropriation Bills http://www.coherentbabble.com/PublicLaws/HR4613PL108-287.pdf	P.L. 108-287 -- August 5, 2004 -- Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005.			
OCO Request	\$41,415.3 million			
Funds Appropriated	\$13,609.2 million Army; \$39.6 million Reserve; 291.1 million NG; \$16,980.3 million O&M Army; \$26.4 million O&M Reserve; \$327.0 million O&M NG; \$459.0 million Aircraft Procurement; \$310.3 million Missile Procurement; \$2,551.2 million Weapons/Tracked Combat Vehicles; \$533.0 million Ammunition Procurement; \$6,251.0 million Other Procurement; \$37.2 million RDTE			
Appropriation Bills http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ13/pdf/PLAW-109publ13.pdf	P.L. 109-13 -- May 11, 2005 -- Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005.			

Footnote: Funding represented in the above chart may not coincide with supporting budget documentation due to rounding.

Source: Department of Defense, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2005), <http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2005 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2004), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2005.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *FY 2005 Supplemental Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operations Unified Assistance* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), February 2005), http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2006/fy2005_supp.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012); U.S. Congress, Public Law 108-287, 108th Cong., August 5, 2004, <http://www.coherentbabble.com/PublicLaws/HR4613PL108-287.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); U.S. Congress, Public Law 109-13, 109th Cong., May 11, 2005, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ13/pdf/PLAW-109publ13.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX F: Budget–Thesis Matrix (FY 2006)

Supporting Document	FY 2006	Title I - Military Personnel	Title II - O&M	Title III - PROCUREMENT	Title IV - RDTE
National Security Strategy (NSS) http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/nss2006.pdf	March 16, 2006, President George W. Bush, The White House -- Champion aspirations for human dignity; Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; Work with others to defuse regional conflicts; Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD); Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy; Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century; and Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.				
National Defense Strategy (NDS)					
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) http://www.defense.gov/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf	February 6, 2006, Peter Pace, CJCS -- Defeating terrorist networks; Defending the homeland in depth; Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads; and Preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD.				
DoD Budget Request http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2006.html	\$36,773.3 million \$28,401.0 million Army; \$3,249.3 million Reserve; \$5,123.0 million NG	\$31,814.4 million \$25,317.0 million Army; \$1,987.4 million Reserve; \$4,510.0 million NG	\$13,183.4 million \$11,755.4 million Army; \$1,361.3 million for Reserve/NG equipment; \$1,309.0 million NG Active Approp; \$52.8 million Reserve Active Approp	\$9,734.0 million \$9,734.0 million	
DoD OCO Request http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/et/Docs/FY06_GWOT_Supplemental_Request_-FINAL.pdf	\$35,851.0 million \$6,506.2 million Army; \$126.1 million Reserve; \$96.0 million NG; \$18,050.3 million O&M Army; \$100.1 million O&M Reserve; \$179.0 million O&M NG; \$533.2 million Aircraft Procurement; \$830.0 million Ammunition Procurement; \$7,664.0 million Other Procurement; \$203.3 million Missile Procurement; \$1,133.3 million Vehicles; \$429.0 million RDTE				
Congressional Budget	\$33,477.3 million	\$30,571.0 million	\$11,582.2 million	\$11,172.4 million	
Funds Appropriated	\$28,191.3 million Army; \$3,173.0 million Reserve; \$4,913.0 million NG	\$24,106.0 million Army; \$1,973.4 million Reserve; \$4,491.1 million NG	\$2,653.3 million Aircraft; \$1,209.9 million Missile; \$1,392.0 million Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles; \$1,733.0 million Ammunition; \$4,594.0 million Other Proc	\$11,172.4 million	
Appropriation Bills http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ148/pdf/PLAW-109publ148.pdf	P.L. 109-148 -- December 30, 2005 -- Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations To Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006.				
OCO Request http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ234/pdf/PLAW-109publ234.pdf	\$35,714.0 million \$6,588.0 million Army; \$141.0 million Reserve; \$1,940.0 million NG; \$17,744.4 million O&M Army; \$100.1 million O&M Reserve; \$179.0 million O&M NG; \$345.0 million Aircraft Procurement; \$203.3 million Missile Procurement; \$1,768.0 million Weapons/Tracked Combat Vehicles; \$830.0 million Ammunition Procurement; \$5,820.0 million Other Procurement; \$55.0 million RDTE				
Appropriation Bills http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ234/pdf/PLAW-109publ234.pdf	P.L. 109-234 -- June 15, 2006 -- Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006.				

Footnote: Funding represented in the above chart may not coincide with supporting budget documentation due to rounding.

Source: The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006), <http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/nss2006.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 6, 2006), <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2006 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), April 2005), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2006.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *FY 2006 Supplemental Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), February 2006), http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/et/Docs/FY06_GWOT_Supplemental_Request_-FINAL.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012); U.S. Congress, Public Law 109-148, *Emergency Supplemental Appropriation to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act 2006*, 109th Cong., <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ148/pdf/PLAW-109publ148.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); U.S. Congress, Public Law 109-234, *Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, The Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery*, 2006, 109th Cong., June 15, 2006, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ234/pdf/PLAW-109publ234.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX G: Budget–Thesis Matrix (FY 2007)

Supporting Document	Title I - Military Personnel	FY 2007 Title II - O&M	Title III - PROCUREMENT	Title IV - RDTE
National Security Strategy (NSS)		—		
National Defense Strategy (NDS)		—		
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)		—		
DoD Budget Request	\$37,772.0 million	\$32,041.0 million	\$25,770.0 million	\$10,856.0 million
http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2007.html	\$29,112.0 million Army; \$3,406.0 million Reserve; \$5,254.0 million NG	\$24,902.4 million Army; \$2,299.2 million Reserve, \$4,839.0 million NG	\$16,841.1 million Army; \$2,693.0 million for Reserve/NG equipment, \$2,285.2 million NG Active Approp, \$407.4 million Reserve Active Approp	\$10,856.0 million
DoD OCO Request		—		
Congressional Budget	\$33,707.0 million	\$28,680.0 million	\$15,413.4 million	\$11,055.0 million
Funds Appropriated	\$25,911.4 million Army, \$3,043.2 million Reserve; \$4,752.0 million NG	\$22,398.0 million Army, \$1,958.0 million Reserve, \$4,324.0 million NG	\$3,503.0 million Aircraft, \$1,279.0 million Missile, \$1,906.4 million Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles; \$1,720.0 million Ammunition; \$7,005.0 million Other Proc	\$11,055.0 million
Appropriation Bills	P.L. 109-289 -- September 29, 2006 -- Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007.			
http://www.doi.gov/budget/appropriations/2006/upload/pl109_289.pdf	\$7,084.0 million			
OCO Request	\$3,903.0 million Army; \$322.0 million Reserve; \$457.2 million NG; \$1,811.0 million O&M Army; \$202.3 million O&M Reserve; \$388.0 million O&M NG			
Funds Appropriated	\$3,903.0 million Army; \$322.0 million Reserve; \$457.2 million NG; \$1,811.0 million O&M Army; \$202.3 million O&M Reserve; \$388.0 million O&M NG			
Appropriation Bills	P.L. 110-5 -- February 15, 2007 -- Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007.			
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ5.pdf				

Footnote: Funding represented in the above chart may not coincide with supporting budget documentation due to rounding.

Source: Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2007 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2006), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2007.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); U.S. Congress, Public Law 109-289, 109th Cong., September 29, 2006, http://www.doi.gov/budget/appropriations/2006/upload/pl109_289.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012); U.S. Congress, Public Law 110-5, *Revised Continuing Appropriation Resolution, 2007*, 110th Cong., February 15, 2007, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ5/pdf/PLAW-110publ5.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX H: Budget–Thesis Matrix (FY 2008)

Supporting Document	FY 2008			
	Title I - Military Personnel	Title II - O&M	Title III - PROCUREMENT	Title IV - RDTE
National Security Strategy (NSS)			—	
National Defense Strategy (NDS) http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf	June 2008, Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense -- Defend the Homeland; Win the Long War; Promote Security; Deter Conflict; and Win our Nation's Wars.			
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)			—	
DoD Budget Request http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2007.html	\$41,318.2 million \$31,624.0 million Army; \$3,735.0 million Reserve; \$5,959.2 million NG	\$37,273.3 million \$28,925.0 million Army; \$2,508.1 million Reserve; \$5,840.2 million NG	\$35,003.0 million \$24,253.0 million Army; \$5,375.0 million for Reserve/NG equipment, \$4,538.3 million NG Active Approp, \$836.4 million Reserve Active Approp	\$10,590.0 million \$10,590.0 million
DoD OCO Request http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudgetDocs/FY_2008_Emergency_Supplemental_Request_detailed_funding_appendix.pdf	\$61,473.0 million \$11,767.3 million Army; \$299.2 million Reserve; \$1,137.0 million NG; 18,720.1 million O&M Army; \$119.0 million O&M Reserve; \$119.0 million NG; \$1,182.0 million Aircraft Procurement; \$5,860.3 million Weapons/Tracked Combat Vehicles; \$21,103.3 million Other Procurement; \$360.0 million Ammunition Procurement; \$642.0 million Missile Procurement; \$163.3 million RDTE			
Congressional Budget	\$41,144.0 million	\$35,637.0 million	\$22,772.2 million	\$12,127.0 million
Funds Appropriated	\$31,535.0 million Army; \$3,685.0 million Reserve; \$5,925.0 million NG	\$27,362.0 million Army; \$2,510.0 million Reserve; \$5,765.0 million NG	\$4,187.0 million Aircraft; \$1,912.0 million Missile; \$3,022.0 million Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles; \$2,223.2 million Ammunition; \$11,428.0 million Other Proc	\$12,127.0 million
Appropriation Bills http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ116/pdf/PLAW-110publ116.pdf	P.L. 110-116 -- November 13, 2007 -- Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2008.			
OCO Request	\$55,792.0 million			
Funds Appropriated	\$12,217.0 million Army; \$304.2 million Reserve; \$1,370.0 million NG; \$17,224.0 million O&M Army; \$165.0 million O&M Reserve; \$686.0 million O&M NG; \$954.1 million Aircraft Procurement; \$562.0 million Missile Procurement; \$5,464.0 million Weapon/Tracked Combat Vehicle Procurement; \$345.0 million Ammunition Procurement; \$16,337.3 million Other Procurement; \$163.0 million RDTE			
Appropriation Bills http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ252/pdf/PLAW-110publ252.pdf	P.L. 110-252 -- June 30, 2008 -- Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008.			

Footnote: Funding represented in the above chart may not coincide with supporting budget documentation due to rounding.

Source: Department of Defense, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2008), <http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2008 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2007), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2008.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, “FY 2008 Global War on Terrorism Request” (Power Point Presentation February 2007), http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudgetDocs/FY_2008_Emergency_Supplemental_Request_detailed_funding_appendix.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012); U.S. Congress, Public Law 110-116, 110th Cong., November 13, 2007, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ116/pdf/PLAW-110publ116.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); U.S. Congress, Public Law 110-252, 110th Cong., June 30, 2008, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ252/pdf/PLAW-110publ252.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX I: Budget–Thesis Matrix (FY 2009)

Supporting Document	Title I - Military Personnel	FY 2009 Title II - O&M	Title III - PROCUREMENT	Title IV - RDTE
National Security Strategy (NSS)			—	
National Defense Strategy (NDS)			—	
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)			—	
DOD Budget Request http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2009.html	\$47,041.3 million \$36,524.0 million Army; \$3,922.0 million Reserve; \$6,595.3 million NG	\$39,761.4 million \$31,243.1 million Army; \$2,642.3 million Reserve; \$5,876.0 million NG	\$38,966.0 million \$25,048.4 million Army; \$6,958.3 million for Reserve/NG equipment; \$5,604.0 million NG Active Approp; \$1,355.0 million Reserve Active Approp	\$10,524.1 million
DOD OCO Request http://comptroller.defense.gov/fybudget/fy2009_Supplemental/FY2009_Supplemental_Request/pdfs/FY_2_009_Supplemental_Request_04-08-09.pdf	\$37,996.0 million \$10,195.1 million Army; \$284.2 million Reserve; \$1,439.3 million NG; \$14,119.4 million O&M Army; \$115.0 million O&M Reserve; \$203.4 million NG; \$763.0 million Aircraft Procurement; \$1,683.4 million Weapons/Tracked Combat Vehicles; \$8,122.0 million Other Procurement; \$230.1 million Ammunition Procurement; \$767.1 million Missile Procurement; \$74.0 million RDTE			
Congressional Budget	\$46,904.0 million	\$39,695.0 million	\$23,977.0 million	\$12,060.1 million
Funds Appropriated	\$36,383.0 million Army; \$3,904.3 million Reserve; \$6,616.2 million NG	\$31,207.2 million Army; \$2,629.0 million Reserve; \$5,858.3 million NG	\$4,901.0 million Aircraft; \$2,185.1 million Missile; \$3,169.1 million Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles; \$2,287.4 million Ammunition; \$10,684.0 million Other Proc; \$750.0 million NG Reserve Equipment	\$12,060.1 million
Appropriation Bills http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ329/pdf/PLAW-110publ329.pdf	P.L. 110-329 – September 30, 2008 – Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009.			
OCO Request	\$39,282.0 million			
Funds Appropriated	\$11,751.0 million Army; \$418.2 million Reserve; \$1,776.0 million NG; \$13,769.4 million O&M Army; \$110.0 million O&M Reserve; \$179.0 million O&M NG; \$1,193.0 million Aircraft Procurement; \$704.0 million Missile Procurement; \$1,984.0 million Weapon/Tracked Combat Vehicle Procurement; \$230.1 million Ammunition Procurement; \$7,114.0 million Other Procurement; \$53.0 million RDTE			
Appropriation Bills http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ32/pdf/PLAW-111publ32.pdf	P.L. 111-132 – June 24, 2009 – Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009.			
<i>Footnote: Funding represented in the above chart may not coincide with supporting budget documentation due to rounding.</i>				

Source: Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2009 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2008), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2009.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *FY 2009 Supplemental Request* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), April 2009), http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2009/Supplemental/FY2009_Supplemental_Request/pdfs/FY_2009_Supplemental_Request_04-08-09.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012); U.S. Congress, Public Law 110-329, *Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriation Act 2009*, 110th Cong., September 30, 2008, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ329/pdf/PLAW-110publ329.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); U.S. Congress, Public Law 111-32, 111th Cong., June 24, 2009, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ32/pdf/PLAW-111publ32.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX J: Budget–Thesis Matrix (FY 2010)

Supporting Document	Title I – Military Personnel	Title II – O&M	Title III – PROCUREMENT	Title IV – RD TE
National Security Strategy (NSS) http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf	March 2010, President Barack Obama, The White House – Security: The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners; Prosperity: A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; Values: Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and International Order: An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.			
National Defense Strategy (NDS) http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.PDF				
DoD Budget Request http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2010.html	\$53,272.0 million \$41,313.0 million Army; \$4,337.0 million Reserve; \$7,622.0 million NG	\$40,152.2 million \$31,275.0 million Army; \$2,620.2 million Reserve; \$6,257.0 million NG	\$31,941.0 million \$21,662.0 million Army; \$5,139.3 million for Reserve/NG equipment; \$3,467.0 million NG Active Approp; \$1,672.4 million Reserve Active	\$10,496.2 million \$10,496.2 million
DoD OCO Request http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbusd/fy2010_fy2010_ocb.pdf	\$72,472.0 million \$9,606.3 million Army; \$295.0 million Reserve; \$840.0 million NG; \$52,367.0 million O&M Army; \$9.0 million O&M Reserve; \$322.0 million NG; \$1,636.2 million Aircraft Procurement; \$760.0 million Weapons/Tracked Combat Vehicles; \$5,675.3 million Other Procurement; \$371.0 million Ammunition Procurement; \$532.0 million Missile Procurement; \$58.0 million RDTE			
Congressional Budget http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ118/pdf/PLAW-111publ118.pdf	\$52,858.0 million \$41,006.0 million Army; \$4,305.0 million Reserve; \$7,547.0 million NG	\$39,743.0 million \$30,935.0 million Army; \$2,618.0 million Reserve; \$6,190.0 million NG	\$19,320.2 million \$5,094.0 million Aircraft; \$1,251.1 million Missile; \$2,336.0 million Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles; \$2,056.1 million Ammunition; \$8,583.0 million Other Proc	\$11,474.2 million
Appropriation Bills http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ118/pdf/PLAW-111publ118.pdf		P.L. 111-118 – December 19, 2009 – Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010.		
OCO Request http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ118/pdf/PLAW-111publ118.pdf	\$68,534.0 million \$9,959.0 million Army; \$293.1 million Reserve; \$825.0 million NG; \$4,782.1 million O&M Army; \$204.3 million O&M Reserve; \$322.0 million O&MNG; \$1,238.2 million Aircraft Procurement; \$476.0 million Missile Procurement; \$1,170.0 million Weapon/Tracked Combat Vehicle Procurement; \$366.0 million Ammunition Procurement; \$5,801.0 million Other Procurement; \$58.0 million RDTE			
Appropriation Bills http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ118/pdf/PLAW-111publ118.pdf		P.L. 111-118 – December 19, 2009 – Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010.		

Source: The White House, *The National Security Strategy 2010* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2010), <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.PDF> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2010 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), June 2009), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2010.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, “Budget Amendment to the FY 2010 President’s Budget Request for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)” (Power Point Presentation, August 2009), http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2010/fy2010_ocb.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012); U.S. Congress, Public Law 111-118, 111th Cong., December 19, 2009, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ118/pdf/PLAW-111publ118.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX K: Continuity Index—Qualitative Analysis Table

Congressional Composition	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010	FY2010
U.S. Senate Majority	107th/Split	107th/Split	108th/Rep	108th/Rep	109th/Rep	109th/Rep	109th/Rep	110th/Split	110th/Split	111th/Dem	111th/Dem	111th/Dem
House of Representatives Majority	107th/Rep	107th/Rep	108th/Rep	108th/Rep	109th/Rep	109th/Rep	109th/Rep	110th/Dem	110th/Dem	111th/Dem	111th/Dem	111th/Dem
President	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	B. Obama	B. Obama	B. Obama	B. Obama
Priority	QDR	NSS	—	—	NDS	NSS	QDR	—	NDS	—	NSS	QDR
Assuring allies and partnerships.	X	X	X	X	X	X		X				
Dissuading future military competition.	X											
Deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests. If deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary.	X	X	X	X	X							
Defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.	X	X	X	X		X	X	X				
Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass	X	X	X		X	X	X	X				
Champion aspirations for human dignity.	X	X	X		X	X		X				
Work with others to defuse regional conflicts.	X	X	X		X	X		X				
Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade.	X	X	X		X			X				
Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of	X	X	X		X			X				
Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power.	X	X	X		X			X				
Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.	X	X	X		X			X				
Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action.					X							
Secure the United States from direct attack.					X							
Establish favorable security conditions.					X							
Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.						X		X				
Defending the homeland in depth.							X	X	X	X		
Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads.							X	X				
Win the Long War.									X	X		X
Promote Security.									X	X	X	
Deter Conflict.									X	X		X
Prosperity: A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity.												X
International Order: An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.												X
Values: Respect for universal values at home and around the world.												X
Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies.												X
Preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force.												X

Footnote : Priorities represented have been extracted from the following priority documents for each of the fiscal years: QDR, NDS, and NSS. (X) denotes a priority is applicable to a priority document for the identified fiscal year.

Source: Pearson Education, Inc., “Composition of Congress, by Political Party, 1855–2015,” Infoplease.com, <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0774721.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 30, 2001), <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); The White House, *The National Security Strategy 2002* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2005), <http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006), <http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/nss2006.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 6, 2006), <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2008), <http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); The White House, *The National Security Strategy 2010* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2010), <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%202029jan10%201600.PDF> (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX L: Continuity Index—Qualitative Analysis Table

Congressional Composition	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2010
Priority	QDR	NSS	—	—	NDS	NSS	QDR	—	NDS	—	NSS	QDR
U.S. Senate Majority	107th/Split	107th/Split	108th/Rep	108th/Rep	109th/Rep	109th/Rep	109th/Rep	110th/Split	110th/Dem	111th/Dem	111th/Dem	111th/Dem
House of Representatives Majority	107th/Rep	107th/Rep	108th/Rep	108th/Rep	109th/Rep	109th/Rep	109th/Rep	110th/Dem	110th/Dem	111th/Dem	111th/Dem	111th/Dem
President	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	B. Obama	B. Obama	B. Obama	B. Obama
Assuring allies and partnerships.	X	X	X	X	X	X	Dropped	X	Dropped			
Dissuading future military competition	X	Dropped										
Deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests. If deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary.	X	X	X	X	X	Dropped						
Defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.												
Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with												
Champion aspirations for human dignity.												
Work with others to defuse regional conflicts.												
Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade.												
Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the												
Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power.												
Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.												
Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action												
Secure the United States from direct attack.												
Establish favorable security conditions.												
Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.												
Defending the homeland in depth.												
Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads.												
Win the Long War.												
Promote Security.												
Deter Conflict.												
Prosperity: A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity.												
International Order: An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.												
Values: Respect for universal values at home and around the world.												
Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies.												
Preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force.												

Footnote : Priorities represented have been extracted from the following priority documents for each of the fiscal years: QDR, NDS, and NSS.. "Added" denotes added priorities. "X" denotes no change in priorities (status quo). "Dropped" denotes dropped priorities.

Source: Pearson Education, Inc., "Composition of Congress, by Political Party, 1855-2015," Infoplease.com, <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0774721.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 30, 2001), <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); The White House, *The National Security Strategy 2002* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2005), <http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006), <http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/nss2006.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 6, 2006), <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2008), <http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); The White House, *The National Security Strategy 2010* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012). Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2010), <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2020jan10%201600.PDF> (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX M: Continuity Index—Qualitative Analysis Table

Congressional Composition	FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2010
U.S. Senate Majority	107th/Split	107th/Split	108th/Rep	108th/Rep	109th/Rep	109th/Rep	110th/Split	110th/Split	111th/Dem	111th/Dem	111th/Dem
House of Representatives Majority	107th/Rep	107th/Rep	108th/Rep	108th/Rep	109th/Rep	109th/Rep	110th/Dem	110th/Dem	111th/Dem	111th/Dem	111th/Dem
President	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	B. Obama	B. Obama	B. Obama
Priority	QDR	NSS	—	—	NDS	NSS	QDR	—	NDS	—	NSS
Added	0	8	0	0	3	8	2	0	3	0	3
Dropped	0	1	0	0	7	4	8	0	11	0	3
Status Quo	3	2	10	10	3	2	2	12	1	4	1
Priorities Per Document	3	11	10	10	13	14	12	12	15	4	7
Added Percent	0%	73%	0%	0%	23%	57%	17%	0%	20%	0%	43%
Dropped Percent	0%	9%	0%	0%	54%	29%	67%	0%	73%	0%	43%
Status Quo Percent	100%	18%	100%	100%	23%	14%	17%	100%	7%	100%	14%
Change Index	0%	82%	0%	0%	77%	86%	83%	0%	93%	0%	86%
											100%

Footnote : Priorities represented have been extracted from the following priority documents for each of the fiscal years: QDR, NDS, and NSS. The "added percent" row is calculated by [added divided by the total of added, dropped, and status quo] per priority document for a given fiscal year. The "dropped percent" row is calculated by [dropped divided by the total of added, dropped, and status quo] per priority document for a given fiscal year. The "status quo percent" row is calculated by [status quo divided by the total of added, dropped, and status quo] per priority document for a given fiscal year. The "change index" row is calculated by [the total of added and dropped divided by priorities per document].

Source: Pearson Education, Inc., “Composition of Congress, by Political Party, 1855–2015,” Infoplease.com, <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0774721.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 30, 2001), <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); The White House, *The National Security Strategy 2002* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2005), <http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006), <http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/nss2006.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 6, 2006), <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2008), <http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); The White House, *The National Security Strategy 2010* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2010), <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.PDF> (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX N: Continuity Index–Qualitative Analysis–Classification

Classification Groups	Ranges	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010	FY2010	
		QDR	NSS	—	—	NDS	NSS	QDR	—	NDS	—	NSS	QDR
Small	0 to 5 priorities	X		X	X				X		X		
Medium	6 to 10 priorities		X			X		X			X	X	
Large	11 to 15 priorities						X			X			

Footnote :The ranges have been developed based on the qualitative result. An "x" identifies the appropriate classification by priority document for a given fiscal year. Each of the above ranges are determined by the number of change (added and dropped) from each fiscal year. The qualitative judgement regarding the change in policy/priorities from priority document to priority is identified as small to medium. The number of small to medium results were equal and represented the vast majority of priority documents reviewed.

Source: Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 30, 2001), <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); The White House, *The National Security Strategy 2002* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2005), <http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006), <http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/nss2006.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 6, 2006), <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2008), <http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf> (accessed November 20, 2012); The White House, *The National Security Strategy 2010* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2010), <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.PDF> (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX O: Continuity Index—Qualitative Analysis Table

Congressional & DoD Composition	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010
U.S. Senate Majority	107th/Split	107th/Split	108th/Rep	108th/Rep	109th/Rep	109th/Rep	110th/Split	110th/Split	111th/Dem	111th/Dem
House of Representatives Majority	107th/Rep	107th/Rep	108th/Rep	108th/Rep	109th/Rep	109th/Rep	110th/Dem	110th/Dem	111th/Dem	111th/Dem
President	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	G. Bush	B. Obama	B. Obama	B. Obama
Secretary of Defense	D. Rumsfeld	D. Rumsfeld	D. Rumsfeld	D. Rumsfeld	D. Rumsfeld	R. Gates	R. Gates	R. Gates	R. Gates	R. Gates
Joint Chiefs of Staff	General R. Myers (U.S. Air Force)	General P. Pace (U.S. Marines)	General P. Pace (U.S. Marines)	Adm. M. Mullen (U.S. Navy)						
<i>Footnote :N/A</i>										

Source: Department of Defense (Comptroller), Secretaries of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/specials/secdef_histories/ (accessed December 5, 2012); Pearson Education, Inc., “Composition of Congress, by Political Party, 1855-2015,” Infoplease.com, <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0774721.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Pearson Education, Inc., “Past Chairman of the JCS,” Infoplease.com, 2011, <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0004630.html> (accessed December 5, 2012).

APPENDIX P: Continuity Index–Quantitative Analysis Table

	Base Funding FY 2002 - FY 2010 ¹														
	FY 2001			FY 2002			FY 2003			FY 2004			FY 2005		
	Request	Approp	Delta % ²	Request	Approp	Delta % ²	Request	Approp	Delta % ²	Request	Approp	Delta % ²	Request	Approp	Delta % ²
Title I - Military Personnel	\$28,381.0	\$28,431.4	0.18%	\$30,245.3	\$30,464.6	0.73%	\$35,620.4	\$35,344.4	-0.77%	\$37,389.0	\$37,317.4	-0.19%	\$39,409.0	\$38,947.4	-1.17%
Title II - O&M	\$23,828.0	\$24,041.0	0.89%	\$26,656.7	\$27,874.5	4.57%	\$30,641.2	\$30,244.3	-1.30%	\$31,129.0	\$31,369.4	0.77%	\$32,573.1	\$32,199.0	-1.15%
Title III - Procurement	\$14,121.0	\$11,084.0	-21.51%	\$13,633.8	\$10,642.7	-21.94%	\$17,748.0	\$12,778.1	-28.00%	\$12,591.0	\$11,680.1	-7.23%	\$13,164.0	\$12,973.3	-1.45%
Title IV - RDTE	\$5,260.4	\$6,343.0	20.58%	\$6,694.0	\$7,106.1	6.16%	\$6,919.0	\$7,670.0	10.85%	\$9,123.0	\$10,364.0	13.60%	\$10,436.0	\$10,699.0	2.52%
	FY 2006			FY 2007			FY 2008			FY 2009			FY 2010		
	Request	Approp	Delta % ²	Request	Approp	Delta % ²	Request	Approp	Delta % ²	Request	Approp	Delta % ²	Request	Approp	Delta % ²
Title I - Military Personnel	\$36,773.3	\$33,477.3	-8.96%	\$37,772.0	\$33,707.0	-10.76%	\$41,318.2	\$41,144.0	-0.42%	\$47,041.3	\$46,904.0	-0.29%	\$53,272.0	\$52,858.0	-0.78%
Title II - O&M	\$31,814.4	\$30,571.0	-3.91%	\$32,041.0	\$28,680.0	-10.49%	\$37,273.3	\$35,637.0	-4.39%	\$39,761.4	\$39,695.0	-0.17%	\$40,152.2	\$39,743.0	-1.02%
Title III - Procurement	\$13,183.4	\$11,582.2	-12.15%	\$25,770.0	\$15,413.4	-40.19%	\$35,003.0	\$22,772.2	-34.94%	\$38,966.0	\$23,977.0	-38.47%	\$31,941.0	\$19,320.2	-39.51%
Title IV - RDTE	\$9,734.0	\$11,172.4	14.78%	\$10,856.0	\$11,055.0	1.83%	\$10,590.0	\$12,127.0	14.51%	\$10,524.1	\$12,060.1	14.60%	\$10,496.2	\$11,474.2	9.32%

Footnote: ¹Funding represented in the above chart may not coincide with supporting budget documentation due to rounding. ²The methodology utilized to determine the Delta% follows: Appropriated minus the request, divided by the request.

Source: Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2001 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2000), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2001.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2002 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), August 2001), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2002.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2003 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2002), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2003.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2004 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2003), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2004.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2005 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2004), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2005.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2006 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), April 2005), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2006.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2007 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2006), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2007.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2008 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2007), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2008.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2009 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2008), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2009.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2010 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), June 2009), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2010.html> (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX Q: Continuity Index–Quantitative Analysis Table

Supplemental Funding FY 2002 - FY 2010 ¹															
	FY 2001			FY 2002			FY 2003			FY 2004			FY 2005		
	Request	Approp	Delta % ²	Request	Approp	Delta % ²	Request	Approp	Delta % ²	Request	Approp	Delta % ²	Request	Approp	Delta % ²
Supplemental Funding	\$1,943.0	\$1,229.3	-36.73%	\$654.2	\$296.4	-54.69%	\$0.0	\$24,643.0	100.00%	\$39,200.0	\$38,113.2	-2.77%	\$41,217.0	\$41,415.3	0.48%
	FY 2006			FY 2007			FY 2008			FY 2009			FY 2010		
	Request	Approp	Delta % ²	Request	Approp	Delta % ²	Request	Approp	Delta % ²	Request	Approp	Delta % ²	Request	Approp	Delta % ²
Supplemental Funding	\$35,851.0	\$35,714.0	-0.38%	\$0.0	\$7,084.0	100.00%	\$61,473.0	\$55,792.0	-9.24%	\$37,996.0	\$39,282.0	3.38%	\$72,472.0	\$68,534.0	-5.43%

Footnote: ¹Funding represented in the above chart may not coincide with supporting budget documentation due to rounding. ²The methodology utilized to determine the Delta% follows: Appropriated minus the request, divided by the request.

Source: Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2001 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2000), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2001.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2002 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), August 2001), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2002.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for the FY 2003 Budget (Green Book)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), March 2002), <http://comptroller.defense.gov/budget2003.html> (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *FY 2004 Supplemental Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Noble Eagle (One)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), September 2003), http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2005/fy2004_supp.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *FY 2005 Supplemental Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operations Unified Assistance* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), February 2005), http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2006/fy2005_supp.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *FY 2006 Supplemental Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), February 2006), http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/Docs/FY06_GWOT_Supplemental_Request_-_FINAL.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, “*FY 2008 Global War on Terrorism Request*” (Power Point Presentation February 2007), http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/Docs/FY_2008_Emergency_Supplemental_Request_detailed_funding_appendix.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, *FY 2009 Supplemental Request*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2009), http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2009/Supplemental/FY2009_Supplemental_Request/pdfs/FY_2009_Supplemental_Request_04-08-09.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012); Department of Defense, “*Budget Amendment to the FY 2010 President’s Budget Request for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)*” (Power Point Presentation, August 2009), http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2010/fy2010_oc.pdf (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX R: Department of Defense Appropriations Laws—Prepared by the Staff of the Pentagon Library

FISCAL YEAR	COMMITTEE APPROVAL			CONFERENCE REPORT	PUBLIC LAW
	HOUSE SENATE				
FY2010	H.R. 3326		S.Rpt. 111-74	Committee Print	P.L. 111-118
				Pt.1	
				Pt.2	
FY2009	H.R. 2638				P.L. 110-329
FY2008	H.Rpt. 110-279		S.Rpt. 110-155	H.Rpt. 110-434	P.L. 110-116
	H.R. 3222				
FY2007	H.Rpt. 109-504		S.Rpt. 109-292	H. Rpt. 109-676	P.L. 109-289
	H.R. 5631				
FY2006	H.Rpt. 109-119		S.Rpt. 109-141	H.Rpt. 109-359	P.L. 109-148
	(H.R. 2863)				
	H.Rpt. 109-388		S.Rpt. 109-230	H.Rpt. 109-494	P.L. 109-234
	(H.R. 4939)				
	H.Rpt. 108-553				
FY2005	(H.R. 4613)		S.Rpt. 108-284	H.Rpt. 108-622	P.L. 108-287
			(S. 2559)		
FY2004	H.Rpt. 108-187		S.Rpt. 108-87 (S. 1382)	H.Rpt. 108-283	P.L. 108-87
	(H.R. 2658)				
FY2003	H.Rpt. 107-532		S.Rpt. 107-213	H.Rpt. 107-732	P.L. 107-248
	(H.R. 5010)				
FY2002	H.Rpt. 107-298		S.Rpt. 107-109	H.Rpt. 107-350	P.L. 107-117
	(H.R. 3338)				
FY2001	H.Rpt. 106-644		S.Rpt. 106-298 (S. 2593)	H.Rpt. 106-754	P.L. 106-259
	(H.R. 4576)				

Footnote : N/A

Source: Pentagon Library Intranet, “DoD Appropriation Laws,” <http://whs.mil.campusguides.com/content.php?pid=321436&sid=2631607> (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX S: Legislative Documents—Appropriation Bills

P.L. 106-259 Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 2001
P.L. 107-20, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2001
P.L. 107-117, Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002
P.L. 107-206, 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States
P.L. 107-248, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003
P.L. 108-11, Wartime Supplemental Appropriations
P.L. 108 -87, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004
P.L. 108-106, Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2004
P.L. 108-287, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005
P.L. 109-13, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005
P.L. 109-148, Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations To Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006
P.L. 109-234, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006
P.L. 109-289, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007
P.L. 110-5, Revised Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2007
P.L. 110-116, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2008
P.L. 110-252, Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008
P.L. 111-329, Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009
P.L. 111-132, Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009
P.L. 111-118, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010
<i>Footnote : N/A</i>

Source: Library of Congress, “Thomas,” <http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php> (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX T: U.S. Troop Levels (Afghanistan and Iraq Wars)

Combined Troops Levels (Afghanistan & Iraq)		
Fiscal Year	Year & Month	Number of Troops
FY 2001	November (beginning strength)	1,300
	December (ending strength)	2,500
FY 2002	January (beginning strength)	4,067
	December (ending strength)	9,700
FY 2003	January (beginning strength)	99,600
	December (ending strength)	134,200
FY 2004	January (beginning strength)	122,500
	December (ending strength)	166,900
FY 2005	January (beginning strength)	176,200
	December (ending strength)	169,800
FY 2006	January (beginning strength)	156,700
	December (ending strength)	150,400
FY 2007	January (beginning strength)	163,000
	December (ending strength)	180,900
FY 2008	January (beginning strength)	181,500
	December (ending strength)	176,300
FY 2009	January (beginning strength)	173,900
	December (ending strength)	178,100
FY 2010	January (beginning strength)	178,800
	December (ending strength)	144,000
<i>Footnote :N/A</i>		

Source: The New York Times, “American Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan,” October 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/10/21/world/asia/american-forces-in-iraq-and-afghanistan.html?_r=0 (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX U: U.S. Troop Levels (Afghanistan War)

Afghanistan War		
Fiscal Year	Year & Month	Number of Troops
FY 2001	November (beginning strength)	1,300
	December (ending strength)	2,500
FY 2002	January (beginning strength)	4,067
	December (ending strength)	9,700
FY 2003	January (beginning strength)	9,600
	December (ending strength)	13,100
FY 2004	January (beginning strength)	13,600
	December (ending strength)	16,700
FY 2005	January (beginning strength)	17,200
	December (ending strength)	17,800
FY 2006	January (beginning strength)	19,700
	December (ending strength)	22,100
FY 2007	January (beginning strength)	26,000
	December (ending strength)	24,700
FY 2008	January (beginning strength)	27,500
	December (ending strength)	31,800
FY 2009	January (beginning strength)	34,400
	December (ending strength)	67,400
FY 2010	January (beginning strength)	71,700
	December (ending strength)	97,000
<i>Footnote :N/A</i>		

Source: The New York Times, “American Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan,” October 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/10/21/world/asia/american-forces-in-iraq-and-afghanistan.html?_r=0 (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX V: U.S. Troop Levels (Iraq Wars)

Iraq War		
Fiscal Year	Year & Month	Number of Troops
FY 2001	March (beginning strength)	—
	December (ending strength)	—
FY 2002	January (beginning strength)	—
	December (ending strength)	—
FY 2003	January (beginning strength)	90,000
	December (ending strength)	121,100
FY 2004	January (beginning strength)	108,900
	December (ending strength)	150,200
FY 2005	January (beginning strength)	159,000
	December (ending strength)	152,000
FY 2006	January (beginning strength)	137,000
	December (ending strength)	128,300
FY 2007	January (beginning strength)	137,000
	December (ending strength)	156,200
FY 2008	January (beginning strength)	154,000
	December (ending strength)	144,500
FY 2009	January (beginning strength)	139,500
	December (ending strength)	110,700
FY 2010	January (beginning strength)	107,100
	December (ending strength)	47,000
<i>Footnote :N/A</i>		

Source: The New York Times, “American Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan,” October 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/10/21/world/asia/american-forces-in-iraq-and-afghanistan.html?_r=0 (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX W: Events Timeline

Iraq War										
FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	
—	—	The start of the Iraq war.	Four Blackwater contractors are killed in Falluja.	Iraqis hold the first free and open elections.	Nuri Kamal al-Maliki is selected as the nominee for prime minister.	U.S. arms Sunni Arab groups in order to assist with efforts against the insurgents.	U.S. suffers large number of casualties.	U.S. Baghdad embassy established.	Iraqi citizens vote on new parliament.	
—	—	Saddam Hussein's rule comes to an end.	U.S. soldiers transfer a new sovereign nation over to new Iraqi leadership.	Saddam Hussein is tried for his crimes.	Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld tenders his resignation to the president.	—	U.S. transfers responsibility of Anbar Province over to the Iraqi military and host nation police.	Iraq celebrates its sovereignty and U.S. troop withdrawal.	The U.S. president declares combat operations in Iraq have now come to an end.	
—	—	Continued search for WMD.	U.S. soldiers move into Falluja to kill, capture, and/or disperse insurgent efforts.	U.S. suffers large number of casualties.	Saddam Hussein is hung in Baghdad.	—	An agreement is reached between the Iraqi and U.S. government that signifies a new relationship and U.S. troop withdrawal.	—	WikiLeaks are disseminated to unauthorized civil organizations.	
—	—	Saddam Hussein is captured by U.S. soldiers.	—	—	U.S. suffers large number of casualties.	—	—	—	—	

Source: The New York Times, “Timeline of Major Events in the Iraq War,” October 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/08/31/world/middleeast/20100831-Iraq-Timeline.html#/time111_3297 (accessed November 20, 2012).

APPENDIX X: Events Timeline

Afghanistan War									
FY 2001	FY 2002	FY 2003	FY 2004	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010
Al Qaeda carries out airliner attacks in the U.S.	Hamid Karzai is sworn in as a chairman for the Afghanistan government.	Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld end combat operations in Afghanistan.	New constitution is approved in Afghanistan.	U.S. and Afghanistan put in place a military agreement.	—	—	U.S. and NATO troops suffers large number of casualties.	(February) U.S. president authorizes surge troops to Afghanistan.	Nato-led offensive launched against insurgents in Helmand.
The U.S. president demands Afghanistan hand over terrorist responsible for the attacks or face attack itself.	Coalition forces conduct combat operations in the Paktia Province.	NATO takes over the peace-keeping mission in Afghanistan.	Hamid Karzai is elected as the first Head of Afghanistan.	Afghanistan holds first free legislative voting.	—	—	—	U.S. administration announces new strategy for the war.	General McChrystal is fired as the U.S. commander in Afghanistan.
U.S. and Britain initiate bombing campaign against Afghanistan.	Hamid Karzai is elected as the interim Head of State.	—	Bin Laden taunts U.S. administration in a televised message.	—	—	—	—	General McChrystal named U.S. commander in Afghanistan.	Afghanistan conducts parliamentary elections, which are later questioned due to coercion, ballot stuffing, etc.
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	(December) U.S. president authorizes surge troops to Afghanistan.	—

Footnote : N/A

Source: The New York Times, “Timeline: Major Events in the Afghanistan War,” October 22, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/06/22/world/asia/afghanistan-war-timeline.html> (accessed November 20, 2012).

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